Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
Detects successful authentication events for accounts that have been dormant for at least 90 days, correlated with suspicious activity markers such as recent failed sign-in attempts, access from an unfamiliar geographic location or ASN, or a complete absence of historical sign-in activity.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
Detects instances where explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) launches common scripting or command-line binaries with suspicious arguments often associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks. These attacks involve tricking users into copying and pasting obfuscated PowerShell, mshta, or curl commands into the Windows Run dialog to execute malicious payloads.
This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
Detects instances where Microsoft Office applications or Windows Explorer (via LNK file execution) spawn suspicious child processes, such as script interpreters or known LOLBins, within a short timeframe. This is a common pattern for initial access via spearphishing attachments where a malicious document or shortcut executes a payload.
This rule detects successful authentication events for remote access applications (VPN, RDP, Azure AD App Proxy) where the source IP address or ASN has not been observed in the user's login history within the preceding 14 days. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover using compromised credentials sourced from infostealers or other credential-harvesting activities.
Detects the execution of known administrative or reconnaissance tools (such as netscan, PsExec, or nmap) that have been renamed or relocated outside of standard directories like C:\Windows\System32 or Program Files, matching TTPs observed in INC Ransom operations.
Detects anomalous AWS Bedrock model invocation patterns where a single identity accesses models across three or more distinct AWS regions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of quota evasion, where attackers bypass per-region rate limits to maximize throughput when leveraging compromised credentials for unauthorized LLM use.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns originating from the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe). This rule identifies the execution of various scripting engines or utilities like PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, and WScript/CScript when they are used with potentially malicious flags or command-line arguments, including encoded commands, hidden window styles, web-download strings, or direct HTA/scripting invocations, which are common indicators of malicious activity following potential user execution.
This rule detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving the legitimate Microsoft Defender binary 'mpextms.exe'. The rule triggers when 'mpextms.exe' is executed from a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and subsequently loads a specific 'endpointdlp.dll' from an equally suspicious location, indicating a potential attempt to masquerade malicious code execution behind a trusted process.
High-fidelity correlation of OS-DET-LNX-005 and OS-DET-LNX-006: a system shell copied to a
non-standard/writable path, followed within 15 minutes on the same host by execution of a
shell with the privilege-preserving -p flag from a non-standard path. The two events
together are a near-certain SUID-root shell misconfiguration abuse (bash -p to root) and a
lower-FP signal than either component alone. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
non-standard/writable path, followed within 15 minutes on the same host by execution of a
shell with the privilege-preserving -p flag from a non-standard path. The two events
together are a near-certain SUID-root shell misconfiguration abuse (bash -p to root) and a
lower-FP signal than either component alone. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
Detects the two Windows-networking-named DLLs the report confirms as sideloaded via the normal OS loader (WinSparkle.dll, libcurl.dll) plus vim64.dll (a filename Vim's real installer never produces at all). Path check now covers any location outside a small allowlist of known-legitimate vendor install folders, not just ProgramData, so it also catches the reported ProgramData\\USOShared, ProgramData\\VIM, and ProgramData\\TightVNC\\VIM placements. Known limitation: the one reported case where the malicious WinSparkle.dll sits at the exact canonical Program Files\\Poedit path cannot be distinguished by path alone -- that specific sideload is instead caught by the companion 'Extensionless Archive Paired with Same-Named DLL Drop' rule via the archive-pairing signal.
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution patterns in Linux environments, specifically targeting Node.js processes performing in-memory evaluation of code (often associated with fileless loaders) or the downloading of files with the .enc extension using common utilities like curl or wget, which may indicate C2 payload retrieval.
Detects a suspected exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-21412. The rule identifies a chain of execution involving an internet shortcut (.url) masquerading as a common file type (e.g., .jpg.url), which subsequently opens another shortcut to a WebDAV/IP host. This sequence is used to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections and execute a malicious batch script and Rundll32 process.
Detects an abnormally high volume of configuration changes (15 or more within a 10-minute window) occurring on network appliances such as firewalls or security gateways, originated by a single source user or IP address. This behavior may indicate unauthorized administrative activity, mass policy updates, or malicious tampering.
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