Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a named pipe seen used by known APTs or malware.
'This query looks at Account Logon events found through Windows Event Id's as well as SigninLogs to discover
login attempts by accounts that have expired.'
login attempts by accounts that have expired.'
'This rule identifies a web request with a user agent header known to belong to a hacking tool. This indicates a hacking tool is used on the host.<br>You can add custom hacking tool indicating User-Agent headers using a watchlist, for more information refer to the [UnusualUserAgents Watchlist](https://aka.ms/ASimUnusualUserAgentsWatchlist).
This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
'Correlate IPs blocked by a Cisco firewall appliance with successful Microsoft Entra ID signins.
Because the IP was blocked by the firewall, that same IP logging on successfully to Entra ID is potentially suspect and could indicate credential compromise for the user account.'
Because the IP was blocked by the firewall, that same IP logging on successfully to Entra ID is potentially suspect and could indicate credential compromise for the user account.'
The query for malicious file creations via TOCTOU Vulnerability in Leading Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and Antivirus (AV) Solutions.
- Microsoft Defender (CVE-2022-37971)
- Defender for Endpoint (CVE-2022-37971)
- SentinelOne EDR
- TrendMicro Apex One (CVE-2022-45797)
- Avast Antivirus (CVE-2022-4173)
- AVG Antivirus (CVE-2022-4173)
- Microsoft Defender (CVE-2022-37971)
- Defender for Endpoint (CVE-2022-37971)
- SentinelOne EDR
- TrendMicro Apex One (CVE-2022-45797)
- Avast Antivirus (CVE-2022-4173)
- AVG Antivirus (CVE-2022-4173)
'This query examines Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins for each application and identifies the most anomalous change in a user's location profile. The goal is to detect user account compromise, possibly via a specific application vector.'
'Identifies a match for SQL Injection attack in the Application gateway WAF logs. The Threshold value in the query can be changed as per your infrastructure's requirement.
References: https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection/'
References: https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection/'
'PIM provides a key mechanism for assigning privileges to accounts, this query detects changes to PIM role settings.
Monitor these changes to ensure they are being made legitimately and don't confer more privileges than expected or reduce the security of a PIM elevation.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
Monitor these changes to ensure they are being made legitimately and don't confer more privileges than expected or reduce the security of a PIM elevation.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
Goal: Find machines in the last N days where the SystemGuardSecurityLevel value NOW is less than it was BEFORE.
Step 1: Get a list of all security levels in the system where the level is not null.
Step 1: Get a list of all security levels in the system where the level is not null.
'Detects anomalous IP address usage by user accounts and then checks to see if a suspicious Teams action is performed.
Query calculates IP usage Delta for each user account and selects accounts where a delta >= 90% is observed between the most and least used IP.
To further reduce results the query performs a prevalence check on the lowest used IP's country, only keeping IP's where the country is unusual for the tenant (dynamic ranges).
Please note, if the initial logic of prevalence to find suspicious logon activity is noisy then consider adding filtering based on Location.
Finally the user accounts activity within Teams logs is checked for suspicious commands (modifying user privileges or admin actions) during the period the suspicious IP was active.'
Query calculates IP usage Delta for each user account and selects accounts where a delta >= 90% is observed between the most and least used IP.
To further reduce results the query performs a prevalence check on the lowest used IP's country, only keeping IP's where the country is unusual for the tenant (dynamic ranges).
Please note, if the initial logic of prevalence to find suspicious logon activity is noisy then consider adding filtering based on Location.
Finally the user accounts activity within Teams logs is checked for suspicious commands (modifying user privileges or admin actions) during the period the suspicious IP was active.'
This query looks for local admin account used to logon into the computer.
This can help to detect malicious insiders that were able to add a local account to the local admin group offline.
This can help to detect malicious insiders that were able to add a local account to the local admin group offline.
Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process
Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
Detects interactive console logons to Server Systems
DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll
Detects creation of "UserInitMprLogonScript" registry value which can be used as a persistence method by malicious actors
Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement.
Detects processes setting a new DLL in DllName in under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots.
The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.
Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots.
The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.
Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
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