Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Detects unauthorized execution of wermgr.exe from suspicious paths or spawned by Task Scheduler service (svchost.exe/taskeng.exe) with non-standard parent processes. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where an unprivileged process leverages the Windows Error Reporting (WER) QueueReporting scheduled task to execute a malicious payload in the context of the SYSTEM account.
Detects anomalous instances of conhost.exe running with SYSTEM integrity within an interactive user logon session. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking techniques, such as those leveraging named pipes or LaunchConsoleInSessionId, used to force console hosts into user-controlled sessions to potentially capture input or manipulate processes.
This rule detects the creation of or connection to a specific named pipe '\RoguePlanet' using Windows Sysmon events 17 (Pipe Created) and 18 (Pipe Connected). It further highlights events where the integrity level of the process interacting with the pipe is 'low' or 'medium', which may indicate potential inter-process communication (IPC) abuse, process injection, or malicious persistence mechanisms often used by attackers to mask execution or communicate between processes.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web App (OWA) by monitoring for a high volume of 401 Unauthorized status codes from non-internal IP addresses. It also correlates these authentication events with subsequent post-authentication actions, specifically identifying mailbox logins followed by mailbox searching or export requests, which may indicate account compromise and unauthorized data collection or exfiltration.
Detects creation of Intune device management scripts, a potential privilege abuse vector.
Detects when a single user principal name (UPN) performs two or more Azure AD admin role assignments within an hour. This could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or establish persistence by assigning administrative roles to multiple accounts or to the same account multiple times.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'RageService' using the sc.exe utility, potentially involving associated binary names like 'RageCore_' or 'win_guard_'. This activity is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by malware or unauthorized tools.
Detects modifications to the AppInit_DLLs or LoadAppInit_DLLs registry values. These values are used to force the loading of specified DLLs into every process that loads user32.dll, a technique used by adversaries for persistence and code injection.
Detects modifications to the 'BootExecute' registry value within the 'Session Manager' key. The 'BootExecute' value, typically set to 'autocheck autochk *', controls programs that execute automatically during the Windows boot process. Adversaries can add arbitrary executables or scripts to this multi-string value to achieve persistence and gain code execution before user logon.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry 'Winlogon\Userinit' key where the value contains double commas. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to append a malicious executable or script path to the legitimate 'userinit.exe' process, causing the malicious code to execute during every system startup or user logon.
Rule for T1548.002 technique "Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)"
Detects execution patterns associated with the DragonReturn loader, which implements a timing delay loop using GetTickCount64 before executing secondary actions, such as deploying a Windows service via sc.exe.
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
This rule monitors for the installation or loading of a specific driver file, 'pcdhost.sys', through file creation, registry modifications for services, or image loads. It then correlates this activity with subsequent rapid process termination events on the same host, flagging cases where five or more processes are terminated within a 5-minute window following the driver activity.
This rule monitors for indicators of process hollowing or memory injection targeting ServiceModelReg.exe. It correlates suspicious events including the creation of suspended processes, memory writes, remote thread creation, specific debug strings (e.g., RUNPE, PEB patched), and outbound network connections. This approach aims to reduce noise from legitimate use of ServiceModelReg.exe by requiring multiple indicators of malicious behavior.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the service executable is located outside of standard system directories (e.g., C:\Windows\ or C:\Program Files\), which is followed by outbound network communication to known SnappyClient C2 ports 3333 or 3334.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface CLSID. This registry-based activity is indicative of a UAC bypass technique, where malicious actors, such as the ResiLoader threat, gain elevated privileges without triggering a standard UAC consent prompt.
Detects indicators of a malicious driver or associated activity named 'pcdhost.sys'. The rule monitors for the installation of this driver via 'sc.exe', registry modifications related to this filename, the creation of this file on disk, and specific suspicious process command-line artifacts ('AtLorenBase', 'MANPO: ReadModule', 'PERS: FAIL', 'RUNPE:', 'POST: hollow=') typically associated with malware or offensive toolkits.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task, either via schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698, where the task content points to a suspicious, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData). It correlates this activity with the presence of known Loader/Stealer process indicators (HijackLoader/Vidar) occurring within a 15-minute window on the same host, indicating likely persistence establishment by malicious software.
Detects the use of the 'docker cp' command with suspicious path traversal characters or known PoC artifacts in the destination parameter. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to exploit path traversal vulnerabilities in the Docker daemon (such as those allowing container escape) by writing files outside the container's intended scope onto the host filesystem.
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