Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of tools designed for Parent Process ID (PPID) spoofing, specifically targeting Didier Stevens' 'SelectMyParent' tool. It identifies these tools through their executable name, specific command-line arguments, original file names, and known IMPHASH values. PPID spoofing is a defense evasion technique where a new process is created with a manipulated parent process ID to obscure its true origin, often to bypass security monitoring or elevate privileges.
Detects modifications to critical Unix shell configuration files. Adversaries may modify these files to establish persistence or elevate privileges by executing malicious commands when a new shell is opened or a user logs in.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a specific registry run key used by the Leviathan APT group for persistence. The key path observed is '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ntkd'. This indicates that a program named 'ntkd' is configured to execute automatically when a user logs in, a common technique for maintaining access to a compromised system.
Detects potential suspicious behavior using secedit.exe, specifically when it is used to export or configure security policies. This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover system configurations or modify them for persistence, defense evasion, or privilege escalation.
Detects successful sign-ins by privileged role accounts that occur outside of normal business hours or from unusual geographic locations. This rule is designed to flag potentially suspicious activity that could indicate compromised credentials or insider threat activity, especially for administrative accounts.
Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that is located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory. The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application has the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object. Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determine if it is malicious.
Identifies when a user grants permissions to another user on Azure resources. The rule specifically looks for the 'Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write' operation in Azure Activity Logs, which indicates a role assignment creation or modification. This can be an indicator of privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. This can be used by adversaries for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.
Detects the installation of a Windows service by the Sliver C2 framework. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 7045 from the Service Control Manager, indicating a service installation, combined with an ImagePath characteristic of Sliver (an executable in the Windows temporary directory with a 10-character alphanumeric name) or a ServiceName explicitly identifying as 'Sliver' or 'Sliver implant'. This behavior is often observed when Sliver implants use tools like PsExec to establish persistence.
Detects the modification of specific CLSID registry keys related to the .NET NGEN scheduled task. This Component Object Model (COM) hijacking technique is used by the threat actor 'Curly COMrades' to establish persistence for their 'MucorAgent' backdoor.
Detects various activities associated with the 'Operation Wocao' campaign, including the use of 'checkadmin.exe', 'netsh' commands to modify firewall rules, PowerShell execution with bypass and encoded commands, scheduled task creation, and attempts to query KeePass configuration files and PuTTY sessions from the registry. These activities indicate potential privilege escalation, persistence, discovery, and defense evasion techniques used by the threat actor.
Detects the execution of GuLoader malware where a rundll32.exe process is spawned by an injected browser process (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, or msedge.exe). This behavior indicates potential malware activity, specifically GuLoader initiating network connections.
This rule detects when a user's account type is changed from 'Guest' to 'Member' within Azure Active Directory. This change signifies an elevation of privileges for the user, as 'Member' accounts typically have broader access and capabilities compared to 'Guest' accounts. Such a modification could be an indicator of an adversary attempting to gain higher privileges or establish persistence within the cloud environment.
Detects when a Privileged Identity Management (PIM) elevation request is approved or denied within Azure AD. This rule helps monitor critical administrative actions related to privilege escalation. Any approvals or denials outside of expected administrative operations should be investigated as they could indicate unauthorized privilege management or attempts to bypass security controls.
This rule detects successful sign-in attempts to Azure AD from devices that are not registered in Active Directory (non-compliant devices) and where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not required. The sign-in is also flagged as 'atRisk' by Azure AD. This scenario can indicate an adversary attempting to gain initial access or maintain persistence using compromised credentials from an unregistered device, bypassing stronger authentication controls.
Detects a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account. This may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from a domain joined limited user to local System privileges.
This rule detects when a ClickOnce application loads an unsigned or expired-signature module. ClickOnce applications are typically found in the `\AppData\Local\Apps\2.0\` directory. The detection specifically looks for image load events where the image path matches this ClickOnce application directory pattern and the loaded module's signature status is either 'false' (unsigned) or 'Expired'. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary abusing ClickOnce for trusted code execution, potentially for privilege escalation, defense evasion, or persistence, by injecting or replacing modules with malicious unsigned ones.
Detects the addition of a new LogonScript to the registry value "UserInitMprLogonScript" via command line, which can be used for persistence.
Detects the installation of new shim databases that attempt to patch sections of known processes for potential process injection or persistence. This rule specifically looks for modifications to the AppCompatFlags\Custom registry key where shims are typically registered, targeting common system processes.
Detects potential Ryuk ransomware activity by looking for specific command-line patterns. This includes attempts to establish persistence via the Run registry key, deletion of backup files, and stopping critical services using 'net stop' commands.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms used by the Kapeka backdoor. It specifically looks for the creation of a scheduled task named "Sens Api" (or "OneDrive" in some cases) via `schtasks.exe` set to run on system startup, or the addition of an autorun registry entry named "Sens Api" under `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` via `reg.exe`. Both persistence methods are identified by their command lines calling `rundll32` with a `.wll` file and the export ordinal `#1`.
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