Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,132 detections
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Detects suspicious access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) process memory, indicated by Sysmon Event ID 10 with an 'UNKNOWN' call trace. This pattern is characteristic of direct syscall usage or memory injection techniques used to bypass standard Windows API hooking and security monitoring, common in credential dumping attempts.
Detects instances where known endpoint security product binaries (EDR/AV) load DLL files from directories outside of their trusted, standard installation paths. This behavior is a common indicator of DLL sideloading, where an attacker attempts to masquerade malicious code as a component of a trusted security process to evade detection.
Detects one web session posting username, password, and MFA or one-time-code form fields through the same intermediary host. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack, where an attacker intercepts and relays authentication requests, including multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes, to gain unauthorized access.
Detects the execution of known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as mshta.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe directly by explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of a user-initiated execution, potentially triggered by social engineering lures like the 'ClickFix' technique, where a user is tricked into pasting and running malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt context.
Detects a non-interactive sign-in using an existing session shortly after the user completes interactive MFA, which can indicate stolen token replay. This rule identifies scenarios where a user successfully completes an interactive multi-factor authentication (MFA) sign-in, and then, within a short time frame (1800 seconds or 30 minutes), a non-interactive sign-in occurs for the same user and session ID. This pattern is indicative of a stolen session token being replayed by an attacker, bypassing subsequent MFA prompts.
Detects instances where Windows event logs are cleared using built-in utilities (wevtutil.exe) or PowerShell (Get-EventLog/Get-WinEvent, Clear-EventLog) shortly after those same logs were queried or enumerated by the same user on the same device. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to conceal malicious activity.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious activities: 1) Inbound emails where the sender display name matches a list of executive titles, commonly indicative of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or executive impersonation attacks; 2) The creation of cloud service accounts with names mimicking administrative or IT support roles, which may indicate an adversary establishing persistent, privileged access.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes or mutexes with GUID-like naming patterns by non-system processes. Threat actors frequently use uniquely generated GUIDs for IPC mechanisms like named pipes and mutexes to coordinate between processes or to check for existing infection, often to avoid detection by using non-obvious names.
Detects the use of bitsadmin.exe to initiate file transfers from remote HTTP/HTTPS locations. This behavior is frequently used by adversaries to download malicious payloads onto a host using legitimate system utilities.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe where the task action executes a scripting engine or living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin). This behavior is often indicative of adversaries attempting to establish persistence or execute code using native system tools to evade detection.
Detects the LokiBot malware spawning aspnet_compiler.exe to perform process hollowing. The rule identifies this activity by monitoring process creation events and filtering out legitimate .NET build processes, targeting the specific behavior of using aspnet_compiler.exe as a host for reflective code injection.
Detects successful authentication to Atlassian Jira from an anomalous network source (e.g., proxied or unusual geolocation/ASN) following a period of credential inactivity. This activity is consistent with tactics used by the HellCat ransomware group, who leverage credentials harvested by infostealers (such as Raccoon, Redline, StealC, or Lumma) to gain initial unauthorized access to corporate Jira environments.
This rule detects potential email spoofing attempts by identifying mismatches between P1 (envelope) and P2 (header) sender addresses, identifying discrepancies between sender and reply-to domains, and flagging emails where the display name impersonates common executive or IT support roles.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that perform XOR decryption of an embedded payload using the hardcoded key 'Pussecretvk456' and subsequently use [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load to reflectively load the resulting .NET assembly into memory. This behavior is indicative of fileless execution patterns commonly observed in the LokiBot and Amadey malware families.
Detects instances where wscript.exe deletes PowerShell files (.ps1) from the C:\Temp directory. This pattern is commonly associated with JScript droppers and malicious scripts performing post-execution cleanup to remove forensic artifacts after a timeout period.
Detects a specific command-line pattern used by the Amadey loader to perform self-relocation. The process chain executed via cmd.exe includes 'taskkill', 'timeout', 'del', and 'ren' in a single command line to terminate, delete, rename, and relaunch its executable from a user-writable directory to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Detects StealC infostealer post-execution self-deletion. The rule identifies instances where cmd.exe is launched by a non-shell process to forcefully delete an executable file located within TEMP or APPDATA directories, a common TTP used by malware to remove forensic artifacts after data exfiltration.
Detects execution of regsvr32.exe with flags indicative of the Squiblydoo application control bypass technique. The rule monitors for the use of the /i flag to load COM scriptlets from remote URLs (http/https) or UNC paths, or the inline loading of scrobj.dll, specifically in conjunction with the silent (/s) flag. Legitimate processes signed by Microsoft are excluded from detection unless remote URL execution is involved.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with arguments pointing to remote UNC paths, HTTP/FTP URLs, or local DLL files residing outside of standard, trusted Windows system directories (System32/SysWOW64). This behavior is indicative of an attempt to proxy malicious code execution, commonly associated with fileless or remote payload retrieval techniques.
Detects anomalous activity associated with information stealing malware, including unauthorized access to browser credential files (Login Data, Cookies), remote thread injection into browser processes, outbound connections to the Telegram API by non-browser processes, and rapid bulk access to multiple sensitive credential or crypto wallet files.
This rule monitors for indicators associated with MiniUpdate/MiniJunk V2 RAT and general .NET AppDomainManager hijacking. It detects suspicious registry keys (AppDomainManagerAssembly/Type) or environment variable manipulation used to hijack .NET application execution flow. Additionally, it identifies .NET host processes loading DLLs from user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and tracks suspicious beaconing patterns to known Azure CDN domains often used by these threats for Command and Control.
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