Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized non-browser processes attempting to access Chrome browser master keys or bypass App-Bound Encryption by interacting with the Chrome IElevator service, DPAPI routines, or the 'Local State' configuration file. This behavior is indicative of infostealer activity aiming to decrypt browser-stored session cookies and credentials.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a risky or anomalous login to Azure AD, such as from an anonymous network or an non-compliant device, followed shortly after by the registration of a new MFA method or security information. This behavior is indicative of an attacker who has compromised credentials and is attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls by enrolling their own MFA device.
Detects activity indicative of the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique, where users are tricked into manually executing obfuscated commands (often from fake CAPTCHA or error prompts) via the Windows Run dialog or command-line interfaces. The rule correlates suspicious process execution (e.g., mshta, powershell, certutil, curl) originating from explorer.exe with the detection of common encoded/obfuscated command line patterns, or interactions with the Windows RunMRU registry key, which logs commands typed into the Run dialog.
Detects an anomalous volume of file downloads from cloud storage platforms (SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Box) occurring within two hours of a high or medium risk sign-in event, including impossible travel or token replay scenarios. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration by an actor using compromised credentials.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege roles to cloud user accounts in Entra ID, AWS, or GCP when that assignment is preceded by anomalous sign-in behavior (high-risk or failed authentication) within 24 hours, or when the account appears to be dormant (no activity in 90+ days) prior to the privilege assignment.
Detects coordinated activity characteristic of NotPetya-like lateral movement. It identifies a local account authenticating across multiple hosts (credential reuse), followed by the creation of a transient Windows service (typically for remote command execution) and the invocation of rundll32.exe to execute a DLL export by ordinal on the same device.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a process loads the .NET CLR (clr.dll or mscoree.dll) and shortly thereafter accesses specific low-prevalence file extensions (.raw or .pak) within high-risk directories (AppData/Local/Temp, ProgramData, or Users/Public). This behavior is characteristic of shellcode loaders (such as the WAV-shellcode loader) that decrypt and execute RAT payloads from obfuscated containers in memory. The rule intentionally excludes common desktop applications to minimize false positives.
Detects successful authentication events for accounts that have been dormant for at least 90 days, correlated with suspicious activity markers such as recent failed sign-in attempts, access from an unfamiliar geographic location or ASN, or a complete absence of historical sign-in activity.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects a file named dnsapi.dll created/modified outside System32/SysWOW64/WinSxS (the only legitimate locations for the real system DLL). Now requires the file to BOTH land in one of the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders AND match the published 3448-byte spoofed-config size -- previously the size check alone could match unrelated dnsapi.dll copies anywhere on disk; requiring both signals together removes that bypass.
Detects >=2 of the four NeedyMantis archive-extraction artifacts (encryptbase64.ps1, dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll) written by the same process within 60 seconds. Anchored to the known sideload staging directories (ProgramData/ProgramFiles subfolders used by the Poedit/curl/Vim/TightVNC/Office/Broadcom/Intel/NVIDIA-masquerading bundles) and excludes System32/SysWOW64, since ws2_32.dll and dnsapi.dll are legitimate system DLL names that would otherwise cause noise if matched by name alone anywhere on disk.
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects anomalous credential access behavior by identifying instances where a compromised explorer.exe process (injected with the Kothamine payload DLL MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll) accesses browser cookie stores and gaming credential files in quick succession.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects web requests targeting common LLM/AI inference API endpoints containing strings indicative of prompt injection attempts, such as attempts to bypass filters, exfiltrate system instructions, or force model behavior changes (e.g., DAN mode).
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