Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,132 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,549
6,212
1,473
1,005
661
Contributors
3,555
2,652
2,153
2,087
1,515
Categories
7,573
3,902
1,466
1,393
1,330
Platforms
13,736
1,393
1,320
824
738
Products / Services
3,828
3,138
2,448
912
908
MITRE Techniques
18,132
15,660
12,605
8,416
6,238
CVEs
19
18
17
16
14
IDS Classtypes
305
51
24
23
22
IDS Protocols
308
136
13
10
10
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where a session token is reused without a fresh MFA challenge, originating from known residential proxy service providers. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen session tokens (Session Replay) to bypass MFA protections.
Detects post-exploitation persistence artifacts on Windows endpoints consistent with abuse of CVE-2026-18577.
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
Detects the execution of known Windows update-related binaries (UpdateAssistant.exe or AppUpdateHelper.exe) from non-standard, suspicious locations within AppData directories. This behavior is indicative of masquerading, where an adversary attempts to blend in by using a legitimate process name from an unexpected path.
This rule detects modifications to the security descriptors (ACLs) of sensitive Active Directory objects, specifically targeting additions of powerful rights like GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, or ForceChangePassword. Monitoring these changes on privileged objects such as Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and Domain Controllers is critical for detecting potential privilege escalation or persistence efforts.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
Detects installation of a service or kernel driver named IPFILTERDRIVER,
the network packet-filtering driver used by the Sality P2P botnet (SALTY SPIDER) to
block infected hosts from reaching antivirus vendor domains/IPs and to shield the
peer-to-peer communication channel from local security tooling. Presence of this
service is a high-confidence indicator of Sality infection.
the network packet-filtering driver used by the Sality P2P botnet (SALTY SPIDER) to
block infected hosts from reaching antivirus vendor domains/IPs and to shield the
peer-to-peer communication channel from local security tooling. Presence of this
service is a high-confidence indicator of Sality infection.
The following analytic detects renaming of Windows built-in accounts via Event ID 4781.
It identifies renames targeting accounts with well-known reserved RIDs (500-504): Administrator, Guest, krbtgt, DefaultAccount, and WDAGUtilityAccount, by matching the TargetSid field against the S-1-5-21-*-50[0-4] pattern.
Attackers commonly rename the built-in Administrator account to evade detections that alert on the literal account name, while retaining the full privileges of the RID-500 account.
Renaming Guest, krbtgt, or other reserved accounts is highly unusual in any legitimate environment.
It identifies renames targeting accounts with well-known reserved RIDs (500-504): Administrator, Guest, krbtgt, DefaultAccount, and WDAGUtilityAccount, by matching the TargetSid field against the S-1-5-21-*-50[0-4] pattern.
Attackers commonly rename the built-in Administrator account to evade detections that alert on the literal account name, while retaining the full privileges of the RID-500 account.
Renaming Guest, krbtgt, or other reserved accounts is highly unusual in any legitimate environment.
The following analytic detects the creation or modification of adsource.dll or other staging files with the name adsource_*.dll within the SCCM SMS Provider bin directory, consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-47301.
This abuses a DLL side-loading vulnerability in the Microsoft Configuration Manager SMS Provider component.
An attacker can plant a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 path, causing the SMS Provider service to load the attacker-controlled library in a privileged context.
The presence of renamed dlls alongside adsource.dll is a strong indicator of the classic DLL hijacking pattern where the legitimate library has been renamed so the malicious replacement can proxy calls to it.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents a privilege escalation vector that can result in SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the SCCM SMS Provider role.
This abuses a DLL side-loading vulnerability in the Microsoft Configuration Manager SMS Provider component.
An attacker can plant a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 path, causing the SMS Provider service to load the attacker-controlled library in a privileged context.
The presence of renamed dlls alongside adsource.dll is a strong indicator of the classic DLL hijacking pattern where the legitimate library has been renamed so the malicious replacement can proxy calls to it.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents a privilege escalation vector that can result in SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the SCCM SMS Provider role.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
Detects high-volume access to Exchange Online mailboxes by a single user from a single IP address using the 'One Outlook Web' application ID, potentially indicating unauthorized automated mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects msiexec.exe executing from the Temp directory with suspicious command-line arguments (such as hidden windows) and spawning child processes like cmd.exe, tasklist.exe, or taskkill.exe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious installation scripts attempting to perform discovery or terminate security processes while remaining stealthy.
This rule detects instances where a process named 'wsc_updata.exe' executing from a Temp directory loads a library named 'wsc.dll'. This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or DLL hijacking, where a malicious or potentially unwanted executable attempts to load a library from a user-writable directory to execute arbitrary code.
This rule detects authentication events occurring from devices that have not been seen in the user's history over the previous 14 days and involve non-compliant, unmanaged, or non-Azure AD joined devices. The detection specifically looks for sign-ins that do not utilize interactive credential prompts (token-based), which may indicate an adversary using a stolen session token (e.g., a Primary Refresh Token) from an unrecognized or insecure source.
Detects instances where an Azure AD Connect or MSOL synchronization account performs directory replication actions (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) from a host or at a time inconsistent with its 14-day established baseline. The rule further correlates these anomalies with Azure Audit logs or AzureActivity entries associated with the identity to identify potential cloud-originated abuse or credential compromise.
Detects country-coded lure path requests (/eg, /ma) followed by a cloaking differential response (desktop UA blocked with 404, mobile UA served content). Fixed a regex bug where the original pattern matched any path merely starting with 'eg' or 'ma' (e.g. /egg.jpg, /mail, /manifest.json) instead of the exact path segment.
Detects the loading of reflective (memory-only) DLLs within the chrome.exe process address space. This activity is indicative of memory-based exploit chains, such as those that corrupt WebAssembly module metadata to facilitate arbitrary code execution following a sandbox escape.
Detects known malicious file hashes for GRAYRABBIT delivery chain components: trojanized 7zp.dll loader, encrypted PE loader shellcode, and GRAYRABBIT backdoor core.dll, gated on PE structural validity and filesize
Detects UNC3569/GRAYRABBIT shellcode combining call/pop self-location, PEB InLoadOrderModuleList walk, and the specific XOR-then-ROR8 export-name hashing loop observed in the GRAYRABBIT loader chain, requiring multiple distinctive elements together to reduce false positives on generic shellcode idioms
Page 158 of 864