Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the gitlab-triage automation tool being invoked with a personal access token scoped to the broad 'api' permission rather than a narrower issue/MR-only scope, inflating the blast radius if the token leaks.
Detects a single GitLab token/account holding Owner-level access across an unusually large number of projects (50+), the standing-privilege condition that turned one leaked token into a 55-project supply-chain exposure.
The following analytic detects an unusual process execution pattern where a process running from C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ attempts to execute a binary from C:\Windows\System32\. In a typical Windows environment, 32-bit processes under SysWOW64 should primarily interact with 32-bit binaries within the same directory. However, an execution flow where a 32-bit process spawns a 64-bit binary from System32 can indicate potential process injection, privilege escalation, evasion techniques, or unauthorized execution hijacking.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, initiating suspicious WebDAV network connections, dropping executable or sensitive files, or spawning known LOLBAS processes (rundll32, explorer, regsvr32) from suspicious directories like Temp or WebDAV paths. It also includes a blocklist for known malicious file hashes associated with these patterns.
Detects an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-14894 within the Super Forms plugin by sending a crafted HTTP POST request to admin-ajax.php. The attack attempts to upload an obfuscated PHP web shell disguised as a base64-encoded GIF image.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
KQL Query from file: Cloudflared Persistence & svchost.exe Masquerading Post-N-central CVE-2026-18577
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line activity involving powershell.exe or mshta.exe that is initiated by a web browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, or iexplore.exe). It monitors for indicators such as encoded commands, usage of Invoke-Expression, download cradles, hidden window flags, and specific known IOCs, correlating these events with recent browser activity to identify potential drive-by download or browser-based exploitation attempts.
Detects processes named 'kworker' (in bracket notation) that are not initiated by the legitimate 'kthreadd' parent process, which is indicative of a process masquerading as a kernel worker thread. Legitimate kworker processes are kernel threads managed by kthreadd. Processes masquerading as these can be used by malware to hide in plain sight.
Detects a discrepancy between the SHA256 hash of a running process image (via /proc/<pid>/exe on Linux) and the hash of the corresponding binary file on disk. This behavior is indicative of process memory manipulation, such as fileless execution or binary replacement, where the code currently running in memory does not match the original file on disk.
Detects sessions using shared Grafana service account tokens that perform both read-only and action-capable tool operations without confirmed prior authentication. This behavior is indicative of an unauthenticated or spoofed session leveraging a service account's excessive permissions, bypassing standard authentication flows.
Detects potential credential harvesting or process memory manipulation against browser processes (Chrome or Edge). The rule monitors for unauthorized debugging activity initiated against browser processes (e.g., using flags like DEBUG_PROCESS or specific API calls) and the access of the App-Bound encryption provider symbol, which is often a target for attackers seeking to decrypt browser-stored secrets.
Detects ERAAgent.exe performing suspicious dynamic API resolution for functions commonly used by the SLEEPWALKER malware (VirtualProtect, SetSecurityDescriptorDacl, and CryptGenRandom). By resolving these functions at runtime via GetProcAddress rather than including them in the static import table, the malware attempts to evade detection and analysis.
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
This rule detects potential reflective code injection or in-memory loading (fileless) where a DLL or PE image is loaded by mshta.exe or powershell.exe, but the module load event lacks a valid file path on disk (or indicates a device path). This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads such as the Amatera loader, where payloads are executed directly in memory to evade file-based security detections.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64-encoded strings, window style arguments for obfuscation, and subsequent decoding to reveal suspicious indicators such as network downloading commands or archive manipulation, indicative of potential fileless malware staging.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64-encoded strings, window style arguments for obfuscation, and subsequent decoding to reveal suspicious indicators such as network downloading commands or archive manipulation, indicative of potential fileless malware staging.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
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