Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to the Windows Registry where the 'EnableLUA' value is set to 0, which effectively disables User Account Control (UAC). This action is often performed by attackers to evade security prompts and maintain higher integrity levels during execution.
Detects the presence of the PoisonX malicious kernel driver (g11.sys), which is used by the Hyadina group in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software and disable user-mode API hooks.
Detects a process that simultaneously loads 'RstrtMgr.dll' and modifies the 'WaitToKillServiceTimeout' registry value within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to force system service restarts or accelerate service termination, often seen as part of persistence mechanisms or defensive impairment.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via PowerShell using 'Register-ScheduledTask' configured to run as the SYSTEM account at system startup. The detection specifically identifies tasks with dynamically generated hexadecimal names (8-20 characters), a technique associated with the persistence mechanism of Banana RAT.
Correlates multiple suspicious behavioral patterns characteristic of the 'ClickFix' attack chain. The rule detects techniques such as PowerShell execution via RunMRU or Windows Terminal, CAPTCHA-lure download cradles, hidden-window PowerShell execution, fileless AES/TripleDES runspace payloads, COM hijacking, and suspicious LOLBin usage. The detection logic uses a 1-hour sliding window to aggregate these patterns on a per-device basis, assigning a higher confidence score as more stages of the attack chain are observed.
This rule detects the silent installation of AnyDesk with persistence enabled via the '--start-with-win' flag. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access tool deployment, often used for establishing persistent command and control.
Correlates a Microsoft 365 OAuth device-code authentication event with subsequent impact actions on the same identity (device registration/PRT setup, inbox rule creation, or PRT/sign-in activity after a password reset) within a 1-hour window. Severity escalates as more distinct impact phases co-occur on the same actor, consistent with ARToken/EvilTokens post-device-code-phishing persistence chains.
Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs usually located in system locations (System32, SysWOW64, etc.).
This rule detects the use of database-related processes (mysql) or scripts (python) interacting with MySQL User-Defined Function (UDF) mechanisms. Attackers often abuse UDFs to execute arbitrary commands, load external libraries, or facilitate lateral movement/privilege escalation within a database environment.
Identifies Linux systems acting as KVM hypervisors that are running kernels vulnerable to CVE-2026-53359 (Januscape), a use-after-free vulnerability in the shadow MMU (arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c). This vulnerability permits a guest virtual machine to escape into the underlying host environment, potentially compromising the hypervisor and other hosted workloads.
Detects an authentication event using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code grant flow, immediately followed by rapid access to multiple high-value cloud resources. This pattern is characteristic of consent phishing or device code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a malicious application, subsequently using that application's access token to programmatically enumerate or exfiltrate data from various services.
Detects unauthorized attempts to modify or interact with the macOS Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) database. This includes direct file system modifications by non-system processes, sqlite-based manipulation of the TCC database, or the usage of 'tccutil' to reset permissions. These behaviors are often indicative of malware attempting to silently elevate privileges or grant itself Full Disk Access to sensitive user data.
This rule detects successful sign-in events originating from IP addresses that have previously demonstrated a password-spraying pattern (multiple failed sign-ins across distinct accounts within a two-hour window). To reduce noise, it excludes successful logins originating from 'known' Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) where at least 10 distinct users have historically authenticated successfully. The detection further filters for sessions lacking managed device identifiers and allows for manual exclusion of specific applications, IP addresses, or geographic locations.
Detects modifications to Google Cloud IAM policies where permissions are granted that allow service account impersonation or key management (e.g., serviceAccountTokenCreator, serviceAccountKeyAdmin, workloadIdentityUser, serviceAccountUser). These roles are frequently abused by attackers to gain durable, persistent access or escalate privileges by generating tokens as highly-privileged service accounts without requiring an existing service account key.
Detects the creation or starting of an AnyDesk service using command-line arguments to specify custom configuration directories or service names. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or ensure remote access tools are configured with specific, potentially silent or pre-defined, settings.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the command line includes a specific security descriptor string '(A;;GA;;;WD)' indicating full access (GA) is granted to everyone (WD). This is a known technique used to ensure the created task has broad permissions for persistence or privilege escalation, often associated with bypassing security controls.
Detects Entra ID users with active medium-to-high identity risk events who perform Microsoft Copilot actions in cloud applications while simultaneously exhibiting impossible travel indicators — successful sign-ins from multiple geographic locations using unmanaged (non-registered) devices within a one-hour window. This triple-signal correlation (identity risk + impossible travel on unmanaged device + Copilot usage) is a strong indicator of account compromise where an adversary has taken over a legitimate identity and is leveraging AI-powered tools to accelerate reconnaissance, data access, or exfiltration against Microsoft 365 resources.
Rule for T1548.002 technique "Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)"
Detects the installation and service creation of the Nezha agent, a monitoring tool often abused by threat actors to establish persistent backdoors on compromised systems.
Detects the loading of 'abe_decrypt.dll' into Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser processes. This behavior is highly irregular and often associated with browser-based malware, credential theft, or injection attempts to intercept browser data.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that involves the string 'CrysomeLoader' in the command line, which is indicative of persistence or execution mechanisms associated with the CrysomeLoader malware.
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