Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the addition of new InProcServer32 registry keys on Windows endpoints. Malware often uses this mechanism to achieve persistence or execute malicious code by registering a new InProcServer32 key pointing to a harmful DLL. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment or execute arbitrary code, posing a significant threat to system integrity and security.
The following analytic detects the execution of an arbitrary DLL by the Windows Remote Auto Dialer (rasautou.exe). This behavior is identified by analyzing process creation events where rasautou.exe is executed with specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it leverages a Living Off The Land Binary (LOLBin) to execute potentially malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.
This analytic identifies processes launching netsh.exe, a command-line utility used to modify network configurations. It detects this activity by analyzing data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant because netsh.exe can be exploited to execute malicious helper DLLs, serving as a persistence mechanism. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistent access, modify network settings, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the network's integrity and security.
This analytic detects the creation or connection to a named pipe associated with Trickbot malware. It specifically looks for Sysmon EventCodes 17 (Pipe Created) and 18 (Pipe Connected) where the PipeName matches the pattern "\\pipe\\*lacesomepipe". This activity is significant because Trickbot uses named pipes for inter-process communication, often for C2 communication, data exfiltration, and command execution. Detecting this behavior can help identify Trickbot infections, which could lead to persistence, arbitrary command execution, and sensitive information exfiltration.
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
Detects the presence of "UWhRC....AAYBAAAA" pattern in command line.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like in CVE-2025-33073.
If you see this pattern in the command line, it is likely an attempt to add spoofed Service Principal Names (SPNs) to DNS records,
or checking for the presence of such records through the `nslookup` command.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like in CVE-2025-33073.
If you see this pattern in the command line, it is likely an attempt to add spoofed Service Principal Names (SPNs) to DNS records,
or checking for the presence of such records through the `nslookup` command.
Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious, publicly writable locations. This activity could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking, abusing the BDEUILauncher Class to execute code in the logged-on user's session without credential theft.
The analytic detects instances of `searchprotocolhost.exe` running without command line arguments but with an active network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network traffic data. It is significant because `searchprotocolhost.exe` typically runs with specific command line arguments, and deviations from this norm can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish network connections for command and control, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects instances of searchprotocolhost.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior is unusual and often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution data. This activity is significant because searchprotocolhost.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its absence may indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potential credential dumping, or other malicious actions within the environment.
This rule detects the creation of remote threads by a specific list of uncommon processes. These processes are often legitimate Windows executables or common applications that are not typically expected to create remote threads in other processes. Such activity can be indicative of process injection techniques used by adversaries for defense evasion or privilege escalation. The rule includes filters to reduce false positives from known legitimate remote thread creations by some of these processes.
Detects the execution of executables with specific names ("WinHealth.exe", "WindowsSecurity.exe") known to be dropped by the SonicCrypt crypter. The execution is often initiated by the Task Scheduler, resulting in a parent process of 'taskhostw.exe'.
Detects a two-stage behavior characteristic of the SonicCrypt crypter: 1) A process creates a suspicious executable in a Windows system directory. 2) The newly created executable is then launched by the Windows Task Scheduler.
The following analytic detects process injection into Notepad.exe using Sysmon EventCode 10. It identifies suspicious GrantedAccess requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to Notepad.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files. This behavior is often associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code within Notepad.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.
Detects M365 Copilot users accessing from multiple geographic locations to identify potential account compromise, credential sharing, or impossible travel patterns. The detection aggregates M365 Copilot Graph API events per user, calculating distinct cities and countries accessed, unique IP addresses, and the observation timeframe to compute a locations-per-day metric that measures geographic mobility. Users accessing Copilot from more than one city (cities_count > 1) are flagged and sorted by country and city diversity, surfacing accounts exhibiting anomalous geographic patterns that suggest compromised credentials being used from distributed locations or simultaneous access from impossible travel distances.
Detects M365 Copilot users exhibiting suspicious application usage patterns including multi-location access, abnormally high activity volumes, or access to multiple Copilot applications that may indicate account compromise or automated abuse. The detection aggregates M365 Copilot Graph API events per user, calculating metrics like distinct cities/countries accessed, unique IP addresses, number of different Copilot apps used, and average events per day over the observation period. Users are flagged when they access Copilot from multiple cities (cities_count > 1), generate excessive daily activity (events_per_day > 100), or use more than two different Copilot applications (app_count > 2), which are anomalous patterns suggesting credential compromise or bot-driven abuse.
Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) spawning suspicious child processes. This activity is uncommon for baaupdate.exe and could indicate an attempt at lateral movement or defense evasion, potentially via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking, by using baaupdate.exe as a proxy for executing other system utilities.
Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
This analytic detects process injection into commonly abused Windows executables using Sysmon EventCode 10. It identifies suspicious GrantedAccess requests (0x40, 0x1fffff, or 0x1f3fff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe, calc.exe, mspaint.exe, lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and web browsers, while excluding injections originating from common system paths like System32 and Program Files. This behavior is often associated with the SliverC2 framework. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.
The analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks that execute commands using native Windows shells (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript) or from public folders (Users, Temp, ProgramData). This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
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