Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe, which is the backend process used by the Windows Package Manager (winget) when applying configuration files. The detection specifically monitors for this process being spawned by winget.exe with flags indicating the acceptance of configuration agreements and the execution of a configuration command.
Detects the use of administrative tools like wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe to invoke WMI event subscription components such as ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, or FilterToConsumerBinding. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence or elevating privileges by executing malicious code when specific system events occur.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Package Manager (WinGet) Desired State Configuration (DSC) engine, specifically via the 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe' process. Adversaries may leverage this mechanism to execute embedded PowerShell scripts with elevated privileges, bypassing standard execution contexts by abusing the legitimate package management infrastructure. The rule tracks the lifecycle of this abuse, from initial activation via 'winget.exe' or 'WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe' to the final execution of PowerShell or other shells by the configuration server.
Detects evidence of Linux-based cryptomining malware, such as xmrig and associated droppers, along with their persistence mechanisms and efforts to disable system security controls (e.g., SELinux, AppArmor, ufw). The rule monitors process execution, file creation, cron job configuration, and modifications to system immutability locks via chattr.
Detects suspicious inter-process communication via named pipes and cross-process thread injection targeting known sideloading host processes, specifically associated with the SPECTRALVIPER threat activity.
Detects execution of GS-Netcat covert C2 tunnels or masqueraded 'uptime' binaries running from non-standard system paths, consistent with persistent implants used by the Velvet Ant threat actor in Operation Highland.
Detects an internet-facing host in the DMZ that receives an inbound connection from an external non-RFC1918 address and subsequently authenticates to an internal RFC1918 host within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a compromised DMZ host being used as a pivot point for lateral movement into the internal network.
Detects artifacts related to the ValleyRAT malware family, specifically identifying markers such as 'Phantom Persistence Module', 'RegisterApplicationRestart', and specific 'RSL_' strings within process command lines, image paths, or module loads using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon data.
Detects the execution of the suspicious binary 'AdgNsy.exe', including scenarios where it is spawned by the WMI Provider Host (WmiPrvSE.exe). This pattern is often associated with malicious activity, including potential persistence mechanisms or arbitrary code execution via WMI event subscriptions.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation activity associated with the abuse of CTFMON related objects (named pipes, symlinks, junctions) which may be used in conjunction with high-privilege operations (like SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege) to elevate access to SYSTEM. It correlates access events for CTF objects by processes (other than the legitimate ctfmon.exe) with subsequent sensitive privilege assignments within a short time window.
Detects the creation of suspicious file types (.exe, .dll, .ps1, etc.) in common staging directories (e.g., C:\Users\Public, C:\Windows\Temp) by the DllHost.exe process. The rule filters out known-good COM surrogate CLSIDs but flags instances where DllHost.exe is launched without a /Processid argument (potential WSL2 proxy activity) or with an unrecognized CLSID, suggesting potential COM hijacking or file staging.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys responsible for the 'open' command handler associated with 'exefile'. Adversaries often modify these registry keys to achieve persistence or execute malicious code whenever an executable is opened, by injecting commands or replacing the default handler.
This rule detects suspicious execution of 'RUNDLL32.EXE' with specific command-line arguments. It looks for instances where 'RUNDLL32.EXE' is executed with both a backslash and a comma in the command line, combined with specific DLL names or keywords like 'iamnotarobot.dll', 'checkme.dll', 'machinerie.dll', 'humanCheck', or 'verifyme'. This pattern is often indicative of malicious DLL loading or persistence mechanisms.
Detects the addition of users to specific high-value or sensitive groups in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), which could indicate potential unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence attempts by an attacker.
Detects the installation and execution of the Cloudflare tunnel utility (cloudflared) as a Windows service. This behavior has been observed in Akira ransomware intrusions, where attackers use cloudflared to create a covert C2 tunnel and obscure RDP sessions by routing traffic through Cloudflare, effectively masking the true origin of connections to the compromised host.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in activity consistent with the Payroll Pirate campaign. This rule monitors for successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxy ASN providers (IPRoyal, Bright Data, Oxylabs) or instances where a successful sign-in occurs with a suspicious browser fingerprint (Firefox 131.0/142.0) during a Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token request, indicating session-token replay.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
Detects behaviors associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, including the dropping of .sys driver files into non-canonical directories, the registration and execution of kernel services via sc.exe, the use of fltMC to load filter drivers, and the loading of driver modules from non-standard locations.
Detects unauthorized modifications to SSH 'authorized_keys' files or the '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' configuration file on Linux systems. These actions can be used for persistent access (key injection) or to weaken SSH security controls (e.g., enabling root login) and are typical indicators of account manipulation or compromise.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH where the command line contains common environment variables and paths associated with the Windows Startup folder. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to achieve persistence, ensuring malicious scripts execute upon user login.
This rule detects SMB traffic indicative of remote service creation over the SVCCTL named pipe, a pattern characteristic of tools like PsExec used for lateral movement and remote code execution.
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