Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects common self-deletion patterns used by Pony malware, including the use of 'cmd.exe' with 'del /f' targeting executables in temporary or application data directories, batch file self-deletion loops, and PowerShell 'Remove-Item' or '[System.IO.File]::Delete()' targeting its own image path.
This rule detects potential Pony malware anti-sandbox evasion techniques by correlating WMI queries for virtual machine artifacts and registry reads for BIOS/VM strings with the termination of short-lived processes (less than 30 seconds). This behavior is indicative of malware attempting to determine if it's running in a sandbox environment and exiting if it detects one.
This rule correlates three distinct events to detect a potential credential theft and lateral movement chain: an LSASS credential dump, followed by an NTLM network logon, and then a DCOM activation of mmc.exe with the '-Embedding' flag on the target system. This sequence of events is indicative of an attacker compromising credentials, using them to move laterally, and then potentially executing further commands or tools via DCOM.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity where an untrusted process attempts to inject code into common trusted Windows processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, notepad.exe, rundll32.exe, dllhost.exe, taskhost.exe, taskhostw.exe) using a combination of VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread API calls. This behavior is often associated with malware, such as StealC, attempting to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Detects various post-exploitation activities associated with the Amadey loader, including the execution of its persistence mechanism (nudwee.exe), dropping and executing secondary payloads in temporary directories, using PowerShell download cradles, creating scheduled tasks for persistence, and silent MSI installations. This rule aims to identify the delivery of secondary payloads like StealC and Lumma Stealer.
Detects the deletion of a storage bucket immediately followed by the creation of a new bucket with the same name across different cloud providers (GCP, AWS S3, Azure). This rule specifically flags scenarios where the deleting actor or project differs from the creating actor or project, indicating a potential cross-account hijack or data exfiltration attempt.
Detects the execution of a process named 'servertool.exe' specifically when it originates from a user's OneDrive Music folder or a generic Music folder within the user profile. This could indicate an attempt to masquerade malicious activity by placing an executable in an unusual, typically benign location.
Detects a potential logging sink hijack in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) by identifying the deletion of a logging sink's destination bucket followed by the creation of a new bucket with the same name in a different project. This technique could allow an attacker to redirect logs to an attacker-controlled bucket, impairing defenses and potentially exfiltrating sensitive log data.
Detects various suspicious activities related to macOS wallet applications, including the removal of Gatekeeper quarantine flags, ad-hoc re-signing of application bundles, force-killing wallet applications, non-installer processes writing to application bundles (specifically 'app.asar'), and the use of 'dscl . authonly' which can be abused for fake password prompts.
Detects suspicious named pipe server creation by Medium/Low integrity processes followed by a SYSTEM-level process spawned from the same initiating process within a short correlation window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges using named pipe impersonation.
Correlates the loading of a .sys driver with the subsequent rapid termination of security, EDR, and AV processes via the EDR Killer utility.
Detects the loading of specific vulnerable drivers (Huawei, Topaz Antifraud, Tower of Fantasy, K7 Security) abused by DragonForce ransomware in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software.
Detects the Havoc Demon utilizing execute-assembly to load post-exploitation .NET tooling (like Seatbelt or SharpHound) directly into memory without touching disk. This rule identifies processes loading 'mscoree.dll' (a .NET runtime component) and subsequently making network connections to non-localhost IP addresses, indicating potential in-memory .NET execution with C2 communication.
Uses time-series anomaly detection to identify a sudden, complete drop-off in DeviceEvents telemetry from a host immediately following a suspect driver load, indicating kernel-mode EDR blinding.
Detects Vidar Stealer scanning the memory of a forked browser process for the Chromium KeyRing 32-byte pattern using NtReadVirtualMemory and NtQueryVirtualMemory to locate the v20_master_key across MEM_COMMIT and MEM_PRIVATE regions.
Detects registration of malicious DLLs as LSASS drivers for credential theft
Detects process doppelganging using NTFS transactional operations
Detects PubPrn.vbs used for COM scriptlet proxy execution
Detects a web session that proxies an enterprise authorisation endpoint while also handling session-cookie names associated with authenticated access. This rule identifies suspicious activity indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack where an attacker proxies authentication requests and steals session cookies.
Detects deployment of AppDomainManager hijack assemblies for .NET execution
Detects writing to /proc/self/mem for in-memory code injection on Linux
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