Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
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Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
Detects instances where AI agent runtime processes (e.g., Python, Node.js) initiate child processes using common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This behavior may indicate an AI agent has been compromised or misused to execute unauthorized system commands for defense evasion or post-exploitation activities.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe where the process image is located in the user's local AppData directory under specific suspicious folder names. This behavior is indicative of a user-land installer or potential malware attempting to maintain persistence or execute malicious packages while masquerading as common applications.
Detects the loading of known DLLs (WinSparkle.dll, libcurl.dll, vim64.dll, dbghelp.dll, jli.dll, nvml.dll) from suspicious or non-standard file paths. The rule cross-references these image loads with file activity, identifying potential side-loading scenarios where a library is loaded from an unexpected directory or within an archive-related context. It also includes an explicit hash-based detection for a known malicious file.
Detects host enumeration activities (listing processes, user information, and directory contents) performed by known legitimate binaries (e.g., poedit.exe, curl.exe, vim.exe) shortly after they have executed a suspicious sideloading event. This pattern is characteristic of the NeedyMantis actor performing initial discovery before C2 beaconing.
Detects the execution of the encryptbase64.ps1 PowerShell script when invoked by a process other than PowerShell or PowerShell Core. This behavior is indicative of NeedyMantis malware attempting to evade detection by executing scripts outside standard script hosts.
Detects specific malicious archive payloads associated with NeedyMantis that contain a second-stage loader and spoofed system DLLs (e.g., dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll). These archives utilize XOR encoding or RtlDecompressBuffer packing and are designed for DLL sideloading.
This rule detects potential persistence via Python environment variable manipulation (PYTHONPATH) followed by suspicious network activity from a child process of python.exe. It specifically looks for the modification of the PYTHONPATH environment variable using PowerShell on Windows or shell configuration files on Unix-like systems, followed by a python.exe-initiated network connection (like curl) to external domains, which may indicate the execution of a malicious sitecustomize.py hook.
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-24472) involving authentication bypass via HTTP header manipulation (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For) and unauthorized access to the /jsconsole endpoint.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule identifies potential prompt injection attempts against Microsoft Copilot and Azure OpenAI services by monitoring CloudAppEvents for specific adversarial markers, encoded instruction blocks, or hidden text patterns. It flags recurring attempts from a single user as suspicious probing activity.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects successful OAuth device code sign-in attempts where the geographic location of the authentication does not match the user's historical baseline location. This is indicative of OAuth device code phishing, where a user is tricked into approving an authentication prompt for an attacker-controlled device.
Detects the use of open-source secret-scanning tools (e.g., TruffleHog) by identifying their specific User-Agent strings in AWS CloudTrail logs during GetCallerIdentity calls, followed by suspicious enumeration activity (ListBuckets, ListSecrets, ListAccessKeys) from the same source IP. This behavior is indicative of threat actors validating stolen credentials for unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects anomalous large-scale data export operations in Google BigQuery (via jobs.insert or jobs.query) performed by identities (service accounts, API keys) not previously observed in the environment. This activity is indicative of credential abuse where stolen third-party analytics or monitoring service tokens are utilized for illicit data exfiltration, a behavior consistent with tactics employed by threat actors such as ShinyHunters.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
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