Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,129 detections
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Detects PowerShell commands that intentionally disable SSL certificate validation, which can be used by attackers to bypass security controls and trust their malicious HTTPS infrastructure. This technique is often associated with the 'InstallFix' malware.
Detects the Chromelevator loader (drun.exe) performing reflective injection of an encrypted payload DLL into a remote process using direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) to bypass EDR hooks. Also detects the spawned vt-windows-event-stream.exe helper process.
Detects the creation or modification of '.env' files within '.gemini' directories, often found in CI/CD pipelines or developer environments. This activity may indicate an attempt to inject malicious environment variables to hijack the execution flow of the Gemini CLI or related tooling.
Detects the execution or file creation of identified Turla STOCKSTAY malware components, specifically targeting a list of known malicious filenames and installers used by this actor.
Detects the creation or loading of specific DLL files identified as part of the Turla STOCKSTAY malware framework. The rule monitors both file system operations (creation, modification, renaming) and process image loads to identify indicators of this specific campaign.
Detects Python processes executing complex, multi-layered decoding chains (Base64, ROT13, and Hex) in their command line arguments. This pattern is often used by malicious AI skill backdoors, such as ClawHub, to obfuscate payload execution and evade signature-based detection.
This rule detects suspicious inter-process communication (IPC) attempts using WM_COPYDATA messaging, where processes (often script interpreters or unsigned binaries) interact with high-value GUI-based applications (like browsers or shell environments). This pattern is a common indicator of process injection techniques, such as hijacking existing Windows callbacks to execute code within the context of a target process.
Detects potential cross-process memory injection activity by monitoring for a non-debugger process that performs both NtAllocateVirtualMemory and WriteProcessMemory operations against a sensitive GUI target process within a short 5-minute correlation window.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by performing in-memory patching of the AmsiScanBuffer function within amsi.dll. The rule identifies suspicious memory manipulation operations (VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory) performed by script hosts (PowerShell, WScript, CScript) involving PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions or specific memory modification patterns (0xB8 opcode patching) indicative of disabling security scanning capabilities.
Detects the use of .NET reflection within PowerShell scripts to manipulate the 'amsiInitFailed' field in 'System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils'. This technique is a common method to disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) for the current process session. The rule monitors PowerShell script block logs for the co-occurrence of AMSI-related classes/fields and specific reflection primitives.
Detects specific PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) patterns associated with Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass techniques. The rule flags suspicious script content involving DynamicMethod IL emission, Marshal.WriteInt64 memory modification, or reflection-based manipulation of AmsiUtils fields, which are common indicators of attempts to disable or impair security inspection mechanisms in PowerShell environments.
Detects the execution of the Nishang 'Invoke-PowerShellTcp' reverse shell payload via PowerShell. This rule monitors for common obfuscated patterns involving IEX (Invoke-Expression) and 'DownloadString' commonly used to download and execute scripts directly into memory, often following an AMSI bypass attempt.
This rule detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by monitoring specific registry modifications (ms-settings, mscfile) and the unexpected execution of child processes from high-integrity binaries like fodhelper.exe and eventvwr.exe, or processes launched with the runas command from high-integrity contexts.
Detects AutoHotkey (AHK) scripts spawning specific .NET Framework processes (cvtres.exe, AddInProcess32.exe, AppLaunch.exe, aspnet_compiler.exe), which is indicative of process hollowing, often used by malware like AsyncRAT to inject malicious code into suspended legitimate processes.
Detects execution patterns associated with the DirtyClone local privilege escalation exploit. The rule monitors for the execution of the exploit binary, compilation of related exploit source code, the creation of combined user and network namespaces via unshare, manipulation of IPsec xfrm states/policies by unprivileged users, and the spawning of a root shell via su. These activities are indicative of an attempt to elevate privileges from an unprivileged context to root.
Detects the execution of 'wevtutil.exe' with the 'cl' or 'clear-log' arguments targeted at primary Windows Event Logs (Security, System, or Application). This activity is commonly associated with an adversary attempting to clear audit logs to conceal malicious actions during an intrusion.
Detects execution of regsvr32.exe with arguments that indicate loading of a remote scriptlet file (.sct) or script over HTTP/HTTPS, a common technique for bypassing application control and executing arbitrary code, often referred to as Squiblydoo.
Detects cross-process activity where a non-Microsoft signed process or an unsigned process attempts to inject code into high-value Windows system processes, such as lsass.exe, explorer.exe, or svchost.exe. This activity is indicative of malicious code injection or process hollowing, often used to achieve privilege escalation or persistent stealth.
Detects network communication behavior consistent with the TinyRCT backdoor. The rule identifies instances where a process named 'PerfWatson2.exe' attempts to establish HTTP GET or POST connections to a known malicious IP address (45.32.113.172), signaling potential C2 beaconing activity using an encrypted channel.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the Windows Installer utility (msiexec.exe) to non-private (external) IP addresses over standard web ports (80/443). Msiexec.exe can be abused to download and execute malicious payloads or packages from remote locations.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities on Linux systems, including the download of files via curl or wget from a specific IP address, execution of scripts named 'isp.sh', usage of hidden temporary files (e.g., .xlamb), detection of processes named 'lambsys', and execution of scripts within the /var/tmp directory after a chmod +x command. These patterns are often associated with stage-1 or stage-2 dropper behaviors, malware persistence, or post-exploitation activities.
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