Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks by monitoring specific registry key paths associated with the Windows Task Scheduler. Adversaries often use scheduled tasks for persistence, privilege escalation, or execution of malicious code. By observing modifications to these registry paths, the rule aims to identify when new scheduled tasks are being registered on a system.
This rule identifies user sign-ins originating from anonymous IP addresses, which may indicate the use of VPNs, Tor, or other anonymization services. Such activity can be a sign of an adversary attempting to mask their true location or identity during an access attempt.
This rule detects sign-in attempts originating from a country that is considered new or infrequent for the user based on their past activity locations. This behavior can indicate a compromised account being used by an attacker from an unusual geographic location.
Detects exploitation attempts related to the Nimbuspwn privilege escalation vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-29799 and CVE-2022-29800) on Linux systems. The rule looks for specific keywords that indicate the `networkd-dispatcher` service is being manipulated, potentially to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
Detects when important scheduled tasks are deleted or disabled. Adversaries may delete or disable scheduled tasks to hinder defensive capabilities, stop legitimate services, or prevent forensic analysis. This rule specifically targets tasks related to system restore, Windows Defender, BitLocker, Windows Backup, and Windows Update, which are critical for system integrity and security.
Detects suspicious service installations by monitoring Event ID 7045 from the Service Control Manager. The rule looks for specific command-line patterns in the ImagePath field that are commonly associated with malicious service creation, such as PowerShell download commands, hidden windows, or execution from temporary directories.
Detects the creation of a specific DLL file ('api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL') within a user's temporary directory. This pattern is indicative of a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that leverages NTFS reparse points and DLL hijacking, often associated with tools like UACMe (specifically UACMe 36). The rule looks for the exact file path in a user's AppData\Local\Temp directory.
This rule detects a specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique leveraging the Windows Media Player component. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a file named 'OskSupport.dll' within a user's temporary directory, combined with 'DllHost.exe' accessing 'osk.exe' located in the Windows Media Player directory. This pattern is indicative of the UACMe tool's method 32, which exploits a vulnerability related to Windows Media Player to elevate privileges without user interaction.
Detects the execution of non-standard or uncommon assistive technology applications via "AtBroker.exe". AtBroker.exe is a legitimate Windows binary that can be abused to proxy the execution of other programs, often for defense evasion or persistence. This rule specifically looks for instances where AtBroker.exe is used to start applications that are not part of the common, built-in Windows assistive technologies.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes of "eventvwr.exe" which might indicate a User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempt. The rule specifically filters out legitimate child processes like 'mmc.exe' and 'WerFault.exe' to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the creation of a named pipe using `cmd.exe` or `powershell.exe` by looking for specific command-line arguments. The presence of `echo`, `>` and `\\.\pipe\` in the command line indicates an attempt to create or interact with a named pipe. This activity can be associated with privilege escalation techniques, where an attacker might use named pipes for inter-process communication to elevate privileges.
Detects the creation of a file named "MoriyaStreamWatchmen.sys" in the 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\' directory. This specific filename is associated with the Moriya rootkit, as detailed in the Securelist's "Operation TunnelSnake" report. The presence of this file indicates a potential rootkit installation attempt, which could lead to persistence and privilege escalation on a Windows system.
Detects the creation of a file named 'newdev.dll' in a user's AppData\Roaming directory. This specific file path and name are associated with the COLDSTEEL Remote Access Trojan (RAT) for persistence.
This rule detects potentially suspicious child processes spawned by PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell (powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, pwsh.exe) launching a set of common Windows utilities that can be abused for malicious purposes, such as 'bitsadmin.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'mshta.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'rundll32.exe', 'schtasks.exe', and 'wmic.exe'. The rule includes filters to reduce false positives, such as specific command lines for AWS Workspaces, certutil's '-verifystore' option, and common benign wmic queries.
This rule detects anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser. This indicates a potential compromise of user credentials or an attempt to bypass authentication mechanisms.
This rule detects the loading of kernel modules using the 'insmod' command. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are code segments that can be dynamically loaded into and unloaded from the kernel. Adversaries may leverage LKMs for establishing persistence, elevating privileges, or deploying kernel-mode rootkits, as they operate with the highest system privileges (Ring 0). The detection specifically looks for the execution of 'kmod' with the 'insmod' command.
This rule detects the execution of a script via the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript function, which is associated with the OMIGOD vulnerability. Specifically, it looks for process creation events where the user is 'root', the LogonId is '0', the CurrentDirectory is '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp', and the CommandLine contains '/etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/scx'. This pattern indicates the execution of a temporary script created by the SCX agent, often exploited for privilege escalation or initial access.
Detects the installation of a new Windows service where the service executable's image path contains suspicious locations such as 'AppData' directories or remote IP addresses like '127.0.0.1' or 'localhost'. This can indicate an attempt at persistence or privilege escalation by adversaries installing malicious services in non-standard locations.
Detects the creation of new PowerShell module files (.ps or .dll) in the first folder of the module directory structure, specifically within '\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\*\'. This pattern is considered suspicious because legitimate PowerShell modules commonly include a version folder within their directory structure, making direct creation in the module root less common for benign modules.
This rule detects the creation of executable files (.exe) or dynamic link libraries (.dll) within the default Group Policy Object (GPO) storage folder. Adversaries may place malicious files in this location to leverage Group Policy for persistence, privilege escalation, or to distribute malware across a domain. The specific folder path targeted is '\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\' which corresponds to the Default Domain Policy GPO.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile specifically for Visual Studio Code (VSCode). Adversaries may modify these profiles to establish persistence or escalate privileges by injecting malicious commands or scripts that execute every time a user opens a VSCode PowerShell session. This technique can be used to run arbitrary code without direct user interaction after the initial compromise.
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