Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects registry run key additions that masquerade as the legitimate .NET Runtime Optimization Service. This behavior is used by the Lorem Ipsum loader (associated with Rapid Brigantine) to establish persistence by executing a payload dropped in C:\ProgramData\ upon user login.
Detects MFA device registration occurring during a suspicious session heavily focused on HR portal access. This rule correlates MFA registration events with access to HR applications like Workday or ADP within a 10-minute window, indicating potential account takeover or unauthorized access attempts.
This rule detects suspicious activity on high blast radius accounts, specifically correlating failed authentication attempts, password resets, and successful logons outside business hours.
The rule prioritizes detection based on a password reset event to produce an informational severity alert, then looks for preceding failed authentications and subsequent out-of-hours logons to indicate a potential compromise by raising severity accordingly.
You will need to utilise the AlertSeverityOverride configuration, pointed at the AlertSeverity field, in your Sentinel rule metaconfig to use this detection effectively.
Hard requirement: Need UEBA enabled in your tenant to populate the BlastRadius field in your IdentityInfo table.
Change each stage to suit your log source for the behaviour mapped to this stage.
Add in other stages if needed to add more dynamic severity (e.g., Account has high blast radius AND is a GA AND was logged in to from outside of expected geolocation > Critical severity)
The rule prioritizes detection based on a password reset event to produce an informational severity alert, then looks for preceding failed authentications and subsequent out-of-hours logons to indicate a potential compromise by raising severity accordingly.
You will need to utilise the AlertSeverityOverride configuration, pointed at the AlertSeverity field, in your Sentinel rule metaconfig to use this detection effectively.
Hard requirement: Need UEBA enabled in your tenant to populate the BlastRadius field in your IdentityInfo table.
Change each stage to suit your log source for the behaviour mapped to this stage.
Add in other stages if needed to add more dynamic severity (e.g., Account has high blast radius AND is a GA AND was logged in to from outside of expected geolocation > Critical severity)
Detects a persistence script querying for a missing task or payload and recreating it when absent, indicating self-repair behaviour. This rule specifically looks for command-line activity involving 'powershell', 'cmd', or 'schtasks.exe' that queries for scheduled tasks and then attempts to create or register them, often using keywords like 'if', 'missing', 'not found', 'create', or 'Register-ScheduledTask'.
Detects the creation of specific vulnerable driver files abused by Gentlemen RaaS EDR killers.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task involving QEMU binaries or associated configuration files, correlated with registry modifications that reference similar artifacts. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious use of virtualization tools for persistence, execution, or environment cloaking.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks with suspicious task names (e.g., masquerading as Microsoft UI components) or payloads (e.g., Python interpreters or .cat files) set to execute every minute. This behavior is associated with the persistence mechanism of the NarwhalRAT malware used by the APT37 threat group.
Detects the Amadey loader malware attempting to establish persistence via Windows Scheduled Tasks. The rule monitors for the execution of schtasks.exe with parameters creating a task that points to suspicious user-writable directories (Temp, AppData) or known Amadey-related artifacts such as the 'e079729711' staging path or 'nudwee.exe' binary.
Detects modifications to the Windows Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry key where a debugger value is configured to point to scripting engines like VBScript or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript). This technique is commonly used for persistence or to intercept process execution by forcing the execution of scripts when legitimate applications are launched.
Detects anomalous activities associated with the Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability. The rule identifies suspicious machine account password changes, NTLM authentication from potentially untrusted subnets or unconfigured workstations, and privilege escalation indicators occurring on domain controllers.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MYRA RAT on Linux systems, including the creation or modification of cron jobs (specifically targeting .cache-update.sh), registration of a malicious shared object via /etc/ld.so.preload, and the installation of a login hook in /etc/profile.d/.
Detects behavior patterns associated with Payouts King ransomware, including direct syscall-style API calls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, CreateRemoteThread) from processes other than trusted system binaries, and the loading of ntdll.dll from non-standard file paths (outside System32/SysWOW64). It also includes a hash-based detection for known Payouts King malicious samples.
This rule detects suspicious memory manipulation and thread injection activities directed at 'svchost.exe' or 'explorer.exe' by processes other than standard system components. Such behavior is often indicative of malicious code injection, where an attacker attempts to run arbitrary code within the address space of trusted system processes to bypass security controls or achieve persistence.
Detects VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) attempting to create Windows services using 'sc.exe create' or adding new users using 'net user /add'. This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or privilege escalation by malicious scripts.
Detects SSH network connections initiated by common administrative service accounts 'vmanage-admin' or 'troot' using the ssh or sshd process. This pattern may indicate unauthorized use of these service accounts or anomalous remote access behavior.
Detects the execution of a malicious Node.js process using a fake ESLint loader named 'vscode-eioesocxetd.js'. This malware persists by modifying the global 'require' function and setting the 'global['!']' property to ensure its presence across process restarts, typically masquerading within npm package directories.
Detects suspicious authentication and management events associated with SD-WAN devices, specifically targeting indicators of CVE-2026-20245 exploitation. The rule monitors for unauthorized SSH access, usage of tenant-upload commands, execution of rogue scripts like vconfd_script_upload_tenant_list, and anomalous peering activity indicative of device injection.
Detects the creation or modification of VS Code tasks.json files containing the folderOpen trigger by non-editor processes. This technique can be abused to achieve automatic code execution when a project folder is opened, a method known to be used by malicious npm packages to execute payloads disguised as benign files.
This rule detects successful network logons (LogonType 3) using NTLM (NTLMv1 or NTLMv2) where the authentication results in an elevated token and the logon originates from a different workstation than the target computer. This combination of factors can indicate lateral movement attempts, especially when an adversary has obtained NTLM hashes (e.g., via Pass-the-Hash or NTLM relay attacks) and is attempting to authenticate to other systems on the network. The rule excludes machine accounts and anonymous logons, as well as loopback authentications, to reduce noise.
Detects Remcos RAT attempting process hollowing into common web browser executables. This rule identifies several indicators: creation of the 'Remcos_Mutex_Inj' mutex, a sequence of API calls (VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, NtUnmapViewOfSection) targeting browser processes from a non-browser process, and the presence of a known Remcos payload MD5 hash (4924369C0BDAF73B21EB992EB9DB4DEA).
This rule detects potential DLL side-loading activity associated with the SilverFox threat actor, specifically targeting trojanized Panasonic and Philips OEM software. It looks for suspicious DLLs (UxEnhance64.dll, XPSPLOG.dll) being loaded, or legitimate Panasonic/Philips binaries loading DLLs from non-standard paths, including the Public user directory.
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