Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects cross-process injection attempts into the Windows system process 'svchost.exe' where the source process is either unsigned or lacks a verified Microsoft publisher. This pattern is commonly observed in malware payloads, such as DcRAT, attempting to hide malicious activity within a legitimate system process.
Detects the WinRAR.exe process creating a .lnk shortcut file within the user's Startup directory. This behavior is indicative of an exploitation attempt (e.g., UAC-0226 related NTFS path traversal vulnerabilities) where an attacker plants a persistence mechanism via a malicious archive extraction.
This rule detects the execution of Docker containers or related CI/CD runner processes (like Gitea act_runner) with insecure configuration options. These options, such as --privileged, --pid=host, or mounting the Docker socket, can facilitate container escapes or unauthorized host-level access.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from RMM software (specifically SimpleHelp) and associated TaskWeaver processes, including process execution, service/scheduled task installation, file creation consistent with Djinn Stealer, and non-standard outbound network connections.
Detects potential container escape attempts via 'docker cp' path traversal attacks or suspicious shell execution spawned from the Docker daemon. The rule monitors for directory traversal sequences in 'docker cp' commands, the use of PoC tooling strings, file modifications outside expected container paths, and shell process spawning originating from Docker-related parent processes.
Detects anomalous child process execution from PHP web handler processes (e.g., php-fpm, php-cgi) indicative of exploitation of the StreamBucket SOAP RCE vulnerability. The rule identifies spawning of common shell tools or access to sensitive process memory files (/proc/self/maps or /proc/self/mem) associated with ASLR defeat techniques used in this exploit chain.
Detects indicators of the SystemInformer PHSVC (Process Hacker Service) local privilege escalation proof-of-concept. The rule monitors for the loading of the PoC DLL by rundll32, the execution of commands containing specific PoC strings, and the spawning of shell processes by PHSVC-related parent processes.
Detects anomalous child process execution spawned by ImageMagick binaries. This pattern aligns with exploitation of ImageMagick vulnerabilities where Ghostscript delegates are hijacked via search order manipulation (PATH or working directory) to achieve arbitrary code execution.
This rule detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks using either the schtasks command or through the system's scheduled task service. It focuses on task actions originating from suspicious parent processes (such as browsers or script interpreters), tasks executing scripts from writable user directories, or tasks with persistence triggers (e.g., /SC MINUTE, /SC ONLOGON) containing encoded PowerShell commands or hidden window styles indicative of malicious activity.
This rule detects activities associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, including the loading of known vulnerable drivers, the installation or configuration of drivers via system services, and the execution of tools known to facilitate driver-based kernel manipulation.
Detects potential identity pivoting by correlating signs of developer workstation compromise (e.g., shell spawning from IDE/node processes) with subsequent anomalous cloud console or API access from the same or associated identity within a short timeframe. This rule monitors both Azure Sign-in logs and AWS CloudTrail activity for suspicious patterns following endpoint indicators.
Detects persistence attempts via modifications to Windows Registry Run keys, either through direct registry operations or via the execution of 'reg.exe'. It specifically flags suspicious registry value data (e.g., paths in Temp or AppData) and instances where non-standard binaries are utilized to perform these operations.
Detects instances where a user account is created or modified (e.g., added to a local admin group) shortly after a network logon event (Logon Type 3 or 10). This behavioral correlation is highly indicative of lateral movement followed by local privilege escalation or persistence establishment.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a network logon (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) followed by a successful Directory Replication Service (DRS) request (Event ID 4662, Access Mask 0x100) on a Domain Controller within a one-hour window. This pattern is indicative of potential lateral movement followed by credential dumping via DCSync, often associated with tools like Mimikatz.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to Group Policy Object (GPO) manipulation, including the execution of the SharpGPOAbuse tool and suspicious PowerShell commands intended to modify GPOs for persistence or privilege escalation, such as adding local administrators, creating immediate tasks, or applying domain-level policies.
Detects suspicious modifications to GitHub Actions workflows, such as unauthorized file overwrites, commits by bot impersonation identities (e.g., dependabot, renovate), or the upload of sensitive artifacts like 'format-results.txt'. These activities are indicative of IronWorm-style attacks targeting CI/CD pipelines to exfiltrate secrets via build artifacts.
This rule detects token manipulation and impersonation behaviors characteristic of Cobalt Strike post-exploitation activity. It specifically identifies instances where common child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, net.exe, whoami.exe) are spawned from non-standard parent processes associated with Cobalt Strike payloads (e.g., rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe, svchost.exe), often accompanied by a discrepancy between the effective username and the parent process username or the use of discovery tools post-impersonation.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity potentially associated with the 'Ptero' malware family. The rule correlates several behaviors: direct invocation of PowerShell with known Ptero-related script names, execution spawned by common phishing delivery parents (such as Office applications or web scripting engines), PowerShell downloading files from Cloudflare Workers domains, and the correlation of PowerShell network download activity with subsequent registry-based persistence modifications.
Detects the execution of SharpGPOAbuse for malicious Group Policy Object (GPO) manipulation, specifically identifying characteristic command-line arguments used for task creation and modification. The rule also monitors for subsequent forced GPO updates via net.exe or net1.exe, often associated with post-exploitation activities in the StrikeShark campaign.
Detects the deployment and activity of the Remcos Remote Access Trojan (RAT) as part of the BQTLock (BaqiyatLock) attack chain. This rule monitors for process injection into critical Windows processes, malicious Run key persistence entries, non-standard outbound TLS communication from non-browser processes, and the creation of potential keylogging artifacts in the AppData directory.
This rule detects authentication events for service accounts (matching patterns like 'svc', 'sa', 'service') originating from at least two different countries within a short time window (30 minutes or less), indicating potential credential compromise and anomalous geographic movement.
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