Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of specific files identified as indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by UNC4841 in their exploitation of Barracuda ESG appliances. These files are associated with various stages of the attack, including persistence, execution, and defense evasion.
This KQL query analyzes Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) sign-in and audit logs to identify potentially risky multi-factor authentication (MFA) registration events. It works by checking for MFA registrations initiated from a new, previously unseen IP address.
The query joins historical sign-in data with recent MFA-related events. It calculates how many unique days an IP address has been used by a specific user over the last 30 days. It then flags any MFA registration event from the last 24 hours where the IP address is a new IP (seen zero days before). The final results are filtered to exclude events from new user accounts (created in the last 60 days) to focus on more established accounts.
The query joins historical sign-in data with recent MFA-related events. It calculates how many unique days an IP address has been used by a specific user over the last 30 days. It then flags any MFA registration event from the last 24 hours where the IP address is a new IP (seen zero days before). The final results are filtered to exclude events from new user accounts (created in the last 60 days) to focus on more established accounts.
This rule detects instances where 'WerFaultSecure.exe' is launched by an unusual parent process. 'WerFaultSecure.exe' is a legitimate Windows error reporting tool, but its execution by non-standard parent processes can indicate malicious activity, such as process injection, credential dumping, or defense evasion. The rule assigns a suspicion score based on the parent process and command-line parameters, filtering for medium to critical risk levels. It also extracts the target PID and identifies suspicious parameters or dump types.
Detects attempts to suspend or terminate Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent processes by targeting their Process IDs (PIDs). The rule identifies suspicious command-line arguments and tools (e.g., procdump, WerFault) used to interact with processes, specifically looking for these actions against a predefined list of common EDR agent executable names. It correlates process creation events with process ID resolution to identify the targeted EDR agent.
The attack uses WerFaultSecure.exe (Windows Error Reporting component) running with PPL (Protected Process Light) protection at the WinTCB level to call MiniDumpWriteDump on any process, bypassing PPL.
It leverages the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag during process creation and uses OpenProcess with PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME to suspend/resume PPL processes.
It leverages the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag during process creation and uses OpenProcess with PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME to suspend/resume PPL processes.
Detects when a legitimate Windows binary, MSBuild.exe or mtstocom.exe, initiates an outbound network connection. This behavior is not typical for these processes and is a technique used by malware like DarkCloud to evade defenses by process hollowing.
Detects the modification of the 'UserInitMprLogonScript' registry key to execute a PowerShell script with a hidden window. This persistence technique was used by the COLDRIVER APT group.
Detects the YiBackdoor persistence technique where a DLL is written to disk and subsequently configured to be executed by regsvr32.exe via a registry Run key.
Detects modification of shell profile files (.zshrc, .bash_profile, .profile) by processes named 'applet' or 'qtop'. This is a fallback persistence mechanism used by the ChillyHell malware.
Detects the execution of CoercedPotato, a tool used for privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for the executable name 'CoercedPotato.exe', the command-line argument '--exploitId', or specific import hashes (IMPHASH) associated with the tool. This tool leverages vulnerabilities to achieve higher privileges on a system.
Detects the creation of Windows services used by the Silver Fox APT group to establish persistence for their loader and vulnerable driver. This activity is part of a campaign to deploy the ValleyRAT backdoor.
Detects loaders associated with RainyDay, Turian, and a new PlugX variant, used by threat actors like Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy. The rule identifies the shared unpacking routine which uses a combination of RC4 decryption and LZNT1 decompression (via RtlDecompressBuffer), along with specific RC4 keys, PDB paths, and hardcoded payload filenames.
Detects potential abuse of Microsoft Actor tokens for cross-tenant impersonation attacks targeting Entra ID tenants. This rule identifies suspicious audit log entries that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-55241, a critical vulnerability in Azure AD Graph API that allowed attackers to impersonate any user across Entra ID tenants using malicious Actor tokens.
Detects the multi-stage DLL sideloading technique used by the Nimbus Manticore APT group. This rule identifies when the legitimate Windows Defender component 'SenseSampleUploader.exe' loads 'xmllite.dll' from a non-standard directory, a behavior indicative of the group's novel DLL path hijacking method.
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code
Detects creation of a new service (kernel driver) with the type "kernel"
This rule detects various artifacts and behaviors associated with the DeedRAT malware, also known as MicRun or SBAMRES. It identifies the execution of 'MicRun.exe', suspicious file paths like 'C:\ProgramData\MicroDefaults', and registry persistence via 'Run' keys with specific data patterns. The rule also looks for the creation of malicious services using 'sc create MicRun', known malicious SHA256 hashes for both processes and files, and suspicious filenames such as 'SBAMRES.DLL' and 'MicRun.exe'. Additionally, it detects network communication to a known DeedRAT C2 domain, 'luckybear669.kozow.com'.
This rule hunts for various artifacts and behaviors associated with the APT28 campaign "Phantom Net Voxel", which leverages COM hijacking, steganography, and cloud services for C2. This version is specifically tailored for Azure Sentinel using only DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents. It detects known malicious file hashes, regsvr32 execution of a specific DLL, Office applications dropping malicious DLLs or steganographic PNGs, C2 communications to known cloud storage domains, creation of SlimAgent log files, and explorer.exe accessing steganographic PNG files indicating successful COM hijacking.
The analytic detects the loading of new Kernel Mode Drivers from non-standard paths using Windows EventCode 7045. It identifies drivers not located in typical directories like Windows, Program Files, or SystemRoot. This activity is significant because adversaries may use these non-standard paths to load malicious or vulnerable drivers, potentially bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code at the kernel level, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
This rule detects scheduled tasks that execute unsigned binaries. It specifically looks for processes initiated by 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule', which is indicative of a scheduled task, and then filters for binaries that are not signed and have low global prevalence. This can help identify malicious code executed via scheduled tasks that attempts to evade detection by using unsigned executables.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task designed to run with SYSTEM privileges and terminate common AV/EDR processes. This technique is used by kkRAT for persistence and defense evasion.
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