Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the SNOWLIGHT dropper (associated with UNC5221) attempting to evade analysis. The rule monitors for the loading of 'verifier.dll' by the suspicious 'wusvc.exe' process (a common disguise for this malware) as a mechanism to perform debugger checks, alongside the enumeration of various security and analysis tools (e.g., debuggers, packet sniffers, and virtualization tools).
Detects the SNOWLIGHT dropper performing an Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass. The rule identifies processes that load 'amsi.dll' and subsequently perform memory manipulation (WriteProcessMemory or VirtualProtect) on the module's memory region within a 10-second window, excluding known Windows security components.
Detects the SNOWLIGHT dropper attempting to detect analysis or security tools by rapidly enumerating common debugging, profiling, and analysis executables (such as x64dbg, IDA Pro, Wireshark, Process Hacker, etc.). The rule triggers when a single process queries at least 3 distinct blacklisted tool names more than 5 times within a 1-minute window, a characteristic behavior used to identify and evade analysis environments.
Detects the use of specific Windows API functions or terms commonly associated with process hollowing, code injection, or advanced process manipulation within command-line strings. The monitored functions include NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket, NtAssociateWaitCompletionPacket, RtlGetCurrentPeb, ProcessPrng, and PowerRegisterSuspendResumeNotification.
This rule detects potential memory-resident malware or staging activity by identifying instances where a high volume of DLL, OCX, or SYS files are loaded from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Users) on a specific device within a one-hour window. A threshold of 5 or more unique image loads from these locations is flagged as potentially suspicious, as it may indicate an attacker loading multiple malicious components or modules.
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry that enable the 'Shutdown without logon' feature, which allows a user to initiate a system shutdown without needing to log in first. This setting is often modified by attackers or during unauthorized system reconfiguration to weaken access control or facilitate disruptive activities.
Detects potential ransomware activity (specifically VILE) that utilizes direct NT system calls and specific API interactions (e.g., NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket) to bypass user-mode EDR hooks. The rule monitors for a combination of suspicious process activity, unexpected image loads of ntdll.dll, and specific API calls often associated with evasion techniques in Go-based binaries.
This rule detects potential VILE ransomware activity by identifying a specific combination of Windows token manipulation APIs (e.g., AdjustTokenPrivileges, DuplicateTokenEx) paired with the usage of VILE-specific direct NT syscalls (NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket, ProcessPrng) within the same process context. This behavioral pairing serves as a high-fidelity indicator of VILE ransomware execution.
Detects Pay2Key ransomware attempting DLL search order hijacking against Avast Antivirus components. The rule monitors for two behaviors: Windows system DLLs (e.g., powrprof.dll) being loaded from the Avast installation directory, and Avast-specific component DLLs (e.g., snxhk.dll, ashBase.dll) being loaded from non-standard file paths outside the legitimate Avast software installation directory.
Detects reconnaissance and impairment attempts against security software (EDR, AV, backup) using WMI or taskkill/net commands. The rule specifically monitors for these actions when executed by processes originating from user-writable directories, a technique commonly associated with the Grixba infostealer dropped by Play Ransomware.
Detects a suspicious self-deletion pattern associated with the Pay2Key ransomware, where an SFX dropper uses cmd.exe to execute a ping-based delay followed by fsutil to zero out the original dropper file, and subsequently performs mass deletion of remaining .exe and .bat files.
Detects the execution of the Grixba infostealer, which registers a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) using AddVectoredExceptionHandler. This behavior is used by the malware for execution hijacking and debugger evasion to maintain persistence and prevent analysis. The rule monitors for processes identified as Grixba based on specific naming conventions or execution from suspicious paths like C:\Users\Public\Music\.
Detects Grixba infostealer execution from the C:\Users\Public\Music\ staging path, identified by the creation of RWX (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) memory regions and the registration of Vectored Exception Handlers (VEH). These behaviors are indicative of advanced process injection techniques used during the preparation phase of malware execution, often associated with the Play Ransomware group.
Detects the execution of the Grixba infostealer, associated with the Play Ransomware group, which is known to perform ntdll EDR unhooking. The rule specifically monitors the launch of the identified malicious binary (Gt_net.exe or GT_NET.exe) from the C:\Users\Public\Music\ directory, a behavior observed consistently across Grixba versions.
Detects cross-process activity (such as process injection or handle access) initiated by the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe) where the executable is not digitally signed by Microsoft Corporation. This behavior is highly suspicious as the legitimate wusvc.exe should always be signed by Microsoft, and this may indicate process masquerading or a compromised service binary.
Detects process creation of an executable named 'wusvc.exe' that originates from a user Downloads directory and is not digitally signed by Microsoft Corporation. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Update service to evade detection.
Detects the modification of the Windows Registry 'LegalNoticeText' key, which is used to display a message to the user upon logon. This specific rule flags the inclusion of known ransomware-related URLs or domains in the text, commonly used as a ransom note mechanism by adversaries.
Detects the execution behavior associated with the VILE ransomware, specifically focusing on the combination of privilege manipulation API usage (e.g., AdjustTokenPrivileges, DuplicateTokenEx) and the creation of known ransomware-related artifacts like configuration files or decoy files.
Detects Pay2Key ransomware's polyglot technique where a Batch script (e.g., setup.cmd) invokes PowerShell to read its own content and execute it in-memory via Invoke-Expression (IEX). This includes detection of 64-bit PowerShell invocation from 32-bit processes using Sysnative and command-line patterns indicative of self-referencing fileless execution.
Detects the execution of VILE ransomware by identifying specific strings indicative of its presence in command lines, alongside the usage of direct NT system calls (e.g., NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket) and low-level runtime artifacts often utilized by Go-based binaries to bypass user-mode EDR hooking mechanisms.
Detects the execution of VILE ransomware by identifying specific Go runtime and malware-specific strings in the command line. The detection logic focuses on artifacts related to sandbox and debugger evasion techniques, such as breakpoint trap detection, memory checks, and inspection of the Process Environment Block (PEB) via 'RtlGetCurrentPeb', as well as internal identifiers associated with the VILE ransomware binary.
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