Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
Detects msiexec.exe executing from the Temp directory with suspicious command-line arguments (such as hidden windows) and spawning child processes like cmd.exe, tasklist.exe, or taskkill.exe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious installation scripts attempting to perform discovery or terminate security processes while remaining stealthy.
Detects anomalous remote interactive or network logons where the specific account and remote host/IP combination has not been observed in the previous 14 days. The rule correlates these new login events with subsequent process execution on the destination host within a short window (5 minutes) to identify potential lateral movement where an adversary uses valid credentials to log in and immediately execute commands.
Detects a discrepancy between the SHA256 hash of a running process image (via /proc/<pid>/exe on Linux) and the hash of the corresponding binary file on disk. This behavior is indicative of process memory manipulation, such as fileless execution or binary replacement, where the code currently running in memory does not match the original file on disk.
This rule detects potential fileless execution by correlating network connections to a known suspicious domain (workers.dev) with subsequent PowerShell activity on the same device. The rule specifically looks for processes executing PowerShell commands involving Base64 decoding, ChaCha20 decryption, or Assembly.Load, occurring within a 10-minute window of the network connection.
Detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) utilizing Schannel (TLS client certificate) or PKU2U (peer authentication) logon processes. This behavior may indicate an attacker using forged or stolen certificates to authenticate against a system, potentially bypassing Kerberos-based authentication monitoring.
Detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving GlobalProtect VPN components. The rule identifies the execution of GlobalProtect.exe with specific command-line arguments combined with the presence of suspicious versions of bcrypt.dll or WININET.dll within the same directory, which are characteristic of recent malicious activity involving modified DLL files targeting GlobalProtect environments.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process with a name resembling an updater (AutoUpdate.exe or au.exe) accesses a specific remote configuration file from a herokuapp.com URL, followed by the creation or modification of specific application binaries (e.g., InstaTime.exe, ffmpegsumo.dll). This pattern is indicative of a supply chain compromise or an automated software update hijacking where malicious binaries are staged to replace legitimate application components.
Detects the execution of command interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WindowsTerminal) spawned by common user-facing applications (Explorer, WindowsTerminal, DLLHost) where the command line arguments contain keywords associated with automated human verification (e.g., CAPTCHA, bot detection) and suspicious download/execution patterns (e.g., iex, base64). This behavior is characteristic of malicious automated scripts or malware attempting to bypass security challenges via interactive shells.
This rule detects processes with names commonly associated with system daemons (e.g., kworker, fc-cache, chronyd, gvfsd) that are executing from non-standard, suspicious directories such as /tmp/ or user-defined hidden folders. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate system processes to evade detection.
This rule detects processes accessing '/proc/self/status' to read the 'TracerPID' field. Malware often uses this technique to detect if it is being debugged or traced by security analysis tools, allowing the process to terminate or change behavior to avoid analysis.
This rule monitors for successful sign-ins to sensitive cloud resources (such as Microsoft Authentication Broker, Office 365 Exchange Online, or Graph API) that originate from IP addresses not observed in the user's recent history (14-day baseline) or from known datacenter/hosting network ranges. The rule also filters for common scripted User-Agent strings (e.g., Python requests, curl) or empty User-Agent strings to increase the likelihood of detecting programmatic or malicious automated access rather than standard browser-based user activity.
Detects SoftEther VPN bridge dropper/installer disguised as svchost.exe with masquerading MixedRealityOpen service, based on install script and dropped files (a.Bat, hamcore.se2, vpn_server.config)
Detects files referencing malicious implant install paths under C:\Windows\Fonts\web used to blend with legitimate system files
Detects a suspicious sequence of interactive sign-ins to Microsoft management and profile-related applications from unmanaged devices occurring within a tight 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, potentially associated with activity clusters such as UNC6671, where an attacker interacts with account settings shortly after compromising a session.
Detects a suspicious sequence of interactive sign-ins to Microsoft management and profile-related applications from unmanaged devices occurring within a tight 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, potentially associated with activity clusters such as UNC6671, where an attacker interacts with account settings shortly after compromising a session.
Detects a suspicious sequence of interactive sign-ins to Microsoft management and profile-related applications from unmanaged devices occurring within a tight 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, potentially associated with activity clusters such as UNC6671, where an attacker interacts with account settings shortly after compromising a session.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
This rule detects user authentication events that deviate significantly from a 14-day historical baseline of known devices, operating systems, browsers, and network locations (ASN). It flags logins where at least two out of four key metadata signals (DeviceId, OS, Browser, ASN) have changed compared to the user's historical pattern, specifically targeting successful authentications that did not trigger a fresh multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge, potentially indicating token theft or unauthorized session reuse.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-ins where the user agent identifies as a Python requests library version (2.33.1 or 2.34.2) that has not been observed for that specific user account in the preceding 14 days. This behavior is indicative of anomalous automated or scripted access.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where a session token is reused without a fresh MFA challenge, originating from known residential proxy service providers. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen session tokens (Session Replay) to bypass MFA protections.
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