Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of .NET reflection methods (such as Assembly.Load or LoadFrom) within command-line arguments of processes frequently abused for secondary execution (e.g., rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe) when initiated by common scripting or execution engines like PowerShell, cmd.exe, or mshta.exe. This pattern is indicative of fileless malware execution or reflective assembly loading commonly used to bypass traditional signature-based detection.
Detects the loading of the 'user32.dll' library into a process named 'firefox.exe' where the process is either unsigned or executing from a suspicious location like 'ProgramData'. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of BabylonRAT, which masquerades as the Firefox browser to perform keylogging by hooking system APIs.
This rule detects instances of a process named 'firefox.exe' that is executing from a directory other than the standard 'Mozilla Firefox' program folders. When this masquerading process loads critical system DLLs like 'kernel32.dll' or 'ntdll.dll', it flags potential dynamic API resolution activity commonly associated with BabylonRAT and similar malware that attempts to hide its capabilities by resolving system functions at runtime.
Detects the execution of a process named 'firefox.exe' that is running from a path other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation directory. This is a common technique used by malware to masquerade as a legitimate web browser.
This rule detects processes named 'firefox.exe' running from locations other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation directories. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious activity by using a legitimate browser process name.
Detects the use of .NET reflection assembly loading techniques (e.g., Assembly.Load, [Reflection.Assembly]::Load) within the command line arguments of known LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binary and Script) processes. This behavior is frequently associated with fileless malware execution or the loading of malicious assemblies directly into the memory space of trusted Windows binaries.
This rule detects processes named 'firefox.exe' running from locations other than the standard Mozilla Firefox installation directories. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious activity by using a legitimate browser process name.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates using the OAuth Device Code flow followed by subsequent mailbox operations (such as reading, sending, or deleting items) from a different IP address within a 10-minute window. This behavior is a strong indicator of adversary-in-the-middle phishing attacks where an attacker captures a session token and utilizes it from a remote location.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation or stealth-related flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, -w hidden) when initiated by CMD or from a LNK file, particularly when originating from Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for malicious file execution and dropper activity.
Detects instances of 'firefox.exe' executing from locations other than the standard Mozilla installation directories, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or ProgramData. Additionally, the rule validates if the binary is digitally signed by Mozilla. This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt, where an attacker runs a malicious executable disguised as Firefox.
Detects instances of 'firefox.exe' executing from locations other than the standard Mozilla installation directories, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or ProgramData. Additionally, the rule validates if the binary is digitally signed by Mozilla. This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt, where an attacker runs a malicious executable disguised as Firefox.
Detects instances where a process named firefox.exe is running from a non-standard location or includes keywords indicative of keylogging activity such as 'SetWindowsHookEx', 'GetAsyncKeyState', 'GetKeyState', or 'keylog'. This is a common behavioral indicator for the BabylonRAT malware.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity originating from the Microsoft Authentication Broker or utilizing the OAuth device code flow, which are frequently abused by adversaries to perform OAuth phishing and obtain access tokens.
Detects execution of the suspicious installer 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' or the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files associated with this specific executable name. This activity is indicative of potential malicious installer behavior, likely used to distribute malware or drop persistent components.
Detects execution of the suspicious installer 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' or the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files associated with this specific executable name. This activity is indicative of potential malicious installer behavior, likely used to distribute malware or drop persistent components.
Detects instances of 'firefox.exe' executing from locations other than the standard Mozilla Firefox program directories, a technique used by BabylonRAT and other malware to masquerade as a legitimate browser application.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Google Chrome Update' using the Windows schtasks.exe utility. The rule flags instances where the task is created from locations other than the legitimate Google Chrome installation directories, identifying potential persistence mechanisms masquerading as a common software update process.
Detects the use of PowerShell's System.Reflection.Assembly Load methods to dynamically load .NET assemblies into process memory from a byte array. This technique is often used by adversaries to execute malicious code directly in memory, bypassing disk-based detection mechanisms.
Detects the execution or loading of modules, processes, or command lines associated with the Stella_Gary C# backdoor framework. This framework is utilized by the Kimsuky (APT-C-55) threat group as part of a modular, plugin-based capability loading architecture.
Detects PowerShell command lines that perform environment validation by enumerating running processes for security software (AV/EDR/Analysis tools) and querying WMI for virtualization artifacts. This behavior is consistent with anti-analysis and anti-sandbox evasion techniques used by threat actors, such as Kimsuky, to identify and verify the execution environment before proceeding with malicious activity.
Detects files that are masquerading as Rich Text Format (RTF) documents but do not contain valid RTF magic bytes and instead contain embedded Portable Executable (PE) headers or DOS stubs. This behavior is indicative of malware delivery via file-type masquerading, often used in spearphishing campaigns by actors such as Kimsuky.
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