Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll.dll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread'. This API call can be abused by adversaries as an alternative to standard thread creation APIs (like CreateThread) to execute shellcode or malicious code in a suspicious process context, often as part of process injection techniques.
Detects sophisticated shellcode execution patterns characteristic of MovieReaper, specifically monitoring for the combination of RWX memory protection allocation, manipulation of Vectored Exception Handlers (VEH), and usage of manual syscall stubs (NtProtectVirtualMemory) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking.
This rule detects known side-loaded PlugX RAT host processes ('GRrte.exe' or 'Jarte.exe') located in 'JartePortable' directories attempting to modify process tokens or privileges. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation preparation, a common activity for the PlugX modular RAT.
Detects execution of the PlugX side-loaded host process (Jarte.exe / GRrte.exe) from the JartePortable directory. This process performs in-memory host/system profiling (GetComputerNameW, GetVersionEx, system directory queries) via the decoded PlugX core (T1082), which is not directly visible as command-line telemetry.
Detects execution of encoded commands in macOS terminal environments that originate from clipboard content mimicking a reCAPTCHA verification process. This pattern often involves users being social-engineered into pasting a malicious string that decodes a payload and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter (sh/bash/zsh). The rule monitors for the co-occurrence of base64/openssl decoding commands and shell execution pipes, while filtering out known legitimate software installation patterns.
Detects execution of encoded commands in macOS terminal environments that originate from clipboard content mimicking a reCAPTCHA verification process. This pattern often involves users being social-engineered into pasting a malicious string that decodes a payload and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter (sh/bash/zsh). The rule monitors for the co-occurrence of base64/openssl decoding commands and shell execution pipes, while filtering out known legitimate software installation patterns.
This rule detects attempts by AutoIt scripts (running as AutoIt3.exe or from Temp directories) to perform process injection into the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe). It monitors for suspicious API calls like OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, and VirtualAllocEx, specifically looking for memory access and protection flags commonly used during malicious process injection.
This rule detects the creation of a synchronization mutex with a specific naming pattern ('Global\EVOLUTION') often used by malware families to ensure only a single instance of the malicious process runs on the infected host. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for 'MutexCreated' or 'MutexEvent' and parses the synchronization object name to identify this specific indicator.
This rule detects instances of MSBuild.exe executing or communicating over the network while referencing .NET Framework paths. MSBuild is often abused as a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binary and Script) to execute arbitrary code or bypass application control, and unusual network activity from this process is a common indicator of beaconing or command-and-control communication.
Detects potential misuse of the WinGet configuration feature, where remote Desired State Configuration (DSC) YAML files are retrieved using masqueraded file extensions (e.g., .jpg or .txt) or suspicious outbound connections on port 8443, which may indicate an adversary attempting to hide malicious configurations or bypass network filtering.
Detects specific samples of the Rmrlx information stealer by identifying unique file artifacts, mutex names (e.g., Global\EVOLUTION), and debugging/staged files commonly associated with its execution environment, including samples exhibiting IP-checking evasion techniques.
This rule detects internal hosts initiating outbound SSH connections to known public tunneling services (e.g., pinggy.io). Attackers frequently use these services to bypass network firewalls and create persistent reverse SSH tunnels for remote command-and-control access. The detection logic focuses on the identification of SSH protocol traffic headers combined with specific domain targeting or repetitive connection behavior.
Detects the use of the Windows 'tasklist' utility or command execution via 'cmd.exe' when the command line includes strings associated with common debugging tools (e.g., windbg, x64dbg). This behavior may indicate an adversary checking for the presence of analysis tools or attempting to manipulate running processes, which is often associated with debugger evasion or malicious environment reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of 'rundll32.exe' or 'dllhost.exe' with command-line arguments typically associated with loading Control Panel items (.cpl files). This behavior is often used by adversaries to proxy execution of malicious payloads or bypass security controls by leveraging legitimate Windows binaries.
Detects the creation of a file named 'Normaliz.dll' within an 'AppData\Roaming\Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. The rule matches a known malicious MD5 hash or a specific folder path structure, which is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or persistence mechanisms using an abnormally located DLL.
Detects execution of 'codeflush.exe' or attempts to rename files involving 'codeflush.exe' and 'pythonw.exe' within 'MusicLibrariesPackage' directories. This activity often indicates the execution of potentially malicious scripts or tools masquerading as legitimate software.
Detects instances where an executable masquerading as 'msedge.exe' (Microsoft Edge) is launched from a user's Startup folder. The rule looks for files identified as 'msedge.exe' that contain metadata or product information associated with DISM (Deployment Image Servicing and Management) or base Windows operating system components, indicating a potential attempt to disguise a different utility or payload as a trusted web browser.
Detects instances where PowerShell rapidly cycles through a known list of Microsoft-signed .NET binary utilities (LOLBins) located in .NET framework directories, within a short duration. This behavior is consistent with resiliency-spray techniques, such as those used by Veil#Drop, to find an available binary to host an injected .NET assembly.
Detects host reconnaissance activity performed by PureLog Stealer, characterized by the execution of system administration tools (e.g., wmic, reg, systeminfo) spawned as child processes from .NET LOLBins (e.g., msbuild, installutil, regsvcs). This behavior indicates an adversary performing discovery of system configuration and environment details.
Detects the execution of base64-encoded shell commands on macOS, a pattern commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious payloads into their Terminal.
Detects the execution of base64-encoded shell commands on macOS, a pattern commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious payloads into their Terminal.
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