Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

18,132 detections

Detects the execution of AutoIt3 scripts using mshta.exe as the parent process from suspicious or non-standard directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass application execution policies or obfuscate malicious script execution.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects Koktevrat Stage 2 Android RAT component (com.kowo.ciligeci) that unpacks the RC4-encrypted uoN.css/uoN.apk payload using the RC4 key iOZ
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This detection identifies enabled user accounts that have not had a successful sign-in for the last 90 days, highlighting potential security risks from dormant accounts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
605
This rule detects the execution of arbitrary commands via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) by monitoring process creation events where 'wsl.exe' is the executable. It specifically looks for command lines that include flags like '--exec' or '-e', or common shell commands and downloaders such as 'curl', 'wget', 'bash -c', 'sh -c', 'nc ', or 'ncat '. This activity can indicate an adversary leveraging WSL to execute malicious code or bypass security controls.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
105
Detects suspicious behavior from database accounts with replication privileges ('rolreplication=true'). The rule monitors for logins from unauthorized IP addresses, the execution of non-replication related SQL commands by these accounts, and the use of potentially malicious plugin names (containing path traversal characters) during replication slot creation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
005
Detects successful remote logons to network devices (routers, VPNs, NAS) using the 'admin' account. This pattern is indicative of credential spraying or brute-force attacks targeting weak default credentials on externally facing management interfaces, often associated with botnets or threat actors performing reconnaissance and initial access operations.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the use of obfuscated PowerShell commands that utilize .NET [Convert]::FromBase64String combined with character replacement string manipulation, a common technique to hide malicious payloads from simple static analysis.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
203
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands that utilize XOR operations combined with byte array manipulation and common file writing methods. This pattern is frequently used by malicious scripts to deobfuscate and drop payloads to disk.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
103
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
103
Detects suspicious execution of files located in the AppData Local Temp directory initiated by PowerShell or using PowerShell-specific hidden window arguments. This behavior is commonly associated with dropper scripts or malware staging execution from a user's temporary folder.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
This rule detects the process 'charmap.exe' establishing an outbound network connection to a known AsyncRAT command-and-control (C2) IP address and port. This behavior is indicative of process injection where the legitimate Windows Character Map utility is utilized as a host process for malicious AsyncRAT payload execution.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
103
Detects the creation of email inbox rules in Microsoft 365 where the rule name is exceptionally short ('.' or '..') and the rule performs potentially malicious actions such as forwarding, redirecting, or deleting incoming messages. This is a common technique used by attackers to hide malicious email activity or exfiltrate sensitive data from a compromised account.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
205
Detects execution of potentially suspicious processes ('Launcher.exe' or 'GapiUpdate.exe') originating from ClickOnce-related processes ('dfsvc.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with 'dfshim.dll'). ClickOnce is often abused to proxy execution of malicious code, allowing adversaries to execute applications from user-writable directories without administrative privileges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
Detects execution of potentially suspicious processes ('Launcher.exe' or 'GapiUpdate.exe') originating from ClickOnce-related processes ('dfsvc.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with 'dfshim.dll'). ClickOnce is often abused to proxy execution of malicious code, allowing adversaries to execute applications from user-writable directories without administrative privileges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
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