Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to the Windows Registry 'shutdownwithoutlogon' value within the 'Policies\System' key. This setting controls whether the 'Shut Down' option is available on the Windows logon screen. Adversaries may modify this to impede access to system power controls or as part of a configuration hardening/persistence tactic.
Detects instances where ImageMagick (convert, mogrify, magick, identify) attempts to execute Ghostscript or shell interpreters. The rule flags suspicious behavior such as spawning shell interpreters, using shell metacharacters or pipes in the command line, or executing Ghostscript from non-standard or potentially writable directory paths, which are indicative of a delegate hijack exploitation attempt for arbitrary command execution.
Detects command-line activity containing keywords associated with process injection or hollowing techniques (e.g., shellcode, inject, hollow, replace) when executed by common script interpreters targeting critical system processes.
Detects unauthorized attempts by a non-super-administrator user within the MyBB Admin Control Panel to assign the administrator group (usergroup=4) to a new or existing user, exploiting a privilege boundary bypass.
Detects the execution of VBScript files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData, etc.) when the process is spawned by common application vectors like web browsers, email clients, or document viewers. This behavior is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan's dropper mechanism, which uses obfuscated VBS scripts for geofencing and locale checks prior to downloading secondary payloads.
This rule detects the loading of specific DLL files (commonly associated with open-source software libraries like mingw or webp) from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData, etc.) by specific processes. The rule further correlates these events with recent execution of potential phishing-related commands (WScript, CScript, or download-related activity) on the same host within a 1-hour window.
Detects potential DLL hijacking persistence by identifying modifications to registry values containing executable or library files that point to locations outside standard Windows system directories (System32 or SysWow64), subsequently joined with the execution of legitimate binary proxies known to be abused for side-loading like rundll32.exe or regsvcs.exe.
Detects multiple concurrent attempts by a process to identify virtualization or analysis environments (sandbox evasion). The rule monitors for registry key lookups related to VMware/VirtualBox, as well as the execution of commands (via wmic, powershell, or tasklist) aimed at enumerating system information such as video controllers, boot times, operating system details, or process lists. An alert is generated when three or more distinct types of these checks are observed within a 60-second window by the same process, excluding administrative or system-level accounts.
Detects a potential exploitation chain where 7-Zip is used to extract files from a RAR5 archive in a way that strips Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) NTFS alternate data streams. The rule specifically monitors for 7z.exe launching with a .rar archive in the command line followed by the execution of potentially malicious files (executables, scripts, etc.) from user-writable directories shortly after.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the GIFTEDCROOK (UAC-0226) threat actor. It identifies the use of PowerShell or cmd.exe to execute staged files from specific ProgramData paths (WC3, wt1), monitors for common NT API-based reflective injection patterns (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtWriteVirtualMemory) originating from PowerShell, tracks the creation of known staging artifacts in ProgramData, and identifies the execution of known malicious process image hashes.
Detects the KuinaExtractor UAC bypass technique, which exploits the auto-elevated 'SilentCleanup' scheduled task. The rule identifies suspicious activity via two patterns: the execution of 'cleanmgr.exe' from an unexpected parent process (bypassing normal task scheduler invocation) or the explicit execution of 'schtasks.exe' to trigger the 'SilentCleanup' task.
Detects execution of PowerShell or PWSH containing multiple suspicious command line flags commonly associated with malicious scripts and evasion techniques, such as bypassing execution policies, running in hidden windows, using encoded commands, or utilizing invoke-expression.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts attempting an in-memory AMSI bypass by patching the AMSI scan content handler. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of .NET reflection and memory protection APIs (such as RuntimeHelpers.PrepareMethod, VirtualProtect, and Marshal.Copy) commonly utilized to overwrite AMSI function pointers or return values during runtime.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by nulling the pAppName pointer in memory using Marshal.WriteInt64. This technique forces AmsiScanBuffer and AmsiNotifyOperation to return E_INVALIDARG, causing them to fail open and skip security inspection.
Detects Node.js processes ('node' or 'node.exe') spawning other processes or executing commands that reference suspicious file paths, such as '.libcache.so' or '.sh.local', or utilizing risky syscall patterns like 'memfd_create' or 'fexecve'. This pattern is often associated with malicious npm post-install scripts or supply chain attacks.
Detects suspicious activities within GitHub repository logs that indicate potential supply chain attacks, including the use of unauthorized workflow names, the creation of orphan snapshot branches, dependabot impersonation attempts, commit messages containing known campaign markers, exposure of internal secrets (HAS_GCR_TOKEN), and the push of suspicious files or configuration modifications.
This rule detects potentially malicious process behavior on Linux systems. It triggers on two conditions: 1) Masquerading of the 'systemd-userdbd' process by detecting processes named 'systemd-userdbd' that do not originate from the legitimate system path. 2) Fileless execution by detecting process image paths that contain 'memfd:', which is commonly associated with loading malicious binaries directly from anonymous memory to evade disk-based detection.
Detects the creation or loading of specific DLL files identified as part of the Turla STOCKSTAY malware framework. The rule monitors both file system operations (creation, modification, renaming) and process image loads to identify indicators of this specific campaign.
Detects Python processes executing complex, multi-layered decoding chains (Base64, ROT13, and Hex) in their command line arguments. This pattern is often used by malicious AI skill backdoors, such as ClawHub, to obfuscate payload execution and evade signature-based detection.
This rule detects suspicious inter-process communication (IPC) attempts using WM_COPYDATA messaging, where processes (often script interpreters or unsigned binaries) interact with high-value GUI-based applications (like browsers or shell environments). This pattern is a common indicator of process injection techniques, such as hijacking existing Windows callbacks to execute code within the context of a target process.
Detects multiple techniques associated with Linux post-exploitation and persistence, including LD_PRELOAD environment variable hijacking, suspicious cron jobs, profile.d persistence modifications, systemd service masquerading via prctl, and fileless execution via memfd_create.
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