Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of an executable file where the command line matches a specific pattern of a single character argument (e.g., '.exe s'). This behavior is frequently associated with malicious tools attempting to perform actions with minimal command-line footprints or potential process injection/tampering patterns when executed by a different user than the initiating process.
This rule identifies potential SparroWocky malware payload files by detecting a specific custom header (0x11328712 in both little-endian and big-endian format) used for identifying encrypted .dat files that contain embedded RC4 keys.
Detects threads created using CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread where the start address resolves to the AnimateWindow function in user32.dll. This technique is often used by malware, such as those leveraging the MinHook library, to disguise the true entry point of injected code by redirecting thread execution through a legitimate Windows API function (hooking).
Detects the allocation of executable memory regions (RWX or EXECUTE_READ) that are not backed by a file on disk (i.e., anonymous memory). This behavior is a common indicator of process injection, shellcode execution, or fileless malware techniques where code is injected into a process and executed directly from memory without a corresponding file on disk.
Detects components associated with the SparroWocky trident loader, specifically targeting side-loaded DLLs (DukeQt.dll or winfsp-x64.dll) and .dat data containers that contain a specific magic value (0x11328712) and RC4 strings, indicating in-memory payload decryption and mapping.
Detects a process re-launching itself with a specific command-line argument format (a single 's' character followed by a numeric session ID). This behavior is characteristic of the SparroWocky malware, which enumerates user sessions and spawns a new backdoor instance under a different session using CreateProcessAsUserW after duplicating the target session's token.
Detects instances where a process is created with a session ID that differs from its parent process, which is indicative of token manipulation or impersonation techniques like those observed in SparroWocky. The rule looks for cross-session process creation using the CreateProcessAsUserW API or specific command-line argument patterns.
Detects a multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern often associated with 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering lures, where a base64-encoded or obfuscated command is used to invoke malicious network downloads (IEX, WebClient, DownloadString). The rule further correlates these execution patterns with potential persistence mechanisms, specifically monitoring modifications to Windows startup locations or Run keys.
Detects reflective memory mapping and reflective code loading activities consistent with the SparroWocky payload. The rule identifies suspicious memory configurations, specifically executable and writable (RWX) memory regions that are not backed by a corresponding file on disk, often associated with memory-only execution techniques. It also monitors for execution artifacts related to NtMapViewOfSection or reflective loading keywords.
Detects reflective memory mapping and reflective code loading activities consistent with the SparroWocky payload. The rule identifies suspicious memory configurations, specifically executable and writable (RWX) memory regions that are not backed by a corresponding file on disk, often associated with memory-only execution techniques. It also monitors for execution artifacts related to NtMapViewOfSection or reflective loading keywords.
Detects DLL side-loading of 'winfsp-x64.dll' or 'DukeQt.dll' by legitimate signed executables from non-standard directories. This behavior is associated with the FamousSparrow threat actor's 'SparroWocky' trident loader scheme, which leverages side-loading to execute malicious payloads in the context of trusted processes.
Detects DLL side-loading of 'winfsp-x64.dll' or 'DukeQt.dll' by legitimate signed executables from non-standard directories. This behavior is associated with the FamousSparrow threat actor's 'SparroWocky' trident loader scheme, which leverages side-loading to execute malicious payloads in the context of trusted processes.
Detects a suspicious multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern where an initial process utilizing obfuscated arguments (e.g., -EncodedCommand) launches a secondary PowerShell process that performs network operations indicative of downloading and executing a remote payload.
Detects the presence of hidden DOM elements containing suspicious AI instructional phrases (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'you are now') served in HTML responses from known AI assistant platforms. This behavior is indicative of a Prompt-Forcing attack, where an adversary attempts to manipulate the AI model's behavior by injecting hidden instructions that the user cannot see but the AI consumes.
This rule detects potential DLL side-loading activity by identifying when known malicious file hashes are loaded by a specific set of executable files that are commonly abused for side-loading, or when these executables are executed from locations outside of their standard, verified installation directories.
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
Detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving GlobalProtect VPN components. The rule identifies the execution of GlobalProtect.exe with specific command-line arguments combined with the presence of suspicious versions of bcrypt.dll or WININET.dll within the same directory, which are characteristic of recent malicious activity involving modified DLL files targeting GlobalProtect environments.
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
Detects a pattern of multiple failed authentication attempts (brute force) from an external IP address followed by a successful authentication event on remote access services such as RDP, VPN, or NTLM. The rule filters for non-private IP addresses and flags successes occurring outside of standard business hours.
Detects potential exploitation of PostgreSQL via logical decoding plugins, specifically targeting CVE-2026-6471. The rule monitors for the PostgreSQL server process spawning suspicious shell utilities or loading modules from locations outside of the expected PostgreSQL library or plugin directories, which is a common indicator of unauthorized code execution.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
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