Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,549
6,208
1,473
1,005
661
Contributors
3,555
2,652
2,153
2,087
1,515
Categories
7,572
3,901
1,465
1,393
1,330
Platforms
13,733
1,392
1,319
824
738
Products / Services
3,828
3,137
2,448
912
908
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,651
12,599
8,410
6,235
CVEs
19
18
17
16
14
IDS Classtypes
305
51
24
23
22
IDS Protocols
308
136
13
10
10
Detects ClickFix-style attacks where a user is tricked into copying and pasting malicious, often obfuscated, commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt. The detection identifies suspicious parent processes (like explorer.exe) spawning shell interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe) with inline encoded payloads or remote content retrieval patterns. It correlates these process executions with recent entries in the Windows RunMRU registry key to identify commands triggered via the Run dialog.
Detects chained AWS STS AssumeRole/AssumeRoleWithSAML/AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity events where a principal assumes a role in a different account and then quickly performs another role assumption from that new context. This pattern, often referred to as 'role chaining' or 'role laundering', is frequently used to obfuscate identity tracking and facilitate lateral movement across AWS account boundaries.
Detects the modification of the wsl.exe binary from its installed location.
Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Okta flagged a password as present in a known breach corpus and still issued a session
for the same account within the same hour. Indicates the tenant's sign-on policy is not
enforcing the breached-credential signal and the account is likely under attacker control.
for the same account within the same hour. Indicates the tenant's sign-on policy is not
enforcing the breached-credential signal and the account is likely under attacker control.
Detects HTTP traffic associated with the Wazza phishing kit anti-bot mechanism, including token minting requests, signed token responses, and validation checks.
Detects HTTP traffic associated with the Wazza phishing kit anti-bot mechanism, including token minting requests, signed token responses, and validation checks.
Detects network traffic associated with Wazza phishkit anti-bot gates, including beacon communications, TLS SNI patterns, fingerprint iframe URIs, and challenge-platform requests.
Detects network traffic associated with Wazza phishkit anti-bot gates, including beacon communications, TLS SNI patterns, fingerprint iframe URIs, and challenge-platform requests.
The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen countries. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the geographic location of the source IP address against a baseline of known locations. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or potential compromise of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain control over cloud assets, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further infiltration into the network.
This analytic detects mailbox rule creation, a common technique used in Business Email Compromise. It uses a scoring mechanism to identify a combination of attributes often featured in mailbox rules created by attackers. This may indicate that an attacker has gained access to the account.
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects potentially malicious use of rundll32.exe by monitoring for execution from suspicious directory paths (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), execution with arguments missing common legitimate entry points, unexpected network connections originating from rundll32.exe, or rundll32.exe spawning child processes (excluding known safe binaries like conhost.exe or werfault.exe).
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-24472) involving authentication bypass via HTTP header manipulation (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For) and unauthorized access to the /jsconsole endpoint.
This rule identifies successful sign-in events using the Azure CLI application where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not enforced. This is a potential indicator of a misconfiguration where sensitive cloud management interfaces are accessible via single-factor authentication, or a sign of an adversary attempting to leverage a less secure authentication pathway.
Detects modifications to the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) InstallLocation registry key.
Attackers can modify this registry key to redirect the execution flow of legitimate WSL processes (wsl.exe or bash.exe) to a malicious payload, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Attackers can modify this registry key to redirect the execution flow of legitimate WSL processes (wsl.exe or bash.exe) to a malicious payload, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Detects instances where an identity associated with AI or automated agents (service accounts, service principals, bots, or assistants) is assigned to highly privileged administrative roles or security groups in the directory. This behavior potentially indicates an attempt to escalate privileges using a compromised or improperly configured agent identity.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user authenticates to a remote access portal (like Citrix or VPN) without multi-factor authentication (MFA) or with an existing risk flag, followed by a surge in file activity (creation, modification, or renaming of >500 files or >200 distinct files) on the same account within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating compromised credential usage for staging data for exfiltration or ransomware.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
The following analytic detects a user account modifying its own userPrincipalName (UPN) to match the sAMAccountName of another account via Windows Security Event 4738.
This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account.
The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464).
Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder.
A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.
This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account.
The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464).
Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder.
A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.
Detects awk-based shell command construction on ESX BusyBox that interleaves
an esxcli/vim-cmd command string with invisible Unicode code points (zero-width space,
zero-width non-joiner/joiner, word joiner, Mongolian vowel separator, left/right-to-left
marks, or Plane-16 private-use characters generated via sprintf hex escapes), strips them
with gsub(), and passes the result to system(). CrowdStrike documented this as one of 21
validated ESX obfuscation techniques that leaves only the invisible-character-laden string
in shell logs while the executed command is fully hidden from cleartext review.
an esxcli/vim-cmd command string with invisible Unicode code points (zero-width space,
zero-width non-joiner/joiner, word joiner, Mongolian vowel separator, left/right-to-left
marks, or Plane-16 private-use characters generated via sprintf hex escapes), strips them
with gsub(), and passes the result to system(). CrowdStrike documented this as one of 21
validated ESX obfuscation techniques that leaves only the invisible-character-laden string
in shell logs while the executed command is fully hidden from cleartext review.
Page 16 of 864