Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of wermgr.exe from a non-standard directory, specifically targeting the RoguePlanet junction-hijacking technique where the Windows Error Reporting process is replaced by an attacker-controlled binary under a staging path (e.g., %TEMP%\RP_*).
Detects signs of the VerdantBamboo threat actor's BRICKSTORM/PLENET campaign, specifically targeting Linux-based edge appliances like pfSense and Synology NAS. The rule monitors for sudo abuse by specific service accounts (e.g., egnyteservice, www-data) attempting to leverage NOPASSWD sudo privileges for the 'tee' utility to write malicious content into sensitive system files (e.g., /usr/sbin/, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/sudoers). Additionally, it identifies unauthorized sudo enumeration commands that may indicate early-stage reconnaissance or persistence efforts.
Detects successful Microsoft 365 user authentications where Conditional Access (CA) policies were bypassed, resulting in single-factor authentication. This pattern is indicative of attackers using compromised edge network appliances—which are often configured as trusted network locations—to proxy authentication requests and circumvent security controls.
Detects SSH, SFTP, or SCP connections originating from internal edge appliances such as pfSense firewalls or Synology NAS devices directed at internal network hosts. This activity is consistent with VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM lateral movement, where compromised edge infrastructure is leveraged as a pivot point to gain access to the internal network.
Detects the creation of specific file and directory structures under the %TEMP% directory associated with the RoguePlanet (CVE-2026-50656) exploit. The exploit utilizes a UUID-named directory prefixed with 'RP_' to stage components, including wermgr.exe and wdtest_temp, required for a junction swap attack against Microsoft Defender. The detection excludes known system processes that might access the temporary folder.
Detects memory patching operations targeting 'ntdll.dll', specifically aiming to disable ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) by modifying 'EtwEventWrite' or 'NtTraceEvent' functions. This activity is filtered to detect processes originating from PyInstaller-compiled binaries, identified by the use of '_MEI' temporary extraction directories or specific process names like 'winupdate.exe', which are commonly associated with malicious use of the PyInstaller framework.
Detects potential privilege escalation activity including manual privilege discovery using 'whoami /priv', suspicious elevated processes spawned from non-elevated parents, and specific scheduled task execution patterns associated with Payouts King malware.
Detects the loading of unsigned .dll or .ocx modules from non-standard, potentially user-writable directories such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData. This behavior is frequently associated with persistence mechanisms or side-loading techniques.
This rule monitors for suspicious administrative activity on Windows systems, specifically detecting the creation of new local user accounts (excluding machine accounts) and the addition of users to the local Administrators group.
Detects a sequence of events within a 30-minute window for a single user, specifically capturing MFA configuration changes (reset/enrollment), authentication, and device registration, occurring outside of typical business hours (20:00 - 06:00). This behavioral pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or account takeover after gaining access to a valid account.
Detects the installation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains strings commonly associated with remote access or remote control software, such as 'remotepc' or 'rpclient'. This may indicate the unauthorized deployment of remote administration tools.
This rule detects DLL loading events where specific legitimate applications (Adobe Creative Cloud, Microsoft Edge, or Opera GX) load a DLL from their own directory where the DLL file is unsigned or has an invalid digital signature. This pattern is often indicative of DLL sideloading, where an attacker places a malicious DLL in the application's folder to be loaded by the legitimate process.
This rule monitors for two distinct behaviors: direct modification of Group Policy Object (GPO) containers within Active Directory and suspicious execution of GPO management tools (gpupdate.exe or gpedit.msc) across multiple hosts in a short timeframe. AD modification events are flagged as critical, while elevated tool execution patterns are flagged as high or medium risk based on host prevalence.
Detects unauthorized modifications to Windows Registry Run and RunOnce keys where the configured value points to a file within a user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) or uses rundll32.exe to execute a DLL. This behavior is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by Obsidian Sandstorm, such as sideloading binaries or launching malicious loaders from non-standard, writable locations.
Detects unauthorized execution of native binaries initiated by npm during the package installation process. This rule targets the IronWorm supply-chain campaign, where compromised npm packages utilize preinstall hooks or node-gyp build processes to execute malicious binaries (often Rust-based) from unconventional paths within the package directory.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve QEMU virtualization binaries or virtual disk images. This activity is associated with the GOLD ENCOUNTER threat group and campaigns STAC4713/STAC3725, which utilize QEMU to facilitate persistence and infrastructure defense evasion by maintaining virtualized environments across system reboots.
Detects unexpected child process creation spawned by npm or node.exe that is characteristic of the IronWorm Rust-based infostealer. This rule monitors for malicious npm preinstall or postinstall hooks executing common living-off-the-land binaries (like curl, powershell, or regsvr32) from within a node_modules directory structure, common in supply chain compromise scenarios.
Detects accounts performing multiple sensitive operations, privilege assignments, or privileged service calls in a short timeframe, which may indicate account compromise, reconnaissance, or lateral movement.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a dropper (chrome_setup.exe) uses an AppDomainManager injection technique to load a malicious DLL, followed by the execution of the TinyRCT payload (PerfWatson2.exe) from the LocalAppData directory. This behavior has been observed in campaigns targeting Southeast Asian government and critical infrastructure.
This rule detects various User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques (such as fodhelper.exe or eventvwr.exe hijacking), registry modifications involving 'ms-settings' classes, and the use of 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs' to request administrative privileges. It also flags potentially elevated installations of OpenSSH or Tailscale, which are commonly targeted by attackers following privilege escalation.
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods with dangerous security settings that could lead to container escape or privilege escalation. This includes pods configured with hostNetwork enabled, allowing privilege escalation, running as root (UID 0), or abusing capabilities.
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