Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

18,128 detections

Hunting rule for T1222 "Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via reg.exe". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detection & Hunting Community
4 months ago
000
Detects successful non-interactive token acquisitions using specific Microsoft first-party application IDs known to bypass Entra Conditional Access Policies through Nested App Authentication (NAA/BroCI). The detection specifically targets sign-ins to the Microsoft Graph resource.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
003
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity involving 'cmd.exe' that echoes content into a batch file within the 'C:\Windows\TEMP\' directory and subsequently deletes it. This pattern can be indicative of malware staging or cleanup operations, often used to execute temporary scripts or hide traces of execution.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
102
Hunting rule loosely modeled after Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Disable Windows Shutdown Button". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule for Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Disable Windows Registry Tool" (Modify Registry). Correlate with additional signals before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule loosely based off of Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Modify registry to store logon credentials". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule loosely based off of Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Modify registry to store logon credentials". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detection & Hunting Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule loosely modeled after Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Disable Windows LogOff Button". Correlate before alerting on.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detection & Hunting Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule loosely modeled after Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detection & Hunting Community
4 months ago
000
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods with dangerous security settings that could lead to container escape or privilege escalation. This includes configurations such as hostNetwork enabled, allowPrivilegeEscalation set to true, or running as root (runAsUser = 0). The rule specifically monitors 'io.k8s.core.v1.pods.create' operations in cloud audit logs.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
102
Hunting rule loosely modeled after Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Disable Windows LogOff Button". Correlate before alerting on.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule loosely modeled after Atomic Red Team T1112 test "Disable Windows Task Manager application". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Hunting rule based off of T1112 technique "Modify Registry of Local Machine - cmd". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects a command shell using cURL to download an MSI package and immediately install it silently with msiexec, matching a reported RMM delivery workflow. This rule specifically looks for command-line executions involving 'cmd.exe', 'powershell.exe', or 'pwsh.exe' that use 'curl' to download a '.msi' file and then execute 'msiexec' with silent installation flags.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
208
Detects the addition of broad exclusion paths to Microsoft Defender, specifically targeting drive roots, administrative shares, or common working directories. This activity is often associated with ransomware, such as the 'Gentlemen Ransomware', to evade detection.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
005
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules designed to hide security and MFA notifications by deleting, marking as read, or moving them to hidden folders. This technique is commonly used post-compromise to suppress alerts about rogue device enrollment, sign-ins, or password changes, preventing the victim from discovering an account takeover. It is a frequent Business Email Compromise (BEC) and Account Takeover (ATO) persistence technique.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
202
Detects when Windows Defender's real-time monitoring or anti-spyware features are disabled via registry modification. This can indicate an attempt by an adversary to impair defenses and evade detection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
102
Detects suspicious Python process execution that combines network socket creation with memory manipulation imports (ctypes/mmap) or shellcode-like hex byte strings in the command line. This behavior is indicative of in-memory exploit delivery or staging, often used by adversaries to execute malicious code without writing it to disk. The rule also looks for inline Python execution (-c) with similar indicators.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects PowerShell process executions that include the string 'bubble' in combination with string manipulation functions ('replace', 'split') or a campaign-specific function ('otidiform'). This pattern is indicative of attempts to deobfuscate PowerShell commands, often used by adversaries to hide malicious code.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
5 months ago
4018
This rule detects suspicious activity involving a high volume of file compression using common archiving tools like 7-Zip and WinRAR. Adversaries often compress data before exfiltration or for staging purposes to reduce size and potentially evade detection. A high count of compression events within a short timeframe (1 hour) by a single account could indicate malicious activity.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
5018
This rule detects the creation or modification of specific SharePoint policy pages DLL files (microsoft.office.policy.pages.dll) that are known to be vulnerable to CVE-2026-45454. The detection is based on matching the SHA256 hashes of these vulnerable DLL versions. This indicates the presence or manipulation of a vulnerable component within a SharePoint environment.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
5 months ago
9024
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