Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

8,400 detections

'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (default of 5) of failed logon attempts to AWS Console.
Uses that list to identify any successful Microsoft Entra ID logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
3038
Credentials were added to an application by UserA, after the application was granted admin consent rights by UserB
The Nobelium activity group has been observed adding credentials (x509 keys or password credentials) for one or more legitimate OAuth Applications or Service Principals, usually with existing Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions, which grants the ability to read mail content from Exchange Online via Microsoft Graph or Outlook REST. Examples include mail archiving applications.
See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
See Grant tenant-wide admin consent to an application for how to add admin consent to an application.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/manage-apps/grant-admin-consent
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
6037
'Identifies when a user account is created and then deleted within 10 minutes. This can be an indication of compromise and an adversary attempting to hide in the noise.'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
4037
Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects suspicious inline VBScript keywords as used by UNC2452
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti malware noticed in Dec/Jan 2020 in a campaign against Honk Kong universities
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects an exploitation attempt of SystemNightmare in order to obtain a shell as LOCAL_SYSTEM
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects the suspicious file that is created from PoC code against Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527 (PrinterNightmare), CVE-2021-1675 .
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
This method detects malicious services mentioned in Turla PNG dropper report by NCC Group in November 2018
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects Kapeka backdoor scheduled task creation based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects potential DLL injection and execution using "Tracker.exe"
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects the creation of a symbolic link between "cmd.exe" and the accessibility on-screen keyboard binary (osk.exe) using "mklink". This technique provides an elevated command prompt to the user from the login screen without the need to log in.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects when there is a login attempt from a country that has not seen a successful login in the previous 14 days.
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
2037
Detects uncommon "userinit.exe" child processes, which could be a sign of uncommon shells or login scripts used for persistence.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, ironSource PUA & unwanted apps impact millions.
IronSource provides software bundling tools for many popular legitimate apps, such as FileZilla. However, some of ironSource's bundling tools are considered PUA, because they exhibit potentially unwanted behavior. One component of these tools, detected by Microsoft as Prifou, silently transmits system information from the user. It also installs an outdated version of Chromium browser with various browser extensions, resets the user's home page, changes their search engine settings, and forces Chromium and itself to launch at startup.
The following query can be used to locate unique command-line strings used by ironSource bundlers to launch Prifou, as well as commands used by Prifou to install Chromium.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
1036
Detects when a possible suspicious driver is being installed via pnputil.exe lolbin
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location
Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects scheduled task creations or modification on a suspicious schedule type
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
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