Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential process injection activity where a process is created in a suspended state and subsequently performs memory unmapping followed by a remote memory write operation. This behavior targets critical system processes such as svchost, explorer, lsass, services, and spoolsv, which is highly indicative of process hollowing or similar injection techniques used by malicious actors.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity by correlating the creation of known Cobalt Strike or Sliver framework named pipes with subsequent repeated HTTP/S network beaconing from the same process or host. The rule identifies processes establishing suspicious named pipes, then looks for persistent network connections to standard web ports (80, 443) within a 30-minute window, flagging instances where significant beaconing count is observed.
Detects instances where PowerShell or pwsh processes are initiated directly by explorer.exe containing command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated or hidden execution, often used in ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where victims are coerced into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the abuse of Windows protocol handlers ('search-ms:') and WebDAV UNC paths ('@SSL\DavWWWRoot') launched from common web browsers or Windows shell processes. This technique, frequently observed in 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, enables attackers to stage remote payloads like LNK, HTA, or scripts by leveraging native Windows functionality to resolve remote content as if it were a local resource, bypassing typical file download security controls.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving potential social engineering via lookalike conferencing domains. It identifies users visiting suspicious domains resembling well-known conferencing platforms (e.g., Teams, Meet, Zoom), followed by modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key and subsequent execution of suspicious commands (PowerShell, CMD, mshta) by explorer.exe within a short timeframe.
This rule detects potentially malicious in-memory module loading, such as Beacon Object File (BOF) execution, on hosts already identified as exhibiting suspicious behavior related to MLTBackdoor or sideloading activity. It monitors for memory allocation or protection changes (AllocateVirtualMemory, VirtualProtect, CreateRemoteThread) that result in executable memory (RWX or execute-only) without a corresponding file on disk, which is a common indicator of fileless code injection.
Detects modifications, creations, or deletions of critical CI/CD pipeline configuration files (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines) across cloud service logs. The rule correlates these actions with the account's historical IP baseline to identify potentially unauthorized changes originating from anomalous locations.
Detects the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (msdt.exe) being launched by Office applications or web browsers using the ms-msdt protocol handler or PCWDiagnostic parameters, which is indicative of the Follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability exploitation.
Detects instances where the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) is used to launch node.exe with specific command-line arguments (e.g., executing index.js) or a specific binary name, which is indicative of malicious script-based execution chains often seen in RAT deployment.
Detects the execution of binaries that masquerade as legitimate Adobe-signed applications by running from non-standard locations, while simultaneously performing DLL side-loading by loading a malicious 'msvcp140.dll' from the same directory as the executable.
Detects the Exvicy 'ClickFix' campaign execution chain where explorer.exe spawns a PowerShell process utilizing download commands (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-RestMethod) to interact with known malicious domains or IP addresses, followed by the execution of installers (msiexec.exe) or tools (putty.exe) within a short timeframe.
Detects the deletion, truncation, or modification of critical PaperCut server logs and application files (server.log, pcxboot_l.txt, .bin files). This activity is associated with attempts to conceal exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2026-82078/81578) by clearing logs or tampering with binaries, typically executed by the PaperCut application processes themselves (pc-app.exe or Java runtime).
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH with encoded command flags (-EncodedCommand, -enc, -e), which is a common technique used by adversaries to hide malicious scripts or payloads from inspection.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe with potentially malicious command-line arguments, including references to external URLs, protocol handlers like javascript:, or loading DLLs from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of Living-off-the-Land (LotL) techniques used to proxy execution and bypass application control or security monitoring.
Detects instances where an IAM user creates a new access key or requests a session token, followed by subsequent API activity from a different source IP address or region within a one-hour window. This behavior is often associated with the creation of persistence mechanisms or credential theft.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects instances of rundll32.exe being used with suspicious command line arguments, such as referencing JavaScript, loading Control Panel applets (.cpl) via shell32.dll from non-standard locations, or executing DLLs directly from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, ProgramData). These patterns are common techniques used by adversaries to proxy execution and evade detection.
Detects the execution of the Microsoft HTML Application host (mshta.exe) when it is used to launch scripts from remote URLs (http/https/ftp) or when it spawns common command-line shells and scripting engines, which is a common indicator of living-off-the-land techniques used to execute malicious payloads.
Detects modifications to AWS IAM policies (user or role policies) that grant AdministratorAccess, PowerUserAccess, or wildcard permissions (*). This is a common indicator of privilege escalation or persistence, where an attacker grants themselves or another identity broad administrative access within the AWS account.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
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