Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
This rule detects potential attempts to disable Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell 5.1 using reflection-based manipulation of the amsiInitFailed boolean field in the System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils class. Attackers often use obfuscation techniques such as splitting strings or using reflection methods to bypass static security signatures.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time protection by modifying the DisableRealtimeMonitoring registry key using the reg.exe utility.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by dynamically creating methods using System.Reflection.Emit. It looks for specific keywords associated with reflection-based AMSI tampering, such as creating dynamic methods, accessing internal IL generators, and explicitly targeting AMSI-related memory structures like amsiContext or s_amsiInitFailed.
This rule detects potential malicious activity involving PowerShell by correlating signs of an Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempt with an subsequent network connection to an external, non-standard port. The rule monitors for common command-line patterns used to disable or impair AMSI functionality within PowerShell processes, followed by suspicious outbound network traffic from the same process within a five-minute window.
Detects instances where a process obtains a handle with PROCESS_VM_WRITE access to another process, followed shortly thereafter by a WriteProcessMemory operation into that same target process. This behavior is indicative of potential process injection, such as hooking remote GUI processes or other memory-based manipulation techniques.
Detects the execution or file creation of identified Turla STOCKSTAY malware components, specifically targeting a list of known malicious filenames and installers used by this actor.
Detects the creation of new Inbox rules in Microsoft 365 that are configured to automatically move or delete emails containing payroll-related keywords such as 'direct deposit', 'bank', or 'hr'. This behavior is consistent with post-compromise activity by threat actors attempting to hide payroll fraud notifications or security alerts from the victim.
Detects ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) token requests to Microsoft Graph using specific client IDs associated with Microsoft To-Do or Intune Company Portal. This activity could indicate an attempt to bypass MFA via hidden Conditional Access policy exclusions, as described in CVE-2025-0309.
Detects the execution of suspicious files that exhibit characteristics of finance-themed malware droppers. This includes files with known malicious MD5 hashes, specific internal file metadata (original filename, file description, product name), or filenames masquerading as financial documents (e.g., 'GST Debit Note', 'RTGS_IMPS') with an executable extension like '.com'.
Detects the Chromelevator loader, identified as 'drun.exe', performing reflective DLL injection of 'payload.dll' using direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) and inter-process communication (IPC) via a named pipe ('__DLL_PIPE_COMPLETION_SIGNAL__'). The rule looks for process creation, remote thread creation, memory protection modifications, file creation/modification of 'payload.dll', and specific named pipe events associated with 'drun.exe'.
This rule detects the deployment and activity associated with the TrueSightKiller rootkit, potentially used by threat actors like SilverFox. It identifies several key indicators: the loading of 'truesight.sys' from non-standard directories, the creation of a staging file named 'ranchserv.jpg' in the Windows Temp directory by non-system processes, the presence of the 'truesight.sys' driver based on its known SHA256 hash, and the termination of security products shortly after the creation of TrueSightKiller-related artifacts.
Detects modifications to the 'Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command' registry key, a technique commonly used to bypass User Account Control (UAC). By setting the default handler for the ms-settings protocol to a malicious command, an attacker can achieve elevated execution when the protocol is triggered by a legitimate Windows component.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the Windows Installer utility (msiexec.exe) to non-private (external) IP addresses over standard web ports (80/443). Msiexec.exe can be abused to download and execute malicious payloads or packages from remote locations.
This rule detects the creation of Temporary Access Passes (TAPs) via the Microsoft Graph API targeting highly privileged accounts. This activity could indicate an attacker abusing a service principal with UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All permissions to gain temporary access to critical accounts like Global Administrators, Privileged Role Administrators, or Security Administrators. The rule specifically looks for POST requests to the 'temporaryAccessPassMethods' endpoint in Microsoft Graph Activity Logs and correlates this with IdentityInfo to identify if the target user holds a privileged role.
Detects modifications to the 'Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command' registry key, a technique commonly used to bypass User Account Control (UAC). By setting the default handler for the ms-settings protocol to a malicious command, an attacker can achieve elevated execution when the protocol is triggered by a legitimate Windows component.
This rule detects anomalous sign-in attempts to VPN or SSO services by identifying deviations from a user's established baseline of device and location combinations. It flags sign-ins where there are at least two anomalies (new country, new ASN, new device ID, new user agent), or specific critical combinations like a new country and new device, or an unmanaged device signing in from a new country or ASN. This pattern is consistent with adversaries using stolen credentials, potentially from infostealer logs, to access enterprise resources.
Detects emails successfully delivered to the inbox that exhibit authentication failures for SPF, DKIM, or DMARC, or where a mismatch between the 'SenderFromDomain' and 'SenderMailFromDomain' is observed, indicating potential email spoofing or unauthorized sender impersonation.
Detects the use of the netsh.exe utility to modify Windows Advanced Firewall settings, specifically disabling profiles or adding/deleting firewall rules. This activity is often used by adversaries to impair security controls on a compromised host.
This rule detects potentially malicious invocations of rundll32.exe that utilize scripting protocols (javascript:, vbscript:) or suspicious execution parameters (ShellExec_RunDLL, LaunchApplication), as well as rundll32.exe executing from non-standard or user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp). The rule further filters out trusted Microsoft-signed binaries to reduce noise while highlighting potential proxy execution attempts.
This rule detects the use of 'wmic.exe' with the '/format' switch to execute XSL files, or the direct execution of 'msxsl.exe'. These methods are common techniques used by adversaries to bypass security controls by executing arbitrary scripts embedded within XSL files, often fetched from remote locations or local paths.
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