Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
8,410 detections
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Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
Detects suspicious command line reg.exe tool adding key to RUN key in Registry
Detects some Empire PowerShell UAC bypass methods
'Looks for new device registrations following a risky user account sign-in. By default the
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
Detects when a program changes the default file association of any extension to an executable.
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in.
Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete.
Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects calls to "Add-Content" cmdlet in order to modify the content of the user profile and potentially adding suspicious commands for persistence
Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking Microsoft Defender's processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from loading unsigned DLLs which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL
Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like
Detects activity when a security-enabled global group is deleted
Microsoft has observed attackers exploiting vulnerabilities associated with Log4J.
Detects the load of known vulnerable drivers via their names only.
This query shows authentication methods being added and devices registered around the time of a high risk sign in which could indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised account. The threshold can be changed to a wider timeframe if needed.
Detects a network connection that is initiated by the "notepad.exe" process.
This might be a sign of process injection from a beacon process or something similar.
Notepad rarely initiates a network communication except when printing documents for example.
This might be a sign of process injection from a beacon process or something similar.
Notepad rarely initiates a network communication except when printing documents for example.
Search for the CVEs that should be prioritized and resolved to reduce the success of the FireEye Red Team tools compromised by the Nobelium activity group.
See red_team_tool_countermeasures on the official FireEye repo.
References:
https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md
https://github.com/fireeye
See red_team_tool_countermeasures on the official FireEye repo.
References:
https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md
https://github.com/fireeye
Detects files created during the local privilege exploitation of CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache
Detects WMI script event consumers
Detects tools such as UACMe used to bypass UAC with computerdefaults.exe (UACMe 59)
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