Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule identifies accounts that have been assigned administrative roles within the environment. It helps assess exposure risk by focusing on identities with elevated permissions, supports attack surface reduction by auditing role assignments, and enables proactive threat hunting for potential misuse of admin privileges.
This KQL query detects suspicious service activities (installation, modification, or deletion) by comparing events with a curated list of known suspicious Windows services. It extracts service names and accounts from device events and joins them with an external CSV list of suspicious services to identify matches. The query aims to alert on the presence or manipulation of services commonly associated with malicious activity.
This rule detects the creation or modification of registry values within common Auto-Start Extensibility Point (ASEP) Run keys. It specifically flags entries that point to suspicious file paths (e.g., C:\Users\Public\, C:\ProgramData\, temporary directories) or contain suspicious command-line interpreters (e.g., rundll32, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters out modifications made by known legitimate processes to reduce false positives.
This detection specifically flags credentials being added to the Connect Sync Application in Entra ID, a technique known to have persistance from On-premise AD DS to Entra ID. It tries to look at both certificate, client secret, and federated credentials being added, and tries to remove legitimate renewal processes. Since the legitimate renewal process first adds a new certificate only te remove the old one short after, we by default allow for a maximum of 1 minute between the certificate create and delete events.
This rule identifies all enabled service accounts in the environment. The goal is to audit the state of service accounts to identify unused or stale accounts, ensure only necessary service accounts are active, reduce the attack surface, and support compliance and security posture assessments. While not directly detecting malicious activity, it provides crucial visibility for security hygiene and can help identify potential accounts that could be abused by adversaries for persistence or defense evasion.
Detects the PHP variant of the CORNFLAKE.V3 backdoor, which is often dropped as 'config.cfg' and used for C2 communications and payload execution.
This rule detects attempts to exploit known CVEs on the network where the targeted device is identified as vulnerable to that specific CVE. It correlates network inspection signatures with vulnerability management data to identify high-confidence exploitation attempts.
This detection flags any changes happening on the Connect Sync Application in Entra ID. Since this is a very interesting account for attackers to abuse when moving laterally between AD DS and Entra ID, any change to the account should be investigated. We try to exclude legitimate certificate renewal processes, and a new account onboarding in the detection rule.
This detection rule identifies potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-36401, a JXPath injection vulnerability in GeoServer. Attackers can send malicious WFS, WMS, or WPS requests to achieve remote code execution. The rule looks for common GeoServer service paths and request types combined with Java code execution strings in web server or network logs.
This rule identifies all service accounts in the environment by querying IdentityInfo logs. The goal is to audit the state of these accounts, helping to identify unused or stale service accounts (especially if disabled), ensure only necessary service accounts are active to reduce the attack surface, and support compliance and security posture assessments. This rule does not detect malicious activity but rather provides an inventory for security auditing.
Detects the creation of a randomly named LaunchDaemon .plist file in /Library/LaunchDaemons/, a technique used by Odyssey Stealer for persistence.
This rule detects process events where `svchost.exe` or `schtasks.exe` are the initiating processes on specific devices. This is designed to identify unexpected or suspicious scheduled tasks, whether system-initiated or user-triggered, on monitored devices. It can be used for hunting or to investigate alerts from other security tools regarding suspicious scheduled tasks.
The following analytic detects a process attempting to duplicate the handle of winlogon.exe from an uncommon or public source path. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 10, focusing on processes targeting winlogon.exe with specific access rights and excluding common system paths. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary trying to escalate privileges by leveraging the high-privilege tokens associated with winlogon.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain elevated access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected host.
The following analytic identifies a process writing a .txt file to a world writable path. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file creation events within specific directories. This activity is significant as adversaries often use such techniques to deliver payloads to a system, which is uncommon for legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The analytic identifies the execution of PowerShell scripts from the WindowsApps directory, which is a common technique used in malicious MSIX package execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command lines and parent process paths. This activity is significant as adversaries have been observed using MSIX packages with embedded PowerShell scripts (particularly StartingScriptWrapper.ps1) to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or deliver malware while evading traditional detection mechanisms.
This rule detects suspicious Okta login attempts where a user successfully passes the initial authentication factor but then fails or abandons a subsequent Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, originating from a new IP address, device (user agent), and city combination. It filters out events from known corporate VPN IP addresses to reduce false positives.
Detects Component Object Model (COM) hijacking used by the Curly COMrades threat actor for persistence. This rule identifies registry modifications that alter specific CLSIDs related to the .NET NGEN task to load the MucorAgent malware.
The analytic detects the installation of a Linux kernel module using the `modprobe` utility. This activity is significant because installing a kernel module can indicate an attempt to deploy a rootkit or other malicious kernel-level code, potentially leading to elevated privileges and bypassing security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain persistent, high-level access to the system, compromising its integrity and security.
Detects potential DLL Sideloading activity as used by LockBit ransomware operators. This rule identifies when a legitimate, signed application (e.g., MpCmdRun.exe, jarsigner.exe) loads a corresponding DLL from the same, non-standard directory, a common TTP for defense evasion.
The following analytic detects the installation of a Linux kernel module using the modprobe utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because installing a kernel module can indicate an attempt to deploy a rootkit or other malicious kernel-level code, potentially leading to elevated privileges and bypassing security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain persistent, high-level access to the system, compromising its integrity and security.
Detects suspicious activities in Salesforce environments consistent with the TTPs of the ShinyHunters threat group (also tracked as UNC6040/UNC6240). The attack involves social engineering (vishing) to trick users into authorizing malicious OAuth applications that impersonate legitimate tools like 'Salesforce Data Loader'. This rule looks for key indicators such as the installation of unreviewed packages, creation of impersonating connected apps, elevation of permissions to 'full' API access, and large data exports.
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