Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation or configuration of a scheduled task named 'GoogleErrorReport' which references 'Fondue.exe' located in the 'C:\Users\Public' directory. This specific pattern is associated with 'Dropping Elephant' malware persistence, where the task ensures the binary executes persistently on the host.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows utility 'Fondue.exe' (Features on Demand) loads the control panel library 'APPWIZ.cpl' from non-standard locations such as C:\Users\Public or AppData directories. It also identifies the staging phase where 'APPWIZ.cpl' is written to 'C:\Users\Public', which is indicative of a DLL side-loading attack sequence, often associated with the Elephant malware dropper.
Detects the SHEETCREEP RAT (vaultsvc.exe) creating the 'Global\WinSync_' mutex, often from non-standard locations. This rule correlates process image paths with named object events to identify suspicious activity.
This rule detects attempts by the Rokarolla trojan to disable Google Play Protect on Android devices. It monitors for Accessibility Service actions, Android Accessibility Events, or App Control Actions that target 'com.google.android.gms' and contain keywords like 'play_protect', 'PlayProtect', 'finskyEula', 'security_scan', or 'disable'. This behavior indicates the malware is trying to suppress security scans by Google Play Protect.
This rule detects the loading of suspicious DLL files (commonly associated with MinGW or image processing libraries) from user-writable directories such as AppData or Temp. Loading these libraries from these non-standard locations, particularly when not initiated by a known legitimate process, may indicate DLL side-loading or execution of masqueraded malicious binaries.
Detects the use of 7za to extract archives into the Avast Software directory, a behavior observed in Pay2Key ransomware campaigns to perform DLL hijacking for execution, persistence, or privilege escalation.
This rule detects process execution where the command line contains specific strings commonly associated with process debugging, environment analysis, or exception handling (e.g., 'RtlGetCurrentPeb', 'timeBeginPeriod', 'gcstoptheworld', 'trace/breakpoint trap'). These artifacts are frequently observed in security research tools, malware analysis frameworks, or during the development of exploit payloads designed to interact with process memory or handle execution flow interruptions.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry 'shutdownwithoutlogon' value within the 'Policies\System' key. This setting controls whether the 'Shut Down' option is available on the Windows logon screen. Adversaries may modify this to impede access to system power controls or as part of a configuration hardening/persistence tactic.
This rule detects potentially malicious attempts to escape a container or manipulate the host filesystem using the 'docker cp' command. It identifies commands that contain directory traversal patterns (e.g., '../', '..\') or direct references to the host filesystem via '/proc/self/root'.
Detects instances where ImageMagick (convert, mogrify, magick, identify) attempts to execute Ghostscript or shell interpreters. The rule flags suspicious behavior such as spawning shell interpreters, using shell metacharacters or pipes in the command line, or executing Ghostscript from non-standard or potentially writable directory paths, which are indicative of a delegate hijack exploitation attempt for arbitrary command execution.
Detects attempts to perform a container escape using the 'docker cp' command, where a maliciously crafted source path with traversal sequences allows the container daemon to write files outside of the container boundary. The rule monitors for suspicious 'docker cp' command executions and the creation of artifacts associated with known path traversal escape techniques in the host filesystem by the Docker daemon.
Detects command-line activity containing keywords associated with process injection or hollowing techniques (e.g., shellcode, inject, hollow, replace) when executed by common script interpreters targeting critical system processes.
Detects unauthorized attempts by a non-super-administrator user within the MyBB Admin Control Panel to assign the administrator group (usergroup=4) to a new or existing user, exploiting a privilege boundary bypass.
This rule detects the loading of specific DLL files (commonly associated with open-source software libraries like mingw or webp) from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData, etc.) by specific processes. The rule further correlates these events with recent execution of potential phishing-related commands (WScript, CScript, or download-related activity) on the same host within a 1-hour window.
Detects potential DLL hijacking persistence by identifying modifications to registry values containing executable or library files that point to locations outside standard Windows system directories (System32 or SysWow64), subsequently joined with the execution of legitimate binary proxies known to be abused for side-loading like rundll32.exe or regsvcs.exe.
Detects the use of 'docker cp' to copy files to or from sensitive host paths, such as cron, password files, SSH keys, or system directories, which often indicates attempts to escape container isolation or establish persistence on the host.
This rule monitors for patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, specifically looking for malicious lure behaviors originating from Adobe Reader processes, VBScript-based droppers, payload drops, file creation of known update names, potential banking browser-kiosk overlays, and specific DLL sideloading techniques.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the GIFTEDCROOK (UAC-0226) threat actor. It identifies the use of PowerShell or cmd.exe to execute staged files from specific ProgramData paths (WC3, wt1), monitors for common NT API-based reflective injection patterns (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtWriteVirtualMemory) originating from PowerShell, tracks the creation of known staging artifacts in ProgramData, and identifies the execution of known malicious process image hashes.
Detects the KuinaExtractor UAC bypass technique, which exploits the auto-elevated 'SilentCleanup' scheduled task. The rule identifies suspicious activity via two patterns: the execution of 'cleanmgr.exe' from an unexpected parent process (bypassing normal task scheduler invocation) or the explicit execution of 'schtasks.exe' to trigger the 'SilentCleanup' task.
This rule detects various persistence mechanisms and configuration tampering techniques often associated with compromised development environments. Specifically, it monitors for the creation of LD_PRELOAD libraries in common directories, unauthorized modifications to shell profile scripts, suspicious cron job creation by Node/NPM processes, and the poisoning of configuration files for IDEs and AI coding assistants (e.g., Claude, Cursor, VSCode). It also detects the execution of suspicious Node.js scripts used as session hooks.
This rule detects various persistence mechanisms and configuration tampering techniques often associated with compromised development environments. Specifically, it monitors for the creation of LD_PRELOAD libraries in common directories, unauthorized modifications to shell profile scripts, suspicious cron job creation by Node/NPM processes, and the poisoning of configuration files for IDEs and AI coding assistants (e.g., Claude, Cursor, VSCode). It also detects the execution of suspicious Node.js scripts used as session hooks.
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