Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects IronWorm rootkit activity on Linux, specifically focusing on cases where npm or node processes spawn tools like bpftool, insmod, or modprobe to load eBPF programs or kernel modules. It also flags the usage of specific IronWorm-associated filenames (q2.bpf, libbpf) within directories managed by npm or node.
This rule detects DLL loading events where specific legitimate applications (Adobe Creative Cloud, Microsoft Edge, or Opera GX) load a DLL from their own directory where the DLL file is unsigned or has an invalid digital signature. This pattern is often indicative of DLL sideloading, where an attacker places a malicious DLL in the application's folder to be loaded by the legitimate process.
Detects the use of BPF syscalls by non-root processes or the execution of BPF-related utilities (bpftool, bpfcc) from an interactive shell. This behavior is often associated with the ShadowGuard rootkit and potential BPF-based backdoor activity, which leverages BPF programs for stealthy system monitoring or command execution.
This rule monitors for two distinct behaviors: direct modification of Group Policy Object (GPO) containers within Active Directory and suspicious execution of GPO management tools (gpupdate.exe or gpedit.msc) across multiple hosts in a short timeframe. AD modification events are flagged as critical, while elevated tool execution patterns are flagged as high or medium risk based on host prevalence.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
This rule monitors for suspicious Linux kernel operations, including the loading of BPF programs via bpftool or system calls, and attempts by debugging or tracing tools to interact with processes using forceful termination signals. It also includes an anomaly detection branch that identifies processes with active network connections that are missing from the system process list, which may indicate process ghosting or hiding techniques.
This rule monitors for inbound email messages containing SVG file attachments. SVG files can contain embedded scripts that may be leveraged for malicious purposes, such as SVG smuggling to deliver secondary payloads or perform credential harvesting.
Detects the execution of QEMU emulator binaries (qemu-system-x86_64.exe, qemu-system-i386.exe, qemu.exe, qemu-img.exe) on a Windows host. This activity is associated with threat campaigns attempting to spawn hidden guest virtual machines to evade detection mechanisms and potentially stage ransomware or other malicious payloads.
Detects miner binaries and watchdog scripts associated with the CVE-2026-33017 Langflow cryptominer campaign being staged in hidden directories under /var/tmp, specifically /var/tmp/.xlamb/ and related files used to evade detection. The rule looks for file events or process events where the folder path or file name matches known indicators like '/var/tmp/.xlamb', '/var/tmp/init_rmount', 'lambsys', 'lambsys.elf', or 'init_rmount', or if the process command line contains these paths/filenames.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns a child process of itself with the /elevated command-line flag, a behavior often indicative of attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) or gain elevated script execution privileges.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' or 'node' initiates the deletion of 'setup.cjs' from the 'node_modules/easy-day-js' directory. This includes both direct file system deletion (fs.rmSync) and shell-based deletion commands (e.g., 'del /f', 'rm -f') executed by 'node.exe'. This activity is indicative of potential malicious behavior, possibly related to supply chain attacks or post-exploitation cleanup.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by identifying NTLM Type 3 logons where the account domain originates from outside the local or known corporate domain. The rule specifically excludes system-related accounts such as ANONYMOUS LOGON, WORKGROUP, and NT AUTHORITY, focusing on attempts to authenticate against internal resources using potentially forged or captured credentials.
This rule correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within a 24-hour window, indicating a multi-stage intrusion typically associated with ransomware campaigns. The detection chain includes initial credential harvesting (using tools like Impacket, BloodHound, or potential agent drops), followed by defense dismantlement (deleting shadow copies, terminating security processes, and disabling the firewall), and ending with system auditing/recovery sabotage.
Detects a sequence of actions characteristic of LCRYX ransomware: disabling Windows Defender via registry modification, disabling the Windows Firewall via netsh, and terminating common antivirus processes (e.g., MsMpEng, avp, vsserv) within a 10-minute window on the same host.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe with the /elevated command-line argument, which is a known technique for bypassing User Account Control (UAC) or invoking administrative tasks via COM object elevation.
Detects evidence of the MYRA RAT attempting to establish persistence via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This is achieved by creating or modifying malicious shared libraries (e.g., .libcache.so) and configuring system startup files (e.g., /etc/profile.d/.sh.local) to ensure the library is loaded by the dynamic linker on startup.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe, msiexec.exe, or cmd.exe initiated with command lines pointing to script files (.js, .vbs) or shortcut files (.lnk) located on removable drives (d-z drive letters). This behavior is characteristic of the Raspberry Robin worm spreading via infected USB media.
Detects the staging of exploit artifacts and subsequent spawning of a shell from a modified SUID binary, indicating the exploitation of CVE-2026-45257 (BUMSRAKETE) to achieve root privilege escalation via page-cache shellcode injection.
Detects a multi-stage in-memory delivery chain associated with Operation Poisson, where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe to load and execute the Havoc Demon agent in memory via a VBScript stager.
Detects sign-in events where Conditional Access was not applied for Microsoft Graph access using low-privileged client IDs known to trigger hidden CA exclusions. Tokens issued with only single-factor authentication to Graph indicate exploitation of the hidden scope exclusion behavior introduced when any exclusion is added to an 'All resources' CA policy (CVE-2025-0309). Additionally, this rule identifies audit log events for Conditional Access policy modifications that add exclusions.
This rule detects the execution of processes where the image path or parent process path originates from anonymous memory file descriptors ('/memfd:') or file descriptor links ('/proc/self/fd/'). These patterns are frequently associated with fileless malware execution where binaries are executed directly from memory to avoid disk-based detection.
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