Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a sequence where PowerShell downloads an .msi file from Azure Blob storage (blob.core.windows.net), followed by msiexec.exe spawning PowerShell on the same device within 30 minutes.
Detects when the aws command line binary is used to create an address group with a 0.0.0.0 IP, which means any IP address. This action would expose services to the internet and is used by adversaries to allow access to compromised systems.
Detects process injection targeting a web browser process.
Amatera and comparable infostealers inject into trusted browser processes
such as Chrome, Edge, Brave and Firefox to evade detection and access
credential and cookie data in memory.
Amatera and comparable infostealers inject into trusted browser processes
such as Chrome, Edge, Brave and Firefox to evade detection and access
credential and cookie data in memory.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell downloads an .msi installer file from Azure Blob Storage, followed closely by msiexec.exe spawning a PowerShell process on the same device.
Detects execution of BlackX UEFI bootkit installer components, renamed helper binaries acting as payloads (such as jcef_helper.exe renamed to googleupdate.exe), or known malicious file hashes associated with BlackX campaigns.
Detects WinRAR or 7-Zip extracting an archive with a hard-coded password supplied via command line from a cmd.exe batch parent, using switch patterns associated with the RareWolf AnyDesk dropper.
Detects an inbound public network or remote interactive logon to a device, followed within 24 hours by credential-dumping activity, and subsequently within 7 days by email data staging (creation or modification of PST, OST, EML, or MBOX files) on the same device.
Detects the use of touch, chmod, or chown commands targeting paths containing 'etc/sv/' where reference-based timestamp or permission copying is performed, typically associated with timestomping or privilege/permission manipulation.
Detects process injection activities (such as remote thread creation, memory allocation, and writing to virtual memory) targeting common Windows background processes where the injecting process runs directly from the C:\Windows\ directory with a random or suspicious executable name.
Detects PowerShell execution spawning 7zr.exe to extract password-protected 7z archives using overwrite and password switches within a specified timeframe, or referencing specific malicious IOC file names and domains.
Detects mshta.exe launched with an inline javascript: one-liner that chains MSXML2.XMLHTTP to download, ADODB.Stream to write to disk, and WScript.Shell to execute. This identifies the ClickFix social engineering variant that fetches and executes payloads without using PowerShell.
Detects inbound emails where the sender claims to be from an internal or organization domain but has a null envelope sender address, lacks valid DKIM authentication, and does not match common legitimate automated messages (like DSNs or auto-replies), potentially indicating email spoofing or phishing attempts.
Detects PowerShell registering a logon scheduled task that executes a Trays.exe binary from an AppData Yandex Trays path with the -tray argument, or a scheduled task specifically named 'Microsoft apdate'. Associated with the RareWolf AnyDesk dropper batch script.
MSI-backed loader execution chain
Cortex XDR
This query uses the process ID of each child to match the parent process's PID, then reconstructs the chain back to explorer.exe. It also checks for the encoded PowerShell, silent MSI installation, and embedded MSI execution behaviours described in the source article.
Important caveats
- Causality scope: This finds matching process events within a shared causality ID; it does not establish that each process directly launched the next.
- Explorer root: The root process may not share the same causality ID in every telemetry scenario. If this join removes otherwise valid results, investigate the root separately.
- Strict matching: Requiring every stage will miss partial chains and variants with different command-line arguments. Consider separate alerts for the encoded PowerShell and silent MSI behaviours.
- Validation: Confirm the field names, join syntax, and causality-ID population against your tenant before deploying this as a production detection.
Important caveats
- Causality scope: This finds matching process events within a shared causality ID; it does not establish that each process directly launched the next.
- Explorer root: The root process may not share the same causality ID in every telemetry scenario. If this join removes otherwise valid results, investigate the root separately.
- Strict matching: Requiring every stage will miss partial chains and variants with different command-line arguments. Consider separate alerts for the encoded PowerShell and silent MSI behaviours.
- Validation: Confirm the field names, join syntax, and causality-ID population against your tenant before deploying this as a production detection.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects the execution of fsquirt.exe spawned by INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe where fsquirt.exe subsequently loads an unsigned or untrusted DLL, indicative of a potential TechHub DLL side-loading technique.
Detects a Python process spawning msiexec.exe followed by a high volume of LDAP connections (burst) from the same device within a 30-minute window, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity such as domain enumeration.
Identifies available cross-process memory and thread manipulation telemetry events in DeviceEvents, tracking actions such as remote thread creation, virtual memory allocation, and process hollowing indicators before constructing process injection correlations.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe is executed with no arguments or minimal arguments, matching the typical Cobalt Strike spawn-to sacrificial process behavior. Aggregated per device, account, and parent process.
Detects rundll32.exe creating a named pipe and subsequently establishing an SMB (port 445) connection to a private IP address within a 10-minute window, indicative of potential lateral movement or internal reconnaissance.
Detects browser cache smuggling (ClickFix/FileFix delivery mechanisms) where a non-browser script interpreter or LOLBin accesses a browser HTTP-cache directory and writes an executable or script payload outside the cache, followed shortly by the execution of a payload from a user staging directory.
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