Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential DLL sideloading by monitoring known legitimate Windows binaries that are commonly abused to load malicious DLLs from non-standard directories (i.e., not System32, SysWOW64, or WinSxS). This activity is often associated with the TerminalFix / Lorem Ipsum Loader campaign.
This analytic detects suspicious use of 'mshta.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' invoking 'mshtml.dll'
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
This analytic detects suspicious use of `rundll32.exe` in combination with `mshtml.dll` and the export `RunHTMLApplication`.
This behavior is often observed in malware to execute JavaScript or VBScript in memory, enabling payload staging or
bypassing script execution policies and bypassing the usage of the "mshta.exe" binary.
The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry which offers network flow activity
along with process information such as command-line arguments
If confirmed malicious, this activity may indicate initial access or payload download.
This behavior is often observed in malware to execute JavaScript or VBScript in memory, enabling payload staging or
bypassing script execution policies and bypassing the usage of the "mshta.exe" binary.
The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry which offers network flow activity
along with process information such as command-line arguments
If confirmed malicious, this activity may indicate initial access or payload download.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
This rule identifies successful sign-in events using the Azure CLI application where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not enforced. This is a potential indicator of a misconfiguration where sensitive cloud management interfaces are accessible via single-factor authentication, or a sign of an adversary attempting to leverage a less secure authentication pathway.
Detects C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe spawning a child wsl.exe process from outside the legitimate WSL install locations.
When WSL or bash is invoked, the System32 stub (wsl.exe) looks up the InstallLocation registry key and executes the wsl.exe found there.
An attacker who modifies InstallLocation to a controlled path causes the stub to transparently proxy execution to a malicious payload,
which then appears as a wsl.exe child of the legitimate System32 stub.
When WSL or bash is invoked, the System32 stub (wsl.exe) looks up the InstallLocation registry key and executes the wsl.exe found there.
An attacker who modifies InstallLocation to a controlled path causes the stub to transparently proxy execution to a malicious payload,
which then appears as a wsl.exe child of the legitimate System32 stub.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
Detects execution of potentially malicious or dual-use tools (such as credential dumpers or security-bypass utilities) from within ScreenConnect temporary directories via the 'RunFile' command. This is indicative of an attacker leveraging legitimate remote support software to deploy secondary payloads.
This rule identifies potential account compromise through the detection of non-interactive Azure AD sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations within a short, travel-implausible timeframe. Such activity is highly indicative of the theft and export of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) from a legitimate endpoint, which is subsequently replayed by an adversary from external infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects the installation of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) feature via dism.exe or wsl.exe, or the execution of wsl.exe for non-standard administrative tasks. This activity is often a precursor to running Linux-based tools or malware on a Windows host.
Detects a service principal or application identity performing a burst of deletion operations across multiple Azure resource types, such as Storage Accounts, SQL Databases, Key Vaults, and Function Apps. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, including potential cloud environment destruction or 'agentic' destructive operations similar to those observed in the Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) threat activity.
Detects behavioral patterns associated with the Everest ransomware loader, specifically the execution of a .NET host process from a non-standard parent, potentially indicating process injection, combined with network activity indicative of lateral movement or discovery, such as Wake-on-LAN packets or SMB scanning.
Detects the creation of GCP compute instances that are attached to service accounts with broad 'cloud-platform' scope permissions. This activity is monitored to ensure that only authorized automation service accounts (e.g., IaC pipelines) are performing these actions, as creating instances with highly privileged service accounts can be a technique used to escalate privileges or establish persistence.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain where a device shows signs of credential theft (accessing browser credential stores or cookies) followed closely by a successful cloud authentication from that same user using a device identifier not previously observed in the last 30 days.
Detects two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the deletion of executable files residing in common user-writable temporary directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) using command-line tools like 'del' or 'erase', which is often indicative of anti-forensic activity after malware execution. Second, it monitors for network traffic involving HTTP POST requests or specific SOAP headers related to 'tempuri.org', which are commonly associated with default .NET WCF service scaffolding and may be used by adversaries for C2 communication or exfiltration.
This rule correlates endpoint security alerts for popular information-stealer malware (Lumma, StealC, Vidar, RedLine, Acreed, Atomic Stealer) with subsequent successful cloud identity authentication events from the same user account. The correlation window is set to 72 hours following an endpoint infostealer detection, which suggests potential account takeover or unauthorized access facilitated by credentials stolen from a compromised endpoint.
Detects potential lateral movement by identifying NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to administrative network shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) or high-frequency access to multiple hosts by the same user, which may indicate credential abuse or lateral movement attempts.
This rule detects potential anti-forensic activity on Citrix ADC/NetScaler devices by monitoring for two primary indicators of log tampering: an unexpected drop in syslog volume to zero following a period of activity, or the execution of explicit commands intended to clear audit logs and configuration files.
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