Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Box Shield Suspicious Location Access
Cortex XDR
Surfaces Box Shield suspicious location alerts with geographic context and accessed content details. Detects access from unusual or excluded geographic locations indicating potential compromised accounts or credential theft.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Correlates a device code flow sign-in event with bulk file downloads from SharePoint or OneDrive by the same user account within a 1-hour window. This behavior can indicate potential account compromise or misuse where an adversary uses device code phishing to authenticate and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive files.
Detects cmd.exe executing a ping-based delay to loopback followed by self-deletion of the batch script (%~f0), as well as bulk deletion of common archive and executable files, typically associated with malware droppers like RareWolf.
Detects the writing and subsequent loading of driver files signed by a specific certificate holder (Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology), utilizing DeviceFileCertificateInfo, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents.
Detects instances where inst.exe running from C:\ProgramData\Intel with specific command-line arguments (extensionless and key-like) subsequently writes files to the EFI system partition or boot paths on the same device.
Detects potential SafePay ransomware activity by correlating mass file encryption (.safepay extension) with the creation of potential ransom notes and subsequent self-deletion of the encrypting process.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects a behavioral sequence where a signed process loads an unsigned DLL from a user-writable path (DLL sideloading) followed shortly by outbound HTTPS network connections from the same process to legitimate cloud storage or API infrastructure.
Detects the staging of wmpdmc.exe and wmpdui.dll together within a ProgramData folder, as well as subsequent scheduled task creation or execution of wmpdmc.exe from ProgramData associated with the Yoba campaign.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects creation of a DLL inside a camera management software
installation directory under Program Files. The campaign dropped malicious DLLs
alongside the trusted vendor binary so that the signed camera client side-loads
them at startup, proxying execution through a legitimate vendor process
(T1574.002 / T1036.005).
installation directory under Program Files. The campaign dropped malicious DLLs
alongside the trusted vendor binary so that the signed camera client side-loads
them at startup, proxying execution through a legitimate vendor process
(T1574.002 / T1036.005).
Detects the creation of application-specific passwords followed by their initial use from unknown or new IP addresses using legacy authentication clients, which may indicate account compromise or persistence establishment.
Alerts whenever a default SAP administrative account (e.g., SAP*, DDIC, TMSADM) logs into the system. These accounts should be locked and used only for emergency 'break-glass' scenarios
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Browser sign-ins and MFA prompts with medium or high sign-in risk from devices that have no Entra device identity and are not managed or compliant. Hunting query, not an alert.
Detects non-interactive service principal sign-ins originating from an IP address and location never seen for that specific principal over a prior 30-day baseline period, approximating potential misuse of stolen cloud credentials exposed via environment variables.
Correlates a Webcam.dll image load with VM-detection commands (such as queries for VirtualBox, VMware, vbox, vmtoolsd, Win32_ComputerSystem, or Win32_BIOS) executed by the same RegSvcs.exe process, which is characteristic of XWorm malware behavior.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects Azure AD service principal sign-ins utilizing suspicious scripting-related user agents such as curl, python-requests, Wget, or Postman, which may indicate automated scripting, custom tooling, or potential abuse of cloud service accounts.
Detects a potential app-only tenant-takeover sequence associated with Storm-3119 (YAM Store), where a single service principal performs an administrative password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window.
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