Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Windows Security Event ID 4732. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies instances where explorer.exe is spawned by unusual parent processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because explorer.exe is typically initiated by userinit.exe, and deviations from this norm can indicate code injection or process masquerading attempts by malware like Qakbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects an unusual process execution pattern where a process running from `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\` attempts to execute a binary from `C:\Windows\System32\`. In a typical Windows environment, 32-bit processes under SysWOW64 should primarily interact with 32-bit binaries within the same directory. However, an execution flow where a 32-bit process spawns a 64-bit binary from System32 can indicate potential process injection, privilege escalation, evasion techniques, or unauthorized execution hijacking.
The analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a PingID environment. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within 10 minutes, using JSON logs from PingID. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, as the user might eventually accept the fraudulent request, compromising the security of the account and potentially the entire network.
The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.
The analytic identifies the creation of a login profile for one AWS user by another, followed by a console login from the same source IP. It uses AWS CloudTrail logs to correlate the `CreateLoginProfile` and `ConsoleLogin` events based on the source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new login profile to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate privileges and maintain persistent access to the AWS environment.
The analytic detects an AWS account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically monitoring `ConsoleLogin` events and counting distinct source IPs. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials, potentially from a phishing attack, being used concurrently by an adversary and a legitimate user. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.
The analytic detects the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation role in Office 365 to a user or application. This role allows impersonation of any user, enabling access to and modification of their mailbox. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, manipulate mailbox data, and perform actions as a legitimate user, posing a severe security risk to the organization.
The following analytic identifies instances where read permissions are granted to mailbox folders within an Office 365 environment. It detects this activity by monitoring the `o365_management_activity` data source for the `Set-MailboxFolderPermission` and `Add-MailboxFolderPermission` operations. This behavior is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or changes to mailbox folder permissions, potentially exposing sensitive email content. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to read email communications, leading to data breaches or information leakage.
The following analytic detects potential privilege escalation threats in Azure Active Directory (AD). This detection is important because it identifies instances where privileged roles that hold elevated permissions are assigned to service principals. This prevents unauthorized access or malicious activities, which occur when these non-human entities access Azure resources to exploit them. False positives might occur since administrators can legitimately assign privileged roles to service principals. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials for Service Principals within an Office 365 tenant. It uses O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to credential modifications or additions in the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because Service Principals represent application identities, and their credentials allow applications to authenticate and access resources. If an attacker successfully adds or modifies these credentials, they can impersonate the application, leading to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or malicious operations under the application's identity.
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that enables auto admin logon on a host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the "AutoAdminLogon" value within the "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon" registry path. This activity is significant because it was observed in BlackMatter ransomware attacks to maintain access after a safe mode reboot, facilitating further encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to automatically log in and continue their operations, potentially leading to widespread network encryption and data loss.
The following analytic identifies child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe, the Print Spooler service in Windows, which typically runs with SYSTEM privileges. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate exploitation attempts, such as those associated with CVE-2018-8440, which can lead to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain SYSTEM-level access, allowing them to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and potentially compromise the entire system.
This analytic identifies the creation of a service with a known name used by CLOP ransomware for persistence and high-privilege code execution. It detects this activity by monitoring Windows Event Logs (EventCode 7045) for specific service names ("SecurityCenterIBM", "WinCheckDRVs"). This activity is significant because the creation of such services is a common tactic used by ransomware to maintain control over infected systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with elevated privileges, maintain persistence, and potentially disrupt or encrypt critical data.
The analytic detects the execution of the "sudoedit -s *" command, which is associated with the Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability. This detection leverages the `osquery_process` data source to identify instances where this specific command is run. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability that allows privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain full control of the system, execute arbitrary code, or access sensitive data, leading to potential data breaches and system disruptions.
The following analytic detects the execution of the 'setcap' utility to enable the SUID bit on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments that indicate the use of 'setcap' with specific capabilities. This activity is significant because setting the SUID bit allows a user to temporarily gain root access, posing a substantial security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, execute arbitrary commands with elevated permissions, and potentially compromise the entire system.
The following analytic detects the execution of the 'visudo' utility to modify the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to the /etc/sudoers file can grant elevated privileges to users, potentially allowing adversaries to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, privilege escalation, and persistent unauthorized access, severely impacting the security posture of the affected host.
This detection monitors the addition of specific dangerous Access Control List (ACL) entries to an Active Directory group object. These ACL modifications, such as "Full control", "All extended rights", "Modify permissions", or "Write all properties", can indicate potential privilege escalation or malicious activity within the Active Directory environment. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert to determine the legitimacy and intent behind such changes.
This detection monitors the addition of dangerous Access Control Lists (ACLs) to an Active Directory user object. Specifically, it looks for modifications that grant "Full control", "All extended rights", "All validated writes", "Create all child objects", "Delete all child objects", "Delete subtree", "Delete", "Modify permissions", "Modify owner", or "Write all properties" to a user object. Such modifications can indicate potential privilege escalation or malicious activity within the Active Directory environment. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
The analytic detects the execution of mshta.exe via registry entries to run malicious scripts. It leverages registry activity logs to identify entries containing "mshta," "javascript," "vbscript," or "WScript.Shell." This behavior is significant as it indicates potential fileless malware, such as Kovter, which uses encoded scripts in the registry to persist and execute without files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and evade traditional file-based detection methods, posing a significant threat to system integrity and security.
The analytic detects a user authenticating with special privileges on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4672 from Windows Security logs to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain extensive control over the network, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the environment. Security teams should adjust detection thresholds based on their specific environment.
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