Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the deployment, registration, and loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., mhyprot2.sys, gdrv.sys, rtcore64.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This rule monitors file creation, module loading, service registration via sc.exe, and registry modifications associated with service installation.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-0309, where the Intune Company Portal application identifier is used to acquire Microsoft Graph tokens via a password grant mechanism while bypassing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). This technique typically relies on exploiting misconfigured Conditional Access policies that exclude the Intune resource from mandatory MFA enforcement.
This rule detects potential automated credential stuffing attempts followed by successful authentication and subsequent access to sensitive/privileged APIs within Azure/Entra ID environments. It correlates multiple failed login attempts for service-oriented account names (e.g., svc, api, bot) with a successful login from the same user shortly thereafter, followed by privileged API operations (e.g., KeyVault secret access, user management) within a short time window.
Detects a sequence of events characteristic of a privilege escalation exploit (referenced as CVE-2026-46331). The chain involves an unprivileged user creating a user namespace, followed by the configuration of traffic-control (tc) filters, and finally accessing sensitive setuid binaries or memory files (/proc/self/mem), indicating an attempt to escalate privileges to root.
Detects a suspicious multi-stage infection sequence associated with DcRAT, characterized by a process spawning a child with references to image files (.jpg/.jpeg), followed by the loading of an unsigned DLL from the same directory, and culminating in a TLS network connection within a narrow time window.
Detects multiple indicators of process injection into svchost.exe including suspicious process access rights, remote thread creation, unexpected loading of .NET CLR modules, and the subsequent spawning of suspicious child processes. The rule aggregates these signals to identify potential fileless execution or persistence mechanisms within a legitimate system process.
Detects exploitation attempts of the Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using Impacket tools. The rule monitors for unauthorized machine account password resets via Netlogon, execution of common exploitation scripts like zerologon_tester.py or secretsdump.py, and suspicious NTLM anonymous authentication patterns often associated with the exploit.
Detects a potential privilege escalation attempt targeting the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) vulnerability, where an unprivileged process executes /usr/bin/su with specific command line arguments to spawn a shell without proper authentication, effectively gaining root access.
Detects the exploitation chain of the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) vulnerability on Linux systems. The rule monitors for a sequence involving an unprivileged user (UID > 1000) creating a new user/network namespace, configuring an IPsec XFRM state with loopback source/destination addresses, modifying sensitive memory via /proc/self/mem or /proc/<pid>/mem to bypass Copy-on-Write (CoW) protections, and ultimately spawning a process with root privileges.
This rule identifies potential account compromise by detecting successful logins to at least two different SaaS applications monitored by Microsoft Cloud App Security (MCAS) within a 2-hour window, originating from geolocations separated by more than 500 kilometers. This behavior is indicative of credential sharing or account hijacking where an adversary accesses multiple cloud services rapidly from geographically distant locations.
Detects when a new federated identity credential is successfully added to an Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) application. This activity is a common method for attackers to establish persistent access to cloud resources by bypassing password-based authentication.
Detects Active Directory domain group enumeration activities associated with StrikeShark post-compromise tooling. The rule monitors for Event ID 4661 object access requests to domain groups with specific access masks, as well as the execution of reconnaissance commands via net.exe or the usage of SharpGPOAbuse.exe, which are known indicators of StrikeShark operations.
Detects the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe) loading the advapi32.dll library. While advapi32.dll is a standard Windows component, unauthorized or unexpected library loading by system processes can be an indicator of DLL side-loading, process injection, or other hijacking techniques used to execute malicious code within a trusted context.
Detects potential process injection attempts involving the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe). The rule monitors for remote thread creation or APC injection activities combined with memory operations (VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect) that set memory regions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, which is a common pattern for running shellcode in a hijacked process context.
Detects modifications to the 'Shell' or 'Userinit' values within the 'Winlogon' registry key, excluding the default 'explorer.exe' value. Attackers often modify these keys to gain persistence by executing malicious binaries automatically when a user logs in.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Active Setup registry keys ('StubPath') used by TrymeLocker to achieve persistence. The rule monitors for keys pointing to executables in suspicious locations such as Windows Temp, Users Public, ProgramData, or AppData, and identifies specific threat-related patterns like 'win_guard_', 'RageCore_', and '{RAGE-MASTER}'.
Detects the creation of a registry run key entry in HKLM that points to an executable named 'browser.exe' located within a user's AppData\Local directory, specifically matching a GUID-based subfolder structure. This behavior is indicative of malicious persistence mechanisms, where an adversary attempts to execute a masqueraded binary upon system startup.
Detects evidence of VILE ransomware behavior involving token and privilege manipulation, including the use of Windows API functions such as AdjustTokenPrivileges, OpenProcessToken, and DuplicateTokenEx, as well as potential EDR bypass indicators via NT syscalls like NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
Detects high-risk activity where a user session, characterized by specific suspicious browser user agents and non-interactive authentication (indicative of token replay/session hijacking), is followed by changes to Workday payroll information (direct deposit, banking details) or unauthorized access to HR-related email content.
This rule detects suspicious process access or remote thread creation events where AdgNsy.exe interacts with WAB.exe (Windows Address Book). Such activity is indicative of potential process injection or unauthorized memory access to steal contact data or manipulate process memory.
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