Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects common suspicious PowerShell command-line patterns often used for malicious purposes, including base64-encoded command execution, hidden-window execution with common evasion flags, and the use of download/execution cmdlets for in-memory payload delivery.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying a single user account authenticating to three or more distinct hosts using NTLM via network (LogonType 3) or impersonation (LogonType 9) logons, which is characteristic of credential-based movement across a network.
Detects Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events where a process opens lsass.exe with a GrantedAccess mask matching known credential-dumping access rights (e.g. PROCESS_VM_READ combinations used by Mimikatz/ProcDump-style tooling), excluding common legitimate EDR/AV/diagnostic source processes.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
Detects the execution of a process from a non-standard writable directory (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) which subsequently loads an unsigned DLL from the same directory within two minutes of process creation. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where an adversary uses a legitimate, potentially signed application to load a malicious DLL, bypassing security controls.
This rule detects the invocation of rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, or mshta.exe with arguments pointing to remote resources (UNC, WebDAV, or HTTP(S) URLs). This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute remote scriptlets (e.g., .sct, .hta, .dll) for living-off-the-land bypasses or initial staging of malicious payloads, such as the Squiblytwo or Squiblydoo techniques.
Detects suspicious PowerShell ScriptBlock logs (Event ID 4104) that attempt to bypass security features like AMSI or ETW while employing common obfuscation techniques such as Base64 encoding, reflection, or character concatenation.
Detects the two Windows-networking-named DLLs the report confirms as sideloaded via the normal OS loader (WinSparkle.dll, libcurl.dll) plus vim64.dll (a filename Vim's real installer never produces at all). Path check now covers any location outside a small allowlist of known-legitimate vendor install folders, not just ProgramData, so it also catches the reported ProgramData\\USOShared, ProgramData\\VIM, and ProgramData\\TightVNC\\VIM placements. Known limitation: the one reported case where the malicious WinSparkle.dll sits at the exact canonical Program Files\\Poedit path cannot be distinguished by path alone -- that specific sideload is instead caught by the companion 'Extensionless Archive Paired with Same-Named DLL Drop' rule via the archive-pairing signal.
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
Detects instances where a legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) agent (MSP360 or Faronics) is used to execute PowerShell commands that silently install ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) MSI packages within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary abusing administrative tools for lateral movement or persistence.
Detects instances where a legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) agent (MSP360 or Faronics) is used to execute PowerShell commands that silently install ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) MSI packages within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary abusing administrative tools for lateral movement or persistence.
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