Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Addition of domains is seldom and should be verified for legitimacy.
Detects potential attempts made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password.
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers.
Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers.
Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.
The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA.
Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
Detects a ProcessHacker tool that elevated privileges to a very high level
Detects known malicious service installation that appear in cases in which a Sliver implants execute the PsExec commands
Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the Program being run is located in a suspicious location or it's an unusale program to be run from a Scheduled Task
Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the program being run is located in a suspicious location or where it is an unusual program to be run from a Scheduled Task
Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.
Detects driver load of the Process Hacker tool
Detects driver load of the System Informer tool
Detects the load of known vulnerable drivers via the file name of the drivers.
Detects the load of a signed WinRing0 driver often used by threat actors, crypto miners (XMRIG) or malware for privilege escalation
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity.
Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension
Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references.
Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
Detects msdt.exe creating files in suspicious directories which could be a sign of exploitation of either Follina or Dogwalk vulnerabilities
Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
Detects PowerShell writing startup shortcuts.
This procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We frequently observe adversaries using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish persistence.
Accordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence mechanisms in multiple threats.
In the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation of a malicious DLL"
This procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We frequently observe adversaries using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish persistence.
Accordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence mechanisms in multiple threats.
In the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation of a malicious DLL"
Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut.
If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder.
Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.
If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder.
Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
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