Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects scenarios where an attacker manipulate a computer object and updates its attribute 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity' to enable a resource to impersonate and authenticate any domain user.
Detects a transition from a Refresh Token (RT) to a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for the same user and device within a 24-hour window. This sequence is a strong indicator of an adversary completing a device registration flow (e.g., using ROADtx) and escalating to persistent access with a PRT, which can bypass MFA and conditional access policies. The rule specifically looks for an initial RT authentication via the Microsoft Authentication Broker, followed by PRT usage for resources other than the Device Registration Service.
Detects the creation of a new service using the "sc.exe" utility.
Detects the reconfiguration of a virtual machine where a virtual disk (.vmdk) from a different, often critical, VM is attached. This is a key tactic used by threat actors like UNC3944 to perform offline credential theft by mounting a Domain Controller's disk to a staging VM to access the NTDS.dit file.
Detects the loading of `libcef.dll` by `vcpktsvr.exe` from non-standard directories. This specific DLL Sideloading behavior is a key tactic of the malware associated with the Termncolor/Colorinal malicious Python packages, where a legitimate executable is dropped into an unusual location to load a malicious DLL.
Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to create a service for persistence.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of privilege escalation via TrustedInstaller token manipulation, a technique used by MostereRAT. The rule looks for a process starting the 'TrustedInstaller' service and then immediately launching a new process as the SYSTEM user.
Detects a high frequency of UAC consent prompts (consent.exe) originating from a single parent process, followed by the launch of a common Living Off The Land Binary (LOLBAS). This pattern is indicative of 'UAC Prompt Bombing' used to coerce a user into granting elevated privileges, as seen with the NightshadeC2 loader.
Detects a user initiating an OAuth flow with the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) client to the Device Registration Service (DRS) from multiple IP addresses within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using a phished authorization code to begin the process of registering a malicious device in the target tenant, a key step for establishing persistence. The rule specifically looks for sessions that involve at least one browser-based request, which is common in the initial phishing stage.
Identifies Entra ID sign-in events where a user authenticates using a refresh token issued to the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) client, targeting the Device Registration Service (DRS) with the "adrs_access" OAuth scope. This pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary using a stolen refresh token to initiate a malicious device registration flow, often with tools like ROADtx, as a step towards establishing persistence.
Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to spoof the SAM account name of a a domain controller in order to impersonate it. Vulnerability comes from that computer accounts should have a trailing $ in their name (i.e. sAMAccountName attribute) but no validation process existed until the patch was released. During the offensive phase, attacker will create and rename the sAMAccountName of a computer account to look like the one of a domain controller. Once the attack is done, attacker will rollback the sAMAccountName to its original name.
Detects the creation of files in a deceptive directory 'C:\Windows \System32\' (with a space after 'Windows'). This technique is used by a Zephyr/XMRig cryptomining campaign to stage files for DLL search order hijacking of 'printui.exe'.
Detects scenarios where a new member is added to a sensitive group related to Exchange server
The analytic detects the creation or update of a new Azure Automation Runbook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when this operation occurs. This activity is significant because adversaries with privileged access can use Runbooks to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions such as creating Global Administrators, executing code on VMs, and compromising the entire Azure environment.
Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
Detects scenarios where attack attempts to elevate privileges via the command runas.
Detects scenarios where an federated trust is added by an attacker.
Detects scenarios where a new member is added to a sensitive administration group related to OCS/Lync/Skype for Business in order to scan topology, infiltrate servers and move laterally.
Detects scenarios where an attacker abuse the SeMachineAccountPrivilege which allows per default any authenticated user to join a computer to the domain. Later on, this computer account can be manipulated in order to elevate privileges.
Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies host delegation settings for privilege escalation.
Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a computer account with privileges for later exploitation.
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