Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
8,407 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,122
2,729
773
499
379
Contributors
1,502
1,474
1,085
844
510
Categories
2,695
1,319
905
813
749
Platforms
5,933
913
885
299
280
Products / Services
1,617
1,401
1,090
454
419
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
CVEs
29
27
16
16
15
IDS Classtypes
97
50
21
14
8
IDS Protocols
98
93
9
1
High-fidelity correlation of OS-DET-LNX-005 and OS-DET-LNX-006: a system shell copied to a
non-standard/writable path, followed within 15 minutes on the same host by execution of a
shell with the privilege-preserving -p flag from a non-standard path. The two events
together are a near-certain SUID-root shell misconfiguration abuse (bash -p to root) and a
lower-FP signal than either component alone. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
non-standard/writable path, followed within 15 minutes on the same host by execution of a
shell with the privilege-preserving -p flag from a non-standard path. The two events
together are a near-certain SUID-root shell misconfiguration abuse (bash -p to root) and a
lower-FP signal than either component alone. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
Detects 'unshare' creating a user/mount/net namespace by a non-root user, outside
sanctioned container and sandbox runtimes. This is the shared precursor across CIFSwitch,
OVSwrap, pedit COW and container escapes. Enriched with a namespace-flag decode, an
exploit-family ProfileHint (user+net = OVSwrap shape, user+mount = CIFSwitch/overlay
shape), sandbox-lineage FP suppression, RiskScore / TriagePriority and DeviceInfo context.
Treat as a precursor/triage signal - MDE cannot tie unshare to the subsequent root
transition (no uid_change event). Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
sanctioned container and sandbox runtimes. This is the shared precursor across CIFSwitch,
OVSwrap, pedit COW and container escapes. Enriched with a namespace-flag decode, an
exploit-family ProfileHint (user+net = OVSwrap shape, user+mount = CIFSwitch/overlay
shape), sandbox-lineage FP suppression, RiskScore / TriagePriority and DeviceInfo context.
Treat as a precursor/triage signal - MDE cannot tie unshare to the subsequent root
transition (no uid_change event). Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
Detects creation or modification of files under /etc/sudoers or /etc/sudoers.d/ by a
process outside sanctioned package- and configuration-management tooling. Writing a
passwordless sudo rule is the finishing move in CIFSwitch (CVE-2026-46243) and OVSwrap
(CVE-2026-64531) and a common root-persistence step generally. Enriched with writer
context (non-root, writable-path, shell one-liner, NOPASSWD) and a heuristic RiskScore /
TriagePriority, plus DeviceInfo host context (MachineGroup, OS, logged-on users).
Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs - Linux LPE detection framework.
process outside sanctioned package- and configuration-management tooling. Writing a
passwordless sudo rule is the finishing move in CIFSwitch (CVE-2026-46243) and OVSwrap
(CVE-2026-64531) and a common root-persistence step generally. Enriched with writer
context (non-root, writable-path, shell one-liner, NOPASSWD) and a heuristic RiskScore /
TriagePriority, plus DeviceInfo host context (MachineGroup, OS, logged-on users).
Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs - Linux LPE detection framework.
Detects modifications to IAM role trust policies (UpdateAssumeRolePolicy) or the creation of new roles (CreateRole) where the Principal is configured with a wildcard or generic open access. This configuration enables any AWS account to assume the role, representing a significant risk for privilege escalation and persistence establishment by attackers.
Detects potential Golden Ticket forgery or malicious Kerberos activity by monitoring Windows Security Event IDs 4768 (TGT) and 4769 (TGS). The rule identifies suspicious characteristics including the use of weak encryption (RC4) where AES is preferred, specific ticket option flags commonly associated with Mimikatz, and unusually long ticket lifetimes that deviate from standard domain policies.
Detects cloud service principals identified as AI agents or assistants performing sensitive API operations such as IAM policy modifications or storage configuration changes. This pattern may indicate that an AI service account has been compromised or misused to perform reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence, exceeding its intended scope of operation.
Detects the execution of Python 3.12 commands via 'sudo' to elevate privileges to 'root'. The rule monitors for instances where a non-root account invokes 'sudo python3.12' and subsequently spawns a process or logs activity confirming a root-level execution session within a short time window.
Detects non-interactive 'sudo -n' used to test for or invoke a passwordless sudo rule
(e.g. 'sudo -n true', 'sudo -n -l', 'sudo -n bash'). Directly follows the sudoers write in
the OVSwrap (CVE-2026-64531) chain and is a common post-exploit validation step.
Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs - Linux LPE detection framework.
(e.g. 'sudo -n true', 'sudo -n -l', 'sudo -n bash'). Directly follows the sudoers write in
the OVSwrap (CVE-2026-64531) chain and is a common post-exploit validation step.
Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs - Linux LPE detection framework.
Detects instances where the suspicious binary 'x47_bot.exe' performs process injection or hollows a process, followed by an attempt to gain or elevate privileges (such as via UAC bypass, token manipulation, or privilege checking) on the same host within a 15-minute window.
Detects instances where the suspicious binary 'x47_bot.exe' performs process injection or hollows a process, followed by an attempt to gain or elevate privileges (such as via UAC bypass, token manipulation, or privilege checking) on the same host within a 15-minute window.
Detects the creation of GCP compute instances that are attached to service accounts with broad 'cloud-platform' scope permissions. This activity is monitored to ensure that only authorized automation service accounts (e.g., IaC pipelines) are performing these actions, as creating instances with highly privileged service accounts can be a technique used to escalate privileges or establish persistence.
Detects 'Add member to role' operations in Entra ID where high-privileged directory roles are assigned to a user or service principal. This pattern is often a critical indicator of privilege escalation in account compromise scenarios where an attacker attempts to elevate their own or a secondary account's permissions within the tenant.
Detects the creation of an AWS Lambda function that is assigned an excessively privileged execution role (e.g., AdministratorAccess). Attackers often leverage this technique to establish persistence or facilitate privilege escalation by creating backdoored functions that run with broad administrative permissions.
Detects anomalous process execution originating from a Python-based sandbox (such as Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin in Azure Container Apps) that attempts to break out of the container isolation. The rule monitors for command-line arguments involving interaction with the Docker socket, sensitive host namespaces, or container privilege escalation techniques, indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-25592.
Detects cloud service principals identified as AI agents or assistants performing sensitive API operations such as IAM policy modifications or storage configuration changes. This pattern may indicate that an AI service account has been compromised or misused to perform reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence, exceeding its intended scope of operation.
Detects the assignment of SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege to a non-SYSTEM account, followed by the execution of a new process from common service parents (spoolsv.exe, w3wp.exe, dllhost.exe) within the same logon session. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts using local potato-style exploits (e.g., PrintSpoofer, JuicyPotato) that leverage service tokens for impersonation.
Detects Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) activations for high-privileged roles (e.g., Global Administrator) that occur outside of defined business hours or are performed without an associated justification or ticket number. This helps identify potentially unauthorized or abnormal use of elevated privileges.
Detects the assignment of high-privileged Entra ID roles to a user account shortly after that same account underwent a password reset or MFA method change initiated by a helpdesk-privileged account. This detection pattern is specifically designed to identify Scattered Spider (UNC3944) tactics where social engineering is used to manipulate helpdesk processes to compromise identities and escalate privileges.
Detects the execution of known privilege escalation tools and the use of specific Windows privilege keywords (such as SeImpersonatePrivilege) often associated with access token manipulation and token impersonation attacks to elevate privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects when highly privileged roles (e.g., Global Administrator) are assigned to users in Entra ID, specifically flagging instances where the actor assigns the role to themselves (self-elevation) or where the target account was created within the last 7 days. This behavior deviates from standard administrative workflows and is a strong indicator of potential account compromise or malicious privilege escalation.
Detects the assignment of special, highly privileged rights (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege) to standard user accounts using Windows Security Event ID 4672. This activity, without an associated new logon event, is a common indicator of access token manipulation or impersonation techniques (such as those used by tools like Incognito) to gain elevated system privileges.
Page 13 of 401