Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
This rule detects the creation of specific system mutexes commonly used by malware for persistence or to avoid multiple infections (Mutual Exclusion). It monitors for both a specific hardcoded mutex and a pattern-based approach (15-20 alphanumeric characters) initiated by executables from common temporary or user-writable directories, which is a frequent indicator of malicious secondary payloads or droppers.
This rule monitors for processes named 'msedge.exe' executing from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. The rule filters out legitimate Edge update processes and common browser command-line arguments to isolate potentially malicious masquerading attempts by identifying binaries that share the name of a legitimate application but reside in unexpected, often non-standard locations.
This rule monitors for processes named 'msedge.exe' executing from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. The rule filters out legitimate Edge update processes and common browser command-line arguments to isolate potentially malicious masquerading attempts by identifying binaries that share the name of a legitimate application but reside in unexpected, often non-standard locations.
This rule monitors for processes named 'msedge.exe' executing from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. The rule filters out legitimate Edge update processes and common browser command-line arguments to isolate potentially malicious masquerading attempts by identifying binaries that share the name of a legitimate application but reside in unexpected, often non-standard locations.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects instances where a process named msedge.exe is running from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This is a common location used by attackers to hide malicious executables by masquerading them as legitimate browser processes, particularly when the process command line includes arguments like 'preview' or 'thumbnail' which are often used to blend in with background system activity.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
This rule monitors for ADFS-related security events that may indicate credential theft or authentication bypass attempts. It flags anomalous federated sign-in events (e.g., MFA bypass, unfamiliar location), unauthorized access to the ADFS DKM container in Active Directory, and suspicious attempts to export ADFS token-signing certificates.
Detects a single user account authenticating, performing Graph API reconnaissance, and conducting data exfiltration across three distinct source IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of threat actors like Storm-3121 or Storm-3032 rotating infrastructure per attack stage to evade network-based detection.
Detects a single user account authenticating, performing Graph API reconnaissance, and conducting data exfiltration across three distinct source IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of threat actors like Storm-3121 or Storm-3032 rotating infrastructure per attack stage to evade network-based detection.
Detects network indicators associated with the Exvicy ClickFix campaign, including HTTP callbacks to embed endpoints, DNS queries for the 'cloudflare-check.net' domain, direct connections to the identified C2 IP address (94.26.90.126), and HTTP responses containing fake 'Security Check' iframe content.
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