Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

18,132 detections

Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
000
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
Detects rapid, bulk cloning or downloading of GitHub repositories containing sensitive data (e.g., consensus algorithms, PII, internal blocklists). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized data exfiltration, specifically tracking activity involving suspicious OAuth token prefixes (gho_) and rapid high-volume access to sensitive organizational assets within a short timeframe.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects rapid, bulk cloning or downloading of GitHub repositories containing sensitive data (e.g., consensus algorithms, PII, internal blocklists). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized data exfiltration, specifically tracking activity involving suspicious OAuth token prefixes (gho_) and rapid high-volume access to sensitive organizational assets within a short timeframe.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects rapid, bulk cloning or downloading of GitHub repositories containing sensitive data (e.g., consensus algorithms, PII, internal blocklists). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized data exfiltration, specifically tracking activity involving suspicious OAuth token prefixes (gho_) and rapid high-volume access to sensitive organizational assets within a short timeframe.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
Detects rapid, bulk cloning or downloading of GitHub repositories containing sensitive data (e.g., consensus algorithms, PII, internal blocklists). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized data exfiltration, specifically tracking activity involving suspicious OAuth token prefixes (gho_) and rapid high-volume access to sensitive organizational assets within a short timeframe.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
000
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects PE executables whose embedded filename strings claim to be Adobe, TrueConf, or 1C software but whose PE metadata (company/product name) or digital signature does not match the claimed vendor, as used by NightEagle/GhostContainer operators to blend malicious tooling into normal process activity
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
001
Detects PE executables whose embedded filename strings claim to be Adobe, TrueConf, or 1C software but whose PE metadata (company/product name) or digital signature does not match the claimed vendor, as used by NightEagle/GhostContainer operators to blend malicious tooling into normal process activity
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects PE executables whose embedded filename strings claim to be Adobe, TrueConf, or 1C software but whose PE metadata (company/product name) or digital signature does not match the claimed vendor, as used by NightEagle/GhostContainer operators to blend malicious tooling into normal process activity
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects path traversal attempts against a Vite development server by monitoring for various forms of URI encoding (single/double) and suspicious path patterns (e.g., /etc/passwd, .env, .git/config, /@fs/). The rule tracks these attempts using flowbits and alerts when a successful HTTP 200 response is received after a matching traversal request.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
002
Detects path traversal attempts against a Vite development server by monitoring for various forms of URI encoding (single/double) and suspicious path patterns (e.g., /etc/passwd, .env, .git/config, /@fs/). The rule tracks these attempts using flowbits and alerts when a successful HTTP 200 response is received after a matching traversal request.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
102
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
404
Detects rapid, sequential identity-validation API calls (such as GetCallerIdentity, GetSessionToken, or AssumeRole) performed across a large number of distinct AWS access keys from a single source within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of automated tooling validating a harvested corpus of AWS access keys to identify active credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects rapid, sequential identity-validation API calls (such as GetCallerIdentity, GetSessionToken, or AssumeRole) performed across a large number of distinct AWS access keys from a single source within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of automated tooling validating a harvested corpus of AWS access keys to identify active credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
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