Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,129 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,549
6,209
1,473
1,005
661
Contributors
3,555
2,652
2,153
2,087
1,515
Categories
7,573
3,902
1,466
1,393
1,330
Platforms
13,734
1,392
1,319
824
738
Products / Services
3,828
3,138
2,448
912
908
MITRE Techniques
18,129
15,655
12,603
8,413
6,237
CVEs
19
18
17
16
14
IDS Classtypes
305
51
24
23
22
IDS Protocols
308
136
13
10
10
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
This rule detects the creation of files in directory paths that look similar to the legitimate 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64' folder but contain a hidden trailing space (e.g., 'C:\Windows \SysWOW64'). Attackers use this directory spoofing technique to hide malicious files or executables from users and some security tools that might not normalize the path correctly.
Detects scenarios where a user registers a new WebAuthn/Passkey credential and subsequently performs a sign-in from a different network or device shortly after, preceded by a sign-in from a risky or non-passkey-based method. This pattern is often associated with credential abuse or MFA registration hijacking.
Detects potential AI-targeted cloaking, a technique where a web server serves different content to AI crawlers versus human users, identified by comparing HTTP response sizes or hashes across session logs. The rule uses Microsoft Sentinel's ASIM Web Session schema to correlate web requests, identifying discrepancies that suggest malicious or evasive intent. Covers T1036 & T1027
Detects potential AI-targeted cloaking, a technique where a web server serves different content to AI crawlers versus human users, identified by comparing HTTP response sizes or hashes across session logs. The rule uses Microsoft Sentinel's ASIM Web Session schema to correlate web requests, identifying discrepancies that suggest malicious or evasive intent. Covers T1036 & T1027
Detects potential AI-targeted cloaking, a technique where a web server serves different content to AI crawlers versus human users, identified by comparing HTTP response sizes or hashes across session logs. The rule uses Microsoft Sentinel's ASIM Web Session schema to correlate web requests, identifying discrepancies that suggest malicious or evasive intent. Covers T1036 & T1027
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects evidence of anti-forensic activities associated with the SparroWocky toolset. The rule monitors for the removal of the 'ProcAuditManager' service, deletion of the 'SnapCart' registry key, and the execution of a self-deleting batch script used to remove forensic artifacts.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns common command-line or system utilities often used for post-exploitation activities, specifically when command-line arguments contain references to 'MSExchange' or 'Exchange'. This behavior is frequently associated with exploitation attempts against Microsoft Exchange servers, such as the ProxyLogon chain, where a web shell or other malicious script might be used to execute commands via the IIS process.
Detects indicators of the SparroWocky Trident loader, including specific side-loaded DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll), encrypted payload files with custom magic headers, persistence mechanisms such as specific service names and registry keys, inter-process communication objects (mutexes, events, shared memory), and named pipes used for C2 communication.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency MFA method resets, deletions, or updates performed by a single administrative account within a 15-minute window. This activity is indicative of a compromised support or helpdesk account being leveraged to bypass multi-factor authentication across multiple user accounts for unauthorized access or account takeover.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command-line activity involving the use of encoded, obfuscated, or stealth-focused flags, as well as common patterns associated with fileless payload delivery and execution.
Detects the abuse of the Windows built-in utility 'certutil.exe' to download files or decode obfuscated payloads. Attackers frequently use certutil as a Living off the Land Binary (LOLBin) to bypass security controls by leveraging its native capabilities for file transfer (via URL cache) and base64 or hexadecimal decoding.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user account experiences a burst of multiple MFA failures followed by an anomalous successful authentication within a short 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated MFA fatigue attacks or attempts to exploit MFA bypass vulnerabilities.
Detects an identity that performs a 'ListSecrets' operation followed by a high volume of 'GetSecretValue' or 'BatchGetSecretValue' requests within a short timeframe (15 minutes). This behavioral pattern is indicative of automated bulk exfiltration of secrets from AWS Secrets Manager, a common activity following an initial cloud environment compromise.
The following analytic identifies the use of the esxcli system auditrecords commands, which can be used to tamper with logging on an ESXi host.
This action may indicate an attempt to evade detection or hinder forensic analysis by preventing the recording of system-level audit events.
This action may indicate an attempt to evade detection or hinder forensic analysis by preventing the recording of system-level audit events.
Detects the MovieReaper Stage-3 module which masquerades as Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) within the C:\ProgramData\Windows\Telemetry directory. The detection focuses on suspicious process execution from this directory and identifies instances where the process respawns itself, suggesting malicious activity post-UAC bypass.
This rule detects processes manually resolving API function addresses by traversing the Process Environment Block (PEB) Ldr structure or parsing module export tables. This technique is often used by malicious code to resolve Windows API functions dynamically without relying on standard LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress calls, effectively evading common API-hooking based monitoring.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
This rule monitors for outbound TCP traffic from internal hosts to a specific IP address (212.34.141.103) on port 4521, which is associated with C2 beaconing behavior, potentially involving the abuse of MSBuild.exe as a LOLBin.
Page 114 of 864