Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of the `mknod` syscall to create special files (e.g., character or block devices) on Linux systems. This syscall is rarely used by legitimate applications and can be abused by attackers or malware to create fake devices, interact with kernel interfaces, establish covert channels, bypass file system restrictions, or create backdoors.
This rule detects the installation of a new service that exhibits characteristics commonly associated with the Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike 'getsystem' command. Specifically, it looks for Event ID 4697 (A service was installed in the system) and then analyzes the 'ServiceFileName' for patterns indicative of these tools. It identifies two main techniques: one involving 'cmd.exe' or '%COMSPEC%' echoing data to a named pipe (e.g., `echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a`), and another involving 'rundll32.exe' loading a DLL with specific arguments (e.g., `rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn`). Additionally, it flags service installations where the 'ServiceFileName' starts with a specific network share path (`\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\`). These methods are typically used by adversaries to escalate privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects attempts to create a DLL file in known desktop application dependencies folders (e.g., Slack, Teams, OneDrive) by an unusual process. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.
Detects the installation of a service named "javamtsup" on the system. The CosmicDuke info stealer uses Windows services typically named "javamtsup" for persistence.
Detects the execution of an executable that is typically used by PlugX for DLL side loading starting from an uncommon location
Detects the use of the Pingback backdoor, which establishes an ICMP tunnel for command and control (C2) communications. The rule specifically looks for the creation of a process where the parent image ends with 'updata.exe' and the command line contains 'config', 'msdtc', 'start', and 'auto'. This combination of parent process and command-line arguments is indicative of the Pingback backdoor's activity as described in the Trustwave report.
Detects various suspicious activities associated with the HAFNIUM threat group targeting Microsoft Exchange servers. This includes attempts to hide files using `attrib`, scheduled task creation for persistence, execution of an unusual Opera browser, shadow copy enumeration, and data staging/exfiltration using `makecab`, `7zip`, and `rundll32` for minidump creation.
Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME
Detects remote RPC calls to the ITaskSchedulerService interface, specifically focusing on operations that create or execute scheduled tasks. This behavior is commonly associated with lateral movement and persistence techniques. The rule leverages an RPC Firewall to monitor these specific RPC calls.
Detects when a user account is created and subsequently deleted within a short period. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to establish temporary persistence, perform actions, and then remove traces of their activity to evade detection. It could also be related to privilege escalation attempts where an account is created for a specific task and then removed.
This rule detects when a user is added to a group that has permissions to modify Conditional Access (CA) policies within Azure Active Directory. Such an action could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, bypass existing security controls, or establish persistence by altering authentication processes.
Detects when failed sign-in attempts increase by 10% or greater within Azure AD. This could indicate brute-force attacks, password spraying, or attempts to gain unauthorized access to accounts.
Detects when successful authentications to important applications occur using only single-factor authentication. This could indicate a weakened security posture for critical resources or a bypass of expected multi-factor authentication policies.
Detects the creation of files named "ebpfbackdoor" within the "cron.d" and "sudoers.d" directories. This activity is associated with the TripleCross eBPF rootkit, which uses these locations for persistence.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the client process or its parent process has a Process ID (PID) of 0. A PID of 0 typically indicates the System Idle Process, which should not be initiating service installations. This behavior can be indicative of highly privileged malware or rootkits attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges by creating services in an unusual context.
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking Microsoft Defender's processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from loading unsigned DLLs. This activity may indicate an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLLs into legitimate Microsoft Defender processes, potentially for privilege escalation, persistence, or defense evasion.
Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook, specifically 'VbaProject.OTM', which can be used for persistence or to execute malicious code when Outlook is launched.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects activity associated with the OilRig APT group, as detailed in Nyotron's March 2018 report. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a scheduled task named 'SC Scheduled Scan' that executes 'autoit3.exe' from a specific path, execution of executables within a '
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Detects post-exploitation execution technique of the Serpent backdoor. This involves creating a temporary scheduled task using an unusual method: creating a fictitious Windows event and a trigger that executes a payload once the event is created. The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of this behavior when executed by cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Detects remote thread creation in command shell applications, such as "Cmd.EXE" and "PowerShell.EXE". This is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes.
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