Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins to specific third-party applications related to Updraft (TeamUpdraft, UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault, UpdraftClone, UpdraftPlus) with anomalous characteristics such as multi-IP access, distinct countries, or failed-then-successful access attempts, indicating possible credential compromise or misuse.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell disables security or monitoring preferences (defense evasion / sensor blinding) followed closely by injecting code or performing process hollowing into a Windows process from the same PowerShell process.
Detects instances where Setup.exe loads the winmm.dll module from the same non-system directory located in user-writable paths (such as Users, Downloads, AppData, Temp, or ProgramData), which is indicative of DLL hijacking or side-loading activity.
Detects the Yoba campaign behavior involving the staging of wmpdmc.exe along with wmpdui.dll or ampdui.dll in the ProgramData\WMProcess directory, followed by execution or invocation via scheduled tasks.
Hunting query for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application credential abuse reported in October 2026. It returns three signals, sorted by a Priority column. First, sign-ins by the seven ConnectWise and SkyKick application IDs from a public IP address. ConnectWise states the Cloud Backup app normally signs in from Azure private IPv6 addresses. Second, service principals that sign in from a public IP address in a country not seen in their 14-day baseline. This signal evaluates apps with at least 20 prior sign-ins. Third, Entra audit events initiated by applications. These include an application adding itself or another non-user identity to a directory role, an application adding or changing credentials for the first time in the baseline window and any credential change by an application named ConnectWise or SkyKick. Role additions with an unidentified target appear with Review priority. Audit events initiated by applications carry no source IP, so the IP indicator applies to the sign-in signals only. Routine credential changes by Azure services can still appear with Review priority. The query follows the Microsoft Defender advanced hunting schemas and runs without errors in Advanced Hunting. The audit signal was exercised against live Entra audit events in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Indicator columns are short-lived and used for enrichment only.
Detects execution of BlackX UEFI bootkit installer components, renamed helper binaries acting as payloads (such as jcef_helper.exe renamed to googleupdate.exe), or known malicious file hashes associated with BlackX campaigns.
Detects administrative access to the DLP console from an unfamiliar address. Console
access permits policy change, violation review and exception approval — everything
needed to make data loss invisible, in one place.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
access permits policy change, violation review and exception approval — everything
needed to make data loss invisible, in one place.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects successful Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN authentications where no Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge or related text is recorded in the firewall logs, and no corresponding successful MFA sign-in event is found in Entra ID (SigninLogs).
Detects ABNotify.exe, running from the standard AOMEI Backupper installation path,
spawning any executable located in the html\ rendering hierarchy. This directory is
intended for rendering assets, not executables; a child process launched from here
indicates a hijacked upgrade workflow triggered through the AOMEI notification agent
with no user interaction.
spawning any executable located in the html\ rendering hierarchy. This directory is
intended for rendering assets, not executables; a child process launched from here
indicates a hijacked upgrade workflow triggered through the AOMEI notification agent
with no user interaction.
Detects successful administrative login events originating from IP addresses outside of configured trusted management networks on Fortinet devices.
Detects Trays.exe started with the -tray argument from a Trays subfolder or a batch script, as observed in the RareWolf BAT dropper ahead of a silent AnyDesk installation.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects observable hiding actions targeting ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) clients, such as modifying registry keys to hide uninstall entries, using attrib.exe to set hidden attributes, or launching management tools with hidden window styles.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of mscoree.dll outside of standard system and .NET paths, followed closely by network activity connecting to GitHub from the same process within a one-hour window.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects googleupdate.exe loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard path, followed by network communication to a known Command and Control (C2) domain or IP address.
Detects sign-ins and cloud app events associated with specific compromised vendor application IDs, application names, or a known malicious IP address across Microsoft Entra ID and CloudAppEvents logs.
Detects rundll32.exe executing inline JavaScript/VBScript via the
mshtml RunHTMLApplication export or a script payload staged in user-writable
directories. ClickFix chains abuse rundll32 to proxy script execution past
application controls without dropping a conventional executable.
mshtml RunHTMLApplication export or a script payload staged in user-writable
directories. ClickFix chains abuse rundll32 to proxy script execution past
application controls without dropping a conventional executable.
Detects potential SafePay ransomware activity by correlating mass file encryption (.safepay extension) with the creation of potential ransom notes and subsequent self-deletion of the encrypting process.
Detects GCP audit log write operations involving settings, IAM, or metadata modifications (such as setMetadata, setIamPolicy, setServiceAccount) that either originate from a known attacker IP or are performed by a default GCP service account from a public caller IP.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem dataset to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
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