Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

8,410 detections

Detects specific process characteristics of Chinese TAIDOOR RAT malware load
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater in a suspicious directory, which is often used in DLL side-loading attacks
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
1010
Detects addition of users to highly privileged groups via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the execution of the LocalPotato POC based on basic PE metadata information and default CLI examples
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry using reg.exe.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the execution of SharpSuccessor, a tool used to exploit the BadSuccessor attack for privilege escalation in WinServer 2025 Active Directory environments.
Successful usage of this tool can let the attackers gain the domain admin privileges by exploiting the BadSuccessor vulnerability.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects some Empire PowerShell UAC bypass methods
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
1010
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior could be indicative of potential defense evasion attempt during persistence
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the execution of netsh with "add helper" flag in order to add a custom helper DLL. This technique can be abused to add a malicious helper DLL that can be used as a persistence proxy that gets called when netsh.exe is executed.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
The Tasks folder in system32 and syswow64 are globally writable paths.
Adversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or ANY .NET Application
in Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Unfixed method for UAC bypass from Windows 10. WSReset.exe file associated with the Windows Store. It will run a binary file contained in a low-privilege registry.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects installation of new shim databases that try to patch sections of known processes for potential process injection or persistence.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "EACore.dll"
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detect DLL Load from Spooler Service backup folder
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "dbghelp.dll"
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "CCleanerReactivator.dll"
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via file creation.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
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